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Chilean Conversations:
On-line forum participants discuss the detention of Augusto Pinochet

by Eliza Tanner
University of Wisconsin–Madison
tanner@onlineuw.org

Abstract

More than a thousand people participated in an on-line discussion of the October 1998 London detention of Chile's ex-dictator and actual senator-for-life Augusto Pinochet. This textual analysis of 1670 letters shows that participants in the Spanish-language forum of *La Tercera en Internet* created and interacted in a virtual space that was important to them. Forum participants saw this communication as essential to the Chilean reconciliation process and a way to strengthen civic life.

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Chilean Conversations:
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"Long live technology!'" wrote Cecilia Alejandra A. in an on-line forum.

> "For the first time, we Chileans have the opportunity to assist and participate in a true debate over the historic events that occurred in the country in the last 25 years. YES. THIS IS CATHARSIS." (#1182)

Cecilia and more than a thousand other people in forty countries were discussing the October 1998 detention of the Chilean ex-dictator and actual senator-for-life Augusto Pinochet in London. The forum is part of the on-line version of the Chilean newspaper *La Tercera* (www.tercera.cl), which publishes daily news and information in Spanish. For months after Pinochet's arrest, Chileans argued over the meanings of justice, reconciliation, forgiveness, truth, democracy, liberty, sovereignty, and human rights. They debated events since the 1960s, examined the more recent transition to democracy, reviewed 19th century history, and decried forms of colonialism. They criticized governments, public officials, and political parties; attacked opponents; shared personal experiences; proposed solutions to current social problems; and constructed visions of their country's future.

This paper is part of a larger study and is based on a textual analysis of 1670 letters sent to *La Tercera en Internet* between 16 October 1998 and 23 January 1999. The editorial staff provided me with electronic copies of the original, unedited email documents while I was doing a year of field research in Chile. Since the content of these letters is extremely rich, it is important to delineate the parameters of this paper. I am looking at the aspects relating to Internet communication and the functioning of an on-line forum. Following ideas from public sphere studies, I argue that this forum is an example of an independent space for public debate with the possibility of forming public opinion. Such on-line forums can play an important role in Chilean society, especially in the reconciliation process. In Chile, the possibilities for public debate on national or local issues is extremely limited; the on-line forum was one of the very few places where one could get a glimpse of "public opinion" or the opinions of common folk. It also allows for interaction between Chileans living inside and outside the country. The paper will proceed as follows: first I will provide a brief outline of events surrounding Pinochet's detention in London, emphasizing the perspective of the people living in Chile. Then I will explain how the on-line forum functions and look at the participants. Third, I will examine the types of communication, the interaction, and the virtual space created by *La Tercera* and the participants.

History

> "Let my General go you @#-%&$%"@#! English. And stop clowning around you resentful communists." (#790)

On 16 October 1998, the unthinkable happened: the aging Chilean retired general, ex-president, and actual senator-for-life Augusto Pinochet was arrested at the London Clinic. Scotland Yard, acting on an international arrest and capture warrant from Spain, detained Pinochet in the hospital where he was recovering from a hernia operation. The Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón and the Unión Progresista de Fiscales de España were pursuing legal action against Pinochet for genocide and terrorism in the deaths of Spanish citizens during the Chilean military regime.

No one in Chile imagined that such an event was possible, though the Spanish case was well-known at the time. It was assumed Pinochet's diplomatic immunity would protect him from the Spanish legal actions. The protests and celebrations began almost immediately. Anti-Pinochetistas and human rights supporters celebrated the event and called for constitutional reforms. The government formally protested the breach of diplomatic immunity. Pinochet supporters and parties of the Chilean Right organized protests in Santiago's upper-class neighborhoods and held violent demonstrations in front of the Spanish and British embassies. A prominent politician daringly drove his white Mercedes in front of the police water tanks during one such protest and a mayor stopped garbage collection at the Spanish embassy in his city.

Within days the country appeared to be polarized along the same Yes-No dividing lines that had resulted in the defeat of Pinochet in the October 1988 plebiscite. The decade-old divisions that had appeared to be nicely covered up, erased, and mended suddenly were just as pertinent and decisive. In fact, the wounds seemed to reach back to the 1973 coup or the 1970 election of Salvador Allende, depending on the group in question.

> The day after Pinochet's arrest, I received a short note from a family member in the United States:
>
> "CNN is reporting that Pinochet was arrested in London on Friday, on a Spanish warrant---that he killed Spaniards while in power. Chile is protesting stating that he has diplomatic immunity as quote unquote senator for life. Have you heard anything about this?"

Of course the irony is that for about two weeks after the arrest there was no other news in Chile. The local media painted a picture of a polarized nation. The evening television news would broadcast about 45 minutes of the Pinochet case, five minutes of commercials, and 10 minutes of soccer. Newspapers filled 90% of their news hole with news of Pinochet. The afternoon paper *La Hora* began running a permanent counter on the front page listing the number of days Pinochet had been arrested. All major newspapers, television stations, and radio stations supported the official government position, which called for Pinochet's release and return to Chile. The media coverage, of course, did not mean that nothing else was happening in Chile. Public school teachers were in the middle of a national, month-long strike; the economic crisis was deepening; and the drought of the century was taking its toll on agriculture and soon would be the excuse for several weeks of power outages.

On 28 October, the High Court in London accepted the appeal from Pinochet's lawyers and recognized his diplomatic immunity. This decision was immediately appealed to the House of Lords and the Chilean Air Force sent an airplane to England, ready to take Pinochet back to Chile when the House of Lords upheld the lower court's decision. After repeated complaints from family members of other patients in the exclusive London Clinic, Pinochet was moved to a public hospital, Groveland Priory Hospital, on the outskirts of London.

The Audiencia Nacional de España ruled on 30 October that Judge Garzón could continue to investigate the crimes committed in Chile and Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s as part of the Operation Condor. The Chilean government protested the decision, saying the Spanish government had no power to try crimes outside its borders. The government repeatedly insisted it was supporting principles of sovereignty, not defending a specific person, i.e. Pinochet. In one impassioned speech to the nation, President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle reminded citizens that many of the officials in the government had been exiled or tortured by the former military government; however, now they had to put the good of the nation above their personal interests. At the end of October, different groups in Chile held large demonstrations with 30,000 Pinochetistas gathered in the rich area of Santiago and about the same number celebrating the arrest in the large O'Higgins Park in Santiago.

Despite the political problems, the government paralysis, and the saturation media coverage, the country continued to work normally. Everyone had an opinion on the Pinochet case, but the political crisis did not really disrupt every day life. Much more disruptive were the power outages that began on 9 November and continued until the end of the month.

On Wednesday, 25 November at 11 a.m. local time, the five law lords in the House of Lords would hand down their decision on Pinochet's immunity. This decision coincided with Pinochet's 83rd birthday. In the days running up to the decision, all the media were running special teasers, reminding everyone to watch or listen to their exclusive coverage of events. The Pinochet case was seen as perhaps the biggest event since 1988 and the vote to end military rule. The day before the decision, the power companies decided to not turn off the electricity on Wednesday so everyone could watch the news.

Early that morning, all the television and news radio stations began their coverage; one station, Radio Cooperativa, announced every few minutes how much time was left until the decision. Schools, offices, groups, businesses, and universities brought in televisions and set up large-screen displays to watch the event. At the Pinochet Foundation, supporters of the ex-dictator had an 3-foot-tall cake, buffet, and cocktails all ready to celebrate his release. When the Law Lords recognized Pinochet's diplomatic immunity, he would be whisked out of the hospital to the airport and on a plane back to Chile. Anti-Pinochetistas and human rights groups were preparing their protests against Pinochet and the House of Lords in both London and Chile.

A few minutes after 11 a.m., the Chilean television stations received the House of Lords television signal and everyone watched the five law lords walk into the chamber. One by one, they briefly stood and read their prepared statements. The first two recognized Pinochet's diplomatic immunity. In the university Andrés Bello, students watching the proceedings began to keep score, as with a soccer match. The third and fourth lords did not recognize Pinochet's immunity. Suddenly the tension increased and the country seemed to hold its breath. The TVN reporter who was supposed to be translating was so flustered he could not translate the proceedings or even speak. The fifth lord stood and said he did not believe Pinochet had diplomatic immunity.

People sat in stunned silence. Many of the older generation, the people who had experienced some of the darker side of the military government, were shaking as they listened or watched the decision. To say people were surprised would be an understatement. They were completely shocked. Even though everyone knew this was a possibility, no one expected such a ruling. No one.

Then came the reactions. Pinochet supporters at the Pinochet Foundation erupted in rage and began to beat up the foreign reporters sent to cover the event. Other people went out into the streets to celebrate and were dispersed by the police with water tanks. Most went on with their business, slightly stunned, watching TV and listening to the radio. Even the anti-Pinochet people had mixed feelings about the decision, since they would much rather see Pinochet brought to justice in Chile and not by a foreign government. The government held a three-and-a-half hour security council meeting with the armed forces to decide on a course of action.

With the decision of the Law Lords, the news reports began to talk about the possibility of extended legal battles that might mean Pinochet would spend Christmas and New Year's in London. Pinochet and his family moved to an exclusive private mansion in Wentworth, Surrey, where he continued under police surveillance. Two weeks later on 9 December, British Interior Minister Jack Straw opened the way for the extradition process to Spain. That same week on 11 December, Pinochet appeared in a British court and refused to accept any jurisdiction that was not Chilean. "With all due respect I want to say that I do not recognize any tribunal that is not of my country that can judge me on these Spanish lies." That same day, Pinochet published an open letter to all Chileans, where he recounted his version of the 1973 military coup and government, his success in restoring Chile to a democracy, and his construction of a strong economic model: "Never have I desired the death of anyone and I feel sincere grief for all the Chileans who have lost their lives in these years," he said, adding that he is "absolutely innocent of all the crimes and acts with which I have irrationally been charged."

Pinochet's lawyers, now joined by the Chilean government, appealed the House of Lord's decision. The House of Lords accepted the appeal and on 17 December they voted to annul the previous decision and re-hear the case. The case opened on 18 January 1999, with a new set of law lords hearing the arguments before deciding if Pinochet has diplomatic immunity or not. The Chilean government began to more forcefully insist that Pinochet could be tried in Chilean courts for human rights abuses, while still arguing that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity from extradition. The law lords heard arguments from the various parties: Pinochet's defense, human rights groups, the Chilean government, and the Spanish government. They then entered a lengthy process of deliberation that coincided nicely with the Chilean summer month of February, thus allowing all Chilean politicians to take their vacation time. By March, the Law Lords appeared to be in no hurry to release their decision and the Chileans seemed to be getting used to the idea of the ex-dictator under arrest in England.

Finally on 24 March, the seven Law Lords handed down their decision. Ruling six to one they said Pinochet did not have diplomatic immunity as a former head of state; however he can only face charges on crimes committed after 1988, which is when the United Kingdom signed the international convention on torture. The stage was thus set for a lengthy legal battle over extradition that could last for months or even years.

Since November, it became more and more evident that the "political crisis" started by Pinochet's arrest really did not deeply affect most Chileans. The gap between the political ruling class and upper class versus the middle and lower classes continued to grow. This could be seen when various organizations began to do surveys and interviews in late November and early December. Depending on the survey or poll, at least 50 percent of the people did not identify with either the government or the opposition, nor with a specific political party. The vast majority listed the economic crisis as the most important issue in the country, though if one were to listen to the news and politicians, the major issue would have to be the Pinochet case. Despite

official proclamations to the contrary, the economic problems started by the Asian crisis continued to grow and deepen, with many people losing their jobs, especially in the poor sections of Santiago and Chile.

Perhaps reacting to this, politicians and political parties began to focus more on the upcoming 1999 presidential elections. The Pinochet case became yet another issue to be used in the political battles, with the Right capitalizing on Pinochet to unify the parties and attack and divide the government and socialist parties. Pragmatic socialists worked to secure Pinochet's release, saying that it would be impossible for their candidate to win if Pinochet was out of the country. In 1999, Chile was facing a difficult year, with more than half a million unemployed, a severe economic crisis said to be as bad as the 1982-83 recession, a continuing drought, a shortage of electricity, and various other social problems.

The on-line forum

"I want to thank La Tercera for giving a space for my opinion." (#486)

When the story first broke on a late Friday afternoon, the team at *La Tercera en Internet* began work on a special Web site for the event. Since 1997, the on-line publication had been experimenting with the new medium of electronic communication. One of the group's developments was a series of "special sections," which are Web sites within the larger on-line publication's Web site. Events of national or international importance were highlighted in these special sections through the use of hypertext, images, and audio files. Working around the clock, the journalistic team put together the site "Pinochet Case" that first weekend. Over the next few months, the site underwent several redesigns and name changes to reflect the latest developments. Besides detailing the latest news on Pinochet each day, the site contains an archive of all news articles since October, archives of important related documents and legal texts, hundreds of audio files, photos, cartoons, a link to a special historical Web site, and all the reader's comments to the on-line forum.

Earlier in 1998, *La Tercera en Internet* had experienced some policy changes relating to on-line discussions, which meant all reader comments were now supposed to be edited by a journalist before publication in the Web site. Even though it is possible to have submissions automatically posted to a Web site, the on-line forum for the Pinochet Case was set up with a simple email link. One click on the submission button opened the email function of the Web browser, allowing a participant to type his or her message and send it off to La Tercera. Journalist Fernando Cardoch then received the message in his email in-box. In the first few days after Pinochet's arrest, Cardoch's email box was flooded with hundreds of messages. Each message had to be extracted from the email file, edited for spelling and grammar, and converted to HTML for use in the Web site. Often accents and other special characters do not translate well across computer platforms, leading many Spanish-speakers to write without accents in their email letters. This compounds the editing problem for journalists. Editor Juan Carlos Camus insisted that *La Tercera en Internet* should publish all the letters, regardless of their political positions. At times the deluge of messages created a backlog as Cardoch and other journalists not only continued with all of their regular duties, but also attempted to edit and respond to the hundreds of email messages they received. By the end of the year, Cardoch was pleading with readers to try and limit the length of their comments. In March 1999, the print version of *La Tercera* began to publish letters from the on-line forums, including the Pinochet Case forum.

Forum participants

> "Thanks for opening this space so that the people can express themselves, excuse the spelling mistakes since I was four years old I've lived in Brazil." (#133)

Just who were these people participating in the on-line forum? The question is somewhat complex since we are dealing with a form of virtual communication. The first thing that must be acknowledged is that it is almost impossible to ascertain the identity of people over Internet. One of the most loved, and hated, features of Internet is its potential for anonymity and the ability for people to take on various persona. With these conditions, however, it is surprising the amount of information one can gather about the participants from email addresses, names and signatures, and textual clues. From reading the letters it soon became apparent that behind every opinion was a person with some reason for communicating those thoughts, whether or not the name was correct.

The people participating in the forum were not politicians, public officials, or well-known figures. Rather, they were students, professionals, and teachers. They were also military people, sons and daughters of Chilean exiles, and ex-political prisoners. Given the constraints to Internet access in Chile and globally, the participants generally were from the upper classes, used Internet at work, or were university students. Despite the restrictions, the breadth of the debate and the sheer volume of letters managed to touch on just about every possible position and theme in the Pinochet case.

The email addresses showed 26.5% of the letters originated on servers in Chile, 64.8% came from servers outside Chile, and 8.4% were Web-based addresses, whose servers are generally located outside Chile. With only less than one percent was I unable to identify the email address (4 letters) since the header information must have been suppressed or erased. The letters were sent from at least forty countries, with the largest group from Chile, followed by Canada, the United States, and Sweden, in that order. The other countries represented are mostly known to have large Chilean exile communities, such as Australia and Norway. There were 1065 unique addresses (64% of the letters analyzed), with 36% remainder written by someone who had previously sent in a letter. A glance at the people writing letters, shows that 23% of the forum participants wrote a second letter, 10% wrote at least three letters, and 6% wrote four or more letters.

Number of letters	People
1 letter	1065
2 letters	248
3 letters	110
4 letters	60
5 letters	44
6 letters	30
7 letters	22
8 letters	18
9 letters	15
10 letters	11
11 letters	6
12 letters	6
13 letters	4
14 letters	4
15 letters	4
16 letters	3
17 letters	3
18 letters	3
19 letters	3
20 letters	3
21 letters	3
22 letters	3
23 letters	1
24 letters	1

The most number of letters written by one person during this time period was 24, with two other authors submitting 22 letters. No one else came close to that number of submissions.

The nationality of the writers was relatively easily identified, mainly through textual analysis. About 33.6% were Chileans living in Chile, 37.5% were Chileans living outside Chile, 18.3% were Chileans probably living outside Chile, 7.9% were not Chilean living outside Chile, 0.4% were non-Chileans living in Chile, and 2.3% were not able to be identified. The obvious pattern that appears is that almost 90% of the forum participants are Chileans and the majority of those live outside Chile. This can reflect the lack of access to Internet in Chile since by then end of 1998, it was calculated that possibly 300,000 people had access to Internet, which is about 1% of the population. It is not surprising that most of the people are Chileans since *La Tercera* is a Chilean on-line publication, the forum is conducted in Spanish, and the topic is the most controversial figure in recent Chilean history. Almost all of the communication in the forum was in Spanish, though a handful of people submitted materials in Portuguese, Italian, French, and English.

My information on email addresses came from the email header or the person's signature. Email headers contain several common elements: from, to, subject, date. The "from" information is set up in a person's configuration for his browser or her email program. The "to" was always the address of *La Tercera*. Addresses in Chile generally end with .cl, though there are some such as entelchile.net that are based on the servers of the Chilean long-distance company Entel. The subject varied, depending on if people used the pre-set subject for the forum (Pinochet_detenido) or not. This often became a title for the person's email. The date usually lists the date and time the message was sent or generated. If a person has an incorrect date set on her computer, then the date will appear to be wrong. One participant wrote back to *La Tercera*,

> "The other thing that you could do is set your computer clock to the year 1998 since your mail to me was dated 1997." (#1258)

About 73% of the forum participants appeared to be men, with 14% appearing to be women, and 13% unable to identify in any way. To distinguish men from women, I looked first at the name and then at the text of the letter. Spanish names are almost always clearly either male or female. Textual clues also are obvious since the writers will use feminine or masculine endings on the words. For example,

> "As a Chilean [woman] living abroad and an assiduous reader of La Tercera Internet..." (#992)
>
> "I am a Chilean [woman]" (#1170)

The task became a bit more complex when I identified the nationality of the writer and his or her possible location. The easiest letters were those in which the email address and header information matched the signature at the end of the letter. Besides these elements, I looked for textual clues and self identification. Textual clues would be phrases such as

> "We Chileans are the ones that must call..." (#1338)
>
> "It is embarrassing that justice still hasn't been obtained in our own country" (#950)
>
> "his arbitrary detention is an insult to our country" (#1188)
>
> "Once again our dignity and sovereignty is trampled" (#1582)

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> "Until when will this continue to divide us? It is shocking how this person continues to divide the Chileans." (#1079)

Thus the use of words such as "our" or "we" demonstrates that the people writing the letter considers themselves Chilean, whether or not they live in Chile. This contrasts with the few non-Chileans who participated; they would not use "our" or "we," but referred to "the Chileans" or just Chile. Furthermore, people who live in Chile were much more "in tune" with Chilean current events and made references to radio programs, television shows, or specific events, such as an accident at an intersection in Santiago.

Chileans are sensitive to criticism from non-Chileans or other countries. For many, both supporters and critics of Pinochet, the Pinochet case was yet another example how foreigners do not understand Chilean history or current political and social problems. These ideas are important to understand the "self identification" of forum participants. Participants chose to identify themselves in a variety of ways. The most common was through a signature at the end of the letter. Many times the person seemed to sign his or her real name. At times, the person used a first initial and a last name, or a partial name. Since Chileans use both their father's and mother's surnames this provides some interesting possibilities for signatures. A woman in Chile, Ximena Andrea Barria Velásquez, signed her name Andrea Velásquez, using her middle name and her mother's surname. She most likely is known by her friends and co-workers as Ximena Barria or Andrea Barria (#1630). Mario Héctor Solis Soto signed his name Héctor Soto (#1029).

Another form of identification, though not very common, was the use of the Chilean national identification number (C.I. or RUT). Letters to the editor in Chilean print newspapers almost always carry the person's name and ID number. At times, the person will just use the ID number, which is seen as a way to preserve anonymity. The custom is based in Spanish legal traditions, where the number is used to prove the existence of that person, with or without a name. If a person provides the I.D. number, he is emphasizing that he really is who he says he is. The use of this number is now under debate since with computer networks in Chile, it is relatively easy to take the ID number and find credit histories, bank records, police records, and other information.

A third form of identification occurred when people specified in the text of their letter who they were. This especially became important with Chileans living outside Chile who almost always justified their participation in the debate. The following are examples of this from people who have email addresses outside Chile:

> "I as a Chilean" (#674)
>
> "As a Chilean" (#698)
>
> "As a Chilean attorney practicing in Spain, the decision did not surprise me in the least" (#769)

Often these identifications can be seen as part of the Chilean culture of speaking in codes. In other words, other Chileans will be able to read these identification statements and understand both why they are given and what they mean. Often the codes give specific clues to political and social positions. The following people identify themselves in various ways. The first is explaining that he is not in Chile because he is working on a graduate degree in the United States.

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> "From Boston, USA, I have learned from La Tercera en Internet about the detention of him who is universally called Dictator and Criminal, sought by the Spanish justice and many countries (including USA) ... graduate student in Boston, Massachusetts." (#1209)

This man is pointing out that he is Chilean, but living in the United States for business purposes, to distinguish himself from Chileans living in exile:

> "I am a Chilean proud of my roots and the history of my beautiful country, right now I run a company in the U.S.A. a company I was able to establish through a lot of effort." (#1293)

This following man is emphasizing that he is Chilean and that he went into exile during the military government. This will identify him as having a specific political position. It also shows the distinction between Chileans who returned to Chile at the end of the military government and those who did not.

> "A Chilean living in the United States since 1983 Oscar Horacio Gutiérrez San Martin RUT 4.553.890-7" (#643)

Another Chilean living outside Chile goes to great lengths to show he is an ardent Pinochet supporter, not to be confused with Chilean exiles who are celebrating the arrest of Pinochet. He also makes specific references to the transition to democracy and the current government.

> "Hi, I'm a Chilean and tocopillano [resident of a city in northern Chile] who has now lived outside Chile for almost 10 years and just like many rockheads that went into self-imposed exile with the coming of Pin8 to power (something that many true Chileans more than asked for, we begged) I also went into self-imposed exile with the arrival of the rainbow that promised to come in colors but only showed up in white and black." (#1218)

Non-Chileans had an even higher burden of proof to show they were qualified to talk about the topic:

> "I'm a North American [woman] and I have lived in Chile and I am married to a Chilean." (#1052)
>
> "An opinion from outside: I had the chance to live in Chile during the time of Mr. Allende, I am not a Chilean [woman], put I have a lot love for Chile and her people." (#1416)

Of course, some people did not sign their letters or only are identified by an email address. If the person wrote several letters to *La Tercera*, it became easier to identify him or her. It also was obvious when the person was using several different names, especially when all the names originated from the same email address and the writing style or position on Pinochet did not change. These people also tended to use their "real" name when they were corresponding with journalists at *La Tercera* and were not writing a letter for publication in the forum. At times, different people would use the same email address and a few even noted that they were using borrowed email addresses since they did not have access to a computer in their home or work.

> "Mr. Cardoch: I beg you not to give out the email [address], it was loaned to me since I don't have the luxury of having a computer." (#1186)

Some used another person's email without permission. In rare instances, the person would find out and send a note into *La Tercera* to set the record straight.

> "To whomever received a letter in my name, I would like to tell him that I do not know who it was that in such a criminal form sent information using my name. I apologize for this person's abuse. Speaking for myself, I have never sent such information." (#1493)

The purpose of all of the self identification is closely bound up in how other people, usually Chileans, would read and consider the opinions in the forum. Participants were quick to criticize participation by non-Chileans who were "ignorant" of Chilean history. Others would base their responses to letters both on the person—if he or she was an exile, or lived outside Chile, for example—as well as what that person said. Thus the identification became an integral part of the functioning of the forum.

The forum letters

> "DIVINE JUSTICe!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" (#1)

The submissions to the forum varied, with the length of the letters ranging from two words to more than 5200 words. Most of the letters were between 150 to 700 words, though it was not at all unusual for readers to submit letters of a thousand words or more. Cardoch's plea for shorter opinions is understandable when one looks at the length of some of these submissions. The shorter letters came in the first few days after a major event in the Pinochet case: the detention in October or the decision by the House of Lords in November. These letters were the people's first reaction to the news. As the case progressed and the weeks became months, people began to submit much longer essays, many of them well-thought-out and finely constructed. I identified five styles of letters in the on-line forum. These I will call commentaries, exclamations, site housekeeping, responses, and testimonials.

Commentaries, which were 45.5% of the submissions, are those letters in which the writer expresses his thoughts on the detention of Pinochet in London. Though many of these were written in October, forum participants continued to provide their opinions on this broad subject throughout the period studied. The following two examples are rather short general commentaries. The first one is written by a Pinochet supporter:

> "Justice is slow but it comes. Thanks to God that in this case it won't be very slow and the savior of Chile will soon return to his beloved homeland. I agree with the Marxists that General Pinochet must be judged, yes, he must be judged for having made Chile a great nation, for having overthrown international Marxism on the 11 of September of 1973 y today in his sick bed and for having given us a protected democracy with which we can defend ourselves from totalitarian and bloody doctrines (read that Communism, Marxism). GLORY BE TO THE LIBERATOR OF CHILE." (#262)

The second letter is an interesting contrast since it uses similar phrases and similar styles of capitalization, but is anti-Pinochet.

> "Justice is slow but it comes, I believe the attitude of the Chilean government is unacceptable the same people that supposedly fought against his government today defend him, the crimes against humanity should be cleared up and defending the diplomatic immunity of Pinochet is a mockery and excuse to hide the truth taking care of their political and partisan interests, in favor of a general who cruelly violated the dignity of our people. As a Chilean I support all actions against Pinochet and support the people who dare to judge the one guilty of so much death, torture and suffering. Carmen Gloria Quintana, Rodrigo Rojas, Rafael Moreno, the decapitated professors, be sure that wherever they are they will be happy. "FOR A JUST CHILE, YES TO JUSTICE."" (#298)

Exclamations (15.1% of the letters) are those letters that are short, often explosive, reactions to events. Some writers use all-caps as emphasis or textual shouts.

> "Long live free Chile. Long live Chile without communism. Long live Pinochet." (#152)

> "I am the happiest man in the world" (#1363)

> "The best news received in the entire world. Pinochet "DETAINED" JUSTICE FOR CHILE BEGINS NOW!!!!!" (#1220)

> "English, traitors" (#424)

Site housekeeping letters (6.8%) are those that were directed specifically to *La Tercera*. These were criticisms of the functioning or non-functioning of the forum; submissions of articles, cartoons, or photos for inclusion in the Web site; requests for specific information or document translations; bravos or thanks for the information provided; charges of censorship; and even apologies for misunderstandings and nasty letters sent earlier. One example of an appreciation note is as follows:

> "I give a lot of thanks to La Tercera for giving me the opportunity to inform myself each day over Internet now that I live in Denver Colorado en the US and feel the need to know about my country and La Tercera gives me the opportunity to do so, thanks" (#748)

Other notes offered corrections or clarifications:

> "After having congratulated you for the objectivity and precision with which you are covering the arrest of General Pinochet, I have to make a few corrections in your information under the title "Possible Solutions to the Conflict"." (#1303)

The criticisms for not publishing their opinions were quick to arrive at *La Tercera*:

> "Since yesterday we are viewing the same opinions on this page. Why do you ask the readers to participate if only a few [opinions] appear? Is it only a coincidence that the majority of the comments are from detractors? Where is La Tercera's pluralism? This isn't an incentive to continue visiting the page." (#1583)

> "... this is to say that you are selecting the opinions, it appears to me that from page 1 to 14 you give more support to the communists and exiles, who still live abroad (and do not think to return) including foreigners who did not experience one day [in Chile] between 1970-1973. Congratulations!" (#87)

> "Quite a long time ago I sent this message to the forum, and you have not published it. I would appreciate its publication." (#320)

Others were requesting information or submitting material for the Web site:

> "I would like to know if it is possible to have the information you gave over Internet about the 11 of September of 1973. I can't find the archives in http://www.latecera.cl/casos/. Many thanks." (#1010)

> "Together with thanking you for the publication of the cartoon I sent a few days ago, I want to say it appears to me that was a good idea of allowing people to collaborate on the Internet page by sending in more cartoons. Once again thanks and congratulations." (#1568)

As mentioned earlier, writers were also apologetic for misunderstandings or sympathetic to the journalists' work:

> "I received your mail, well it [the original submission] was written in a moment of emotion. Use it as you wish, if you don't, it doesn't matter. I congratulate you for your courage and seriousness." (#560)

> "I'm sorry that my email has caused problems. That was not my intention. I apologize." (#742)

The fourth type of letter was the *response letter*. Response letters (25.6% of the submissions) differed from the general commentaries in that they were directed at one person or an event that was not Pinochet's

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arrest. These were responses to other letters in the forum, which will be discussed in some detail later; responses to actions of politicians or public figures, and responses to specific events.

Responses to other letters usually included a statement about the forum and the participants; then the writer would direct his or her response to a specific person. At times, however, the writer would directly address a forum participant:

> "I have been very attentive to all the letters sent in and I have read each one with a lot of attention, in some there is a lot of hatred on both sides. I want to make a small contribution and focus the theme from a point of view that I believe no one has touched on." (#1367)
>
> "mr. arriagada, just one question" (#1443)

Other writers responded to politicians or public figures, usually through scathing criticisms of their actions or words or satire. The people most often to fall under the wrath of the forum participants were Chilean President Frei, the president of the Senate, Andrés Zaldívar, Chancellor José Miguel Insulza and the politicians of the Right Pablo Longueira, Iván Moreira, Cristián Labbé, Joaquín Lavín, and Evelyn Mathei. This does not mean that other people were not criticized. Throughout the months, every person associated with the Pinochet case was named and criticized or applauded. Even people not remotely connected with Chilean politics were brought into the debate, such as soccer stars, tennis players, and television actresses. The government or President Frei and the Christian Democrat Party, represented by Zaldívar, were often seen as betraying the Chileans by defending Pinochet:

> "It is disconcerting the agitation of the government in defense of the so-called "SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY" of Pinochet. President Frei along with ministers and also the opposition are working hard, spending resources and time, in the defense of "PRINCIPLES", as they repeat in every opportunity, and that in practice as has been demonstrated, translates in the defense of criminal actions of Pinochet during the period of his government, acts that are sufficiently impressive as to have him be detained." (#672)

A third type of response letter were the reactions to specific events other than the general Pinochet case. Each new development generated comments from forum participants, especially the November decision of the House of Lords. The selections from these two letters show some of the reactions to the November House of Lords ruling:

> "Today is a great day. Today truth wins out over lies. Justice wins over injustice. But, above all, today death is vanquished by life, and because of that, in the name of the lives of the more than 3000 compatriots who lost their lives because of the arbitrary decision of him who waits today for his imminent punishment, for those that have accompanied us invisibly during 25 years and have shouted, danced and cried, making their presence felt more strongly during this time, it is for them that today we celebrate. ....." (#1543)
>
> "I am terribly traumatized by the decision of the lords in England, it makes me want to cry, how is it possible that the rights of the chileans to do justice are mocked (if it should even be done, since for me, Pinochet is my hero) in our own homeland, and thus permit that there is the possibility that Pinochet be judged in Spain. Pinochet liberated us from communism, from many atrocities, and even though there were terrible things that happened during his government, still there are many who thank him for our LIBERATION from the chaos that existed in the country before the 11 of September. ..." (#1109)

Readers also responded to other events, television shows, and news reports. The issue of garbage collection at the embassies in Santiago generated quite a few responses and jokes, including the following:

> "I think it is great that Providencia follows the law of an Eye for an eye... if they keep our garbage there [in London], the mayor shouldn't collect the embassy's garbage... well, I hope that England doesn't become infected, hee hee hee hee hee..." (#991)

The open letter Pinochet sent off to the Chileans in December generated a number of answers and criticisms, both within and outside Chile:

> "I have carefully read the letter sent by mr. pinochet to his compatriots each one of the phrases expressed in this shows a type of cloning of ideas of the Chilean right." (#247)
>
> "After reading the letter of this man, I was left very confused and feel an internal conflict that torments me, it is that I can't believe how blind I have been all these years for not realizing that the "gentleman" was almost a saint, a hero, a being of incredible spirit and that all those acts were filled with goodness and motivated by a high purpose of patriotism and humanism....." (#1192)

Some of the responses were satire, others were detailed analyses of the contents of Pinochet's letter, and still others were general comments or repudiations.

The last type of letter I identified in the forum is the *testimonial*. Testimonials (7.0%) were perhaps the most distinctive since these were the letters in which the people shared their personal experiences, life histories, and memories. Here I will present selections from several examples, two from Pinochet supporters who remembered their experiences during Allende's Popular Unity government from 1970-1973, two brief identification testimonials, and two selections from people who suffered under Pinochet's military government. The first two letters are written by people who support Pinochet and recall the events before the 1973 military coup:

> "I still remember the 1,000 days of the poorly named popular unity, how can I forget the long lines to buy (bread, meat, cigarettes that my adult family members smoked, all the outrages my mother suffered while trying to get us something to eat, ..." (#723)
>
> "I join the supporters of Captain General Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte as he faces such a complicated situation in London. I congratulate President Frei for his dignified attitude in defending our sovereignty. I lament that the things are so complicated but I can't stop remembering the times "of the UP" [Popular Unity] and the long lines with my 11-month-old son at 10 at night to buy 1 kilo of meat from someone grateful to Pinochet" (#816)

Sometimes the testimonial came in the form of the writer's identification, as in the following two examples:

> "My name is Jose Miguel Enriquez Weinmann. I am the son of Edgardo Enriquez Espinosa, political prisoner who disappeared the 10th of April of 1976 in Buenos Aires as a result of the "Condor Operation" implemented from Chile by the then dictator and all-powerful Augusto Pinochet." (#295)
>
> "Receive a greeting from a Chilean who came of age, detained in the Chacabuco concentration camp, who was a direct witness of the events that marked that epoch so painful for our country." (#1602)

The last two examples detail the experiences of two men who were prisoners and then exiled under the military government. The first one is a selection from a much longer letter written by a Chilean now living in Canada:

> "It snowed last night, and the road to work this morning was a bit cold, with the Christmas lights and decorations in all the shop windows and hanging from the electric light posts. There are also lights on the trees along the avenues and on the trees in the parks. We were only waiting for the snow to come. I remember the last two Christmases I spent in Chile, the one in 1973 on the Island Quiriquina and the one in 1974 in the Chacabuco Concentration Camp. ..." (#1070)

The second author recalls his experiences as a prisoner right after the military coup. He is sharing this memory at the start of the new year 1999.

> "During the day we had to remain hunched over or face down in a patio surrounded by barbed wire, and watched by armed guards. At five in the afternoon, they shut us up in a narrow freight car; dozens of prisoners in the Reg. of Puente Alto (South Santiago): teachers, artists, workers, doctors.... One cold September night, Mario, a worker accused of hiding explosives, would be carted off for the third time for interrogation; (terrible punishment) —Professor, he said to me, take your blanket, I don't need it any more; tonight they are taking me to the Cerros de Chena, from which no one returns.... 23rd of September of 1973, a far-off radio announced: Pablo Neruda died. They killed him, I thought, like Victor Jara. In order to escape some of the sadness I tried to draw a peace dove with tears and pebbles. —What signs are these? Who are they for!! Three soldiers pointed their machine guns at me. It is an homage to the Poet, I replied. A military boot smashed my hand. For Victor, the singer of Chile; for Pablo the poet, whose heart broke from pain; for Mario, a working father, unjustly accused, for the mothers, sisters, and daughters of the 4000 disappeared, murdered, tortured... I don't want friends who forget that person who one day insisted: "I do not repent and I would do it all again!" and so mocked Human Rights... For the 7,000 prisoners, we who were in the National Stadium and never shouted "goal", let me celebrate this "CHILEAN GOAL" of the English. Lic. Adrián Cerda S. C.I. 10.202.804-Vzla Isla Margarita, Venezuela , January 1999.-" (#1511)

These five different types of letters—commentaries, exclamations, site housekeeping, responses, and testimonials—demonstrate the variety of communication in the on-line forum. Some letters combined elements of several types, such as a general commentary that also criticized the government and offered suggestions for facilitating *La Tercera* forum. Some of the most complex letters, however, were those that revealed the interaction among forum participants.

The interaction

> "If anyone wants to debate this theme, but in a civilized form, you are welcome to do so" (#1153)

One of the interesting developments in the forum was the interaction among participants, the interaction between participants and *La Tercera*, and the contacts among participants outside the forum. Seven percent of all letters were responses to previous comments by forum participants. I will indicate some major trends and provide examples. About one third of these letters began their submission with a statement about the forum:

> "Having read an important number of letters sent to your publication, it is more than clear that there is a profound division among the inhabitants of our Chile..." (#766)

Then they went on to discuss some of the themes or ideas that were discussed by other writers.

> "Contrary to the opinions of the series of people who have expressed themselves here..." (#978)
>
> "Isn't it a bit much to compare Pinochet with O'Higgins? I believe the debate just sank to levels that limit on the absurd (Moreover, it is a lack of respect to the memory of O'Higgins)." (#1556)

The other letters responded specifically to a writer, usually addressing their comments to that person. Of all the letters, only three people wrote into the forum to say they agreed with another author. One such person, self-defined communist, complimented a person who defined himself as belonging to the Right.

> "I want to highlight the comments of Mr. José Tomás Irrarazabal, it is this class of opinions that are lacking from the right. I am a communist and I would like to sit down at a table to debate with this man, in an atmosphere of mutual respect, objectivity, and ethics" (#892)

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The rest of the people wrote in to criticize other participants or to "clarify" that person's incorrect historical interpretations. In some cases, the person attacked would then respond to the forum to defend his or her position. At that point, however, the debate usually degenerated into name calling and insults.

One series of interactions began when one person (#206) wrote a general comment about the forum on 16 December 1998:

> "I don't understand why there are so many poorly informed people in this forum who accuse Senator Pinochet of having been the greatest traitor in Chile or a Hitler for having overthrown Mr. Allende." (#206)

The next day another participant responded to that letter, calling the person by name:

> "Do you know, Mr. Barriga I can't believe that your mind is filled with so much filth and ignorance, because of this I want to clear up something that you have forgotten" (#1378)

Three days later, a participant commented on the writer of letter #1378, also calling him by his signed name, Richard.

> "Just like I said in another opportunity, the pigs can't express opinions over the stars, it is the same with this Richard who appears every so often and like Mr. Urenda says, he probably is on some list of the "disappeared"." (#43)

Unlike this type of interchange, most letters generated only one response. However some of the more controversial letters inspired a number of replies and were referenced for weeks afterward. One such letter on 11 December 1998 attacked Sola Sierra, the president of the Association of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared.

> "I'm going to Humbly Contribute. Mrs. ? Sola Sierra and all the relatives, Socialists, Communists, etc.: If you want to know where your disappeared husband is along with all the other UNPATRIOTIC PEOPLE.........I'm going to collect a large package of dog bones and send them to you, because between a dog and your husband there shouldn't be much difference. I will give you the same bones that you gave us during the UP government with your awful and cowardly president Salvador Allende, when you had to wait in unending lines to get food, if you didn't belong to the JAP............Is this a democratic form of government? You Sola Sierra should call yourself "whore Sierra".......and perhaps your dog husband is alive and in Cuba, Why don't you go look for him there?.........I was in Cuba and it is a complete mess.....very similar to the UP times. General Pinochet has given you the liberty to speak, show respect for him.....filthy woman, just like all you Socialists. LONG LIVE CHILE........AND LONG LIVE PINOCHET" (#550)

Understandably, several readers responded with outrage in the next few days:

> "The "beasts" of which Pinochet's son speaks and the "dogs" that Mr. German Z.S. mentions on page 38 of this forum are clear examples of the mentality of the Right of our country. How is it possible that there are individuals so closed minded and ignorant in Chile? It is horrible, fascist, scandalous, and moreover it upsets and enrages [us] to see how the people on the Right believe they have the right to insult whomever they choose and use verbal terrorism.
>
> —Misters Pinochet Jr. and German Z.S., please keep quiet from now on and take a vacation in a psychiatric center. —Mrs. Sola Sierra: please (seriously) present a criminal lawsuit against German Z.S. His personal information can be obtained in "ctcreuna." —To the people at ctcreuna: the user "germanzs" has infringed on the legal norms established by Internet providers in his use of the service to send messages that call for hatred and

> violence. Please take the corresponding measures so that his user learns how to live in society in a civilized form. Thanks. Pablo Garrido." (#542)

A few days after that response, another author wrote:

> "A small rectification with respect to the "package of dog bones," that you so elegantly sent as an answer. I don't know if you understood Mrs. Sierra's petition, she is asking where the remains of her husband are, not your mother. Greetings Guillermo Gonzales (an international stateless person)" (#870)

The original author continued to participate in the forum and on 3 January 1999 he began a letter, identifying himself by the controversy.

> "Hi, I'm the "dog bones" guy Surely none of these Humanoids will remember, what really was the government of Salvador Allende and all his entourage of opportunists. ..." (#552)

The controversy was not forgotten when later that month another author began his letter with references to several previous submissions:

> "I haven't been able to find the information in your pages about the letter of reply by Chilean writers to the missive of the London swine. Couldn't you post the letter in Internet? One of the better ones, don't you think? I am sure that such a letter will refresh us all and will help us get over the pestilence of the sanctimonious interventions of those who are praying to Saint Rita, or the garbage of the dog bones person or the arrogant, uneducated Luisito who criticizes a participant's English." (#1022)

As with this letter, several other documents generated the same type of controversy and were long-remembered and discussed by the forum participants.

The second type of interaction was the dialog some readers had with journalists at *La Tercera*, or with the newspaper in general. Some of this dialog was generated when Cardoch wrote back to the participants, asking them to shorten their letters or soften their insults before he would post the documents on the Web site. The participants were usually polite unless they were grouching about censorship or were upset when their letters were not quickly posted on the forum. In fact, the civilized nature of these comments sometimes contrasted sharply with the insults or attacks in the actual forum letters. In one such letter, Cardoch suggested the following and received a response from the author:

> >-----Original Message-----
> >Hi Rodrigo:
> >In order to publish your collaboration, I recommend that you send it to us again but written in lower case and with about 700 characters less. Also I recommend that you soften the part about the "bastard jerk" so that they don't censor us.
> Regards.
>
> "THANKS FOR YOUR ANSWER. BECAUSE OF TIME CONSTRAINTS AND THE INABILITY TO WRITE IN LOWER-CASE, IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO FIX IT. I AUTHORIZE YOU TO CUT AND EDIT WHAT I SENT YOU. I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE MORE OPTIONS THAN I TO DO THIS. I HOPE THAT YOU PUBLISH MY THOUGHT IN SOME FORM. THANKS. BEST WISHES." (#1408)

Another author wrote to Cardoch to explain that there had been a mistake in posting his letter on the forum.

> "Unfortunately I can't solve your problems of too much mail, but I can tell you that I didn't write the mail "Relax, General." I only wrote the part if you read carefully "RE: Relax, General" which is an answer to the person who wrote the original mail. ..." (#1258)

These and other examples indicate that some forum participants were more closely interacting with the journalists than might be expected at first. Some participants sent Christmas greetings to the journalists or carried on more extended conversations or debates. The access to journalists and media workers could be an important factor in how readers perceive an on-line publication, or if they become a dedicated readership.

The third type of interaction is much more difficult to track since it concerns the contact among participants outside the forum. However, the people would mention this contact, showing that it was taking place. People would see the email addresses of participants on the forum and send letters directly to that person. In some cases, they would send a copy of their letter to the forum as well, or the recipient would reply and send a copy of the reply to the forum. It would not be uncommon to read comments such as the following:

> "I am saddened to read some of these "OPINIONS," .... in one email that I read from AMERICA (one of the many Chileans [woman] abroad) I found a real OPINION, not one that has to please everyone, but I and others liked it, to which I responded, showing my approval and sending my thoughts. As a pleasant surprise I received a reply from her, but it made me sad to read some of her first words "I sincerely thank you for your letter, I agree wholeheartedly with you...I will tell you that because of this message I sent many resentful people have written rude and insulting messages, wishing me bad luck and all sorts of things" It is sad to look around me and see that even though we have so much technology today, we haven't been able to grow spiritually or morally." (#32)
>
> "I am very angry and upset with your Publication, which I read every day, I am one of the many [women] who likes to send in my comments to the different forums, ... I don't like sending messages that disagree with people, I only read and laugh, and give my point of view in the forums and now they have my email, which is filled every day with those communists or socialists with rude [messages], I know that is the only thing they can do. ... Sincerely" (#707)

Others were more brief, but also commented on the number of negative responses they had personally received:

> "I want to take advantage of this occasion to respond to some of the email I have received in the which I have been accused of being anti-Semitic." (#82)
>
> "It is impressive the answer I have received to my previous opinion, unfortunately I have received many anonymous mails" (#832)

A few people encouraged or solicited email contact, but usually with the caveat that it be "civilized."

> "Answers and commentaries are openly accepted only and when the cordiality that characterizes a true democracy is maintained" (#278)
>
> "long live chile!.. long live pinochet!.., let's bring back our liberator and show our loyalty. If you think as I do, send me an email with your address, if you are a lackey of marx, as well, not anonymous....bye" (#80)

Some requested email information if it was not readily available so they could contact a specific person.

> "I know that don Augusto, over there in London, is typing in internet. I would like to send him a few words to express my admiration for his great work and for being a tremendous Chilean and soldier." (#339)

To make things more complex, readers also were interacting with other people in newsgroups or in other on-line publications and then sending the results of these discussions to *La Tercera* forum. At times they would

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pick up conversations from these other media and shift them to *La Tercera*. In this case, the writer refers to a Spanish publication.

> "After reading your answers in El Pais, I congratulate you, because I see that there are people in Chile with fire in their belly. You are true Chileans, and in your letters it is evident that it hurts you, not that Pinochet would be judged, but that this puts in doubt that he can be judged in Chile." (#309)

These various forms of interaction show that the forum is a dynamic form of communication, though not without its defaults. At least some readers are quick to take advantage of the new communication technology to contact other people, to share their ideas and comments. They seem to be building invisible networks, with *La Tercera* forum being a small window on a more complex process.

The virtual space created by *La Tercera* and the participants

"thanks for the space" (#814)

Through the interaction and discussion, the forum participants and *La Tercera* created a virtual space to debate issues of national importance. In their letters they talked about this space and commented on the value it held for them or the role it played in their lives. Readers pointed out the importance they saw in communication and its role in the Chilean transition, as well as the possibilities that this communicative form could have the future of their country. The forum's value is evident in the demands for access to the medium and the charges of censorship.

It was very important to the forum participants that their ideas were published and not censored or changed. The least delay in publishing their opinions on the Web site brought complaints of censorship.

> "To La Tercera Paper, I ask you to maintain this standard of impartiality and transparency, in order that many people can form their own opinions, instruct, and inform the public in this manner, this is ethical. (#1129)
>
> "I want to know why my opinion from the 21st was not published. I appreciate it [your response], please inform me about this. To know about the impartiality of journalism in Chile. Greetings" (#1166)
>
> "I keep sending opinions and ... nothing." (#951)

One participant pointed out that Internet was different from other media in that there are no physical space constraints such as in a newspaper or time on television. He thus disputed the reasons *La Tercera* gave for the backlog in publishing letters.

> "Before participating in this debate, they explain to you that one of the reasons for not publishing all the opinions is the large number of emails received. It appears to me that you are filtering [the messages[, remember that Internet has an unlimited capacity and it is possible to perfectly reproduce the opinions directly, and by what is evident your are giving away most of the platform to personages that aren't even Chilean, they are something like the perfect mix of those who are bitter and should be exiled for life." (#607)

Of course, the first reaction was that if a letter was not published, it must be because of the content. This made the readers very indignant and they demanded access to the medium.

> "I see that the censorship that is being applied to the commentaries is quite strict. You say that it is because of the great number of commentaries that makes it impossible to publish all of them, but I don't see that you are putting new ones up. Please give space to the new commentaries you are receiving, in order to have access to this medium." (#826)

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> "Mr. Director give space for real communication, don't censor, it is apparent that justice is slow but it comes, I hope that you don't suffer the same for your self censorship." (#1587)
>
> "For the second time I send in my opinion, I hope that this time you don't censor me!" (#675)
>
> ">I'm sending this e-mail in for the second time. Are you selecting the letters to publish? Do you have to be from the left or the right to be considered?" (#469)

Over the months they continued to insist that their ideas be published, as wrote the following participants:

> "Despite having sent in my opinion about this topic several times, I still have not seen it published. At last I understand that the immense number of missives could be the cause of this. Once again I insist." (#1217)
>
> "Mr. Director I consider it unjust the attitude of your publication, to the which I have send 2 emails and [illegible]ey have not been published. A permanent reader from Mexico...very angry." (#933)
>
> "Mr. Director, earlier I have commented on the value of your Paper to maintain an international page, but I am sorry that for the second time, my opinion does not appear published... The topic of Mr. Pinochet's arrest is of high interest to the Chilean and international community, and so I insist with faith in your professionalism and I ask respectfully that you publish my opinion sent much earlier...let me send a copy of it. Thankfully..." (#1393)

In most of the cases, the journalists responded to the charges of censorship by sending a note back to the participant, explaining what happened or how the newspaper functions. In one such response to an angry writer, Cardoch recounts some of the problems the journalists were facing:

> "Censorship exactly such, doesn't exist, except in cases of a message overly obscene. Looking at the opinion pages, you can prove that the whole spectrum is represented. What does happen is that sometimes the e-mails are mislaid and don't get published. It appears that this is what happened in the mail where you ask about who pays for the expenses of the [Senator-for-life]. Since your question is still relevant, I combined it with your opinion about the national anthem and I will publish it now. With respect to the other mail, where among other things your refer to the "distinguished" Mrs. Maldonado, the truth is that this night I was totally saturated editing mails with thousands and thousands of letters written without accents and with millions of errors, so it came to a point where it wasn't possible to continue and we made the decision to limit the size of the messages. In the middle of all this chaos, your mail must have been misplaced. If you still consider the comments timely, I recommend that you summarize it [the letter] and send it again so it can be published." (#482)

The issue of censorship and access to the media was perhaps such a sensitive topic for a variety of reasons. First would be the reaction against the censorship and self-censorship during the military government. Since the end of military rule in 1990, censorship is seen as even more incongruent with the goals of a democratic government. Writers contrasted the ability they now have with the forum to analyze the history, to create spaces for different opinions in Chile.

> "Chile today, this feeling appears incomprehensible or perhaps worse these words do not express this feeling. But what I hope to do with these lines is only say that it makes me happy that now there is space in Chile to analyze the terrible years with a lack of freedom of expression, silent genocide and the demolishment of all the cultural structure of which we were so proud. ..." (#890)

A second reason would be the idea that of all the communication media, Internet cannot or should not be censored. The freedom of communication this medium offers was attractive to forum participants.

> "...all of the important problems and the true democratization of Chile, which still hasn't happened, are covered up with the tiring subject of the dictator.
> "Finally, get rid of this Clinton garbage, if you don't I won't visit your Web any more... (this isn't a threat). Don't be upset friends. Is there freedom of expression in Chile, or not? At least in Internet..." (#301)

A third reason is that the participants are reacting to the dearth of public spaces in Chile or spaces where Chileans around the world can interact. Access to the Chilean media, even through letters to the editor, is very restricted. Some radio stations offer a bit more access through call-in shows, though many of those shows don't deal with "political" or current events topics. Some of the very few ways people can communicate is through informal small group gatherings, demonstrations, or alternative forms such as graffiti. These types of communication are very localized and thus would not include Chileans or people in other parts of the world. Thus, when the writers found a space that allowed expression, the threat of censorship generated the previously mentioned responses.

Forum participants discussed the value of the space in three different ways. It was a space to express individual feelings, a space to hear previously "unheard" voices, and a space essential to the Chilean reconciliation process and civic life in general. I will now briefly discuss these three issues and provide some examples.

Submissions often began or ended with a phrase that thanked *La Tercera* for the opportunity to express themselves.

> "Pinochet in jail, or detained or retained, it doesn't matter. It is marvelous! Now I know that there is some hope in this world. (I don't know if you have to identify yourself, but I believe my identity is my own email [address].)(Thanks for the opportunity to pour my heart out." (#290)

> "THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY OPINION./ AN EX-POLITICAL PRISONER" (#1211)

> "Thanks for allowing me to give my humble opinion." (#1338)

> "First of all, congratulations to this publication for its excellent coverage of all the news it presents and I ask that you publish this small reflection." (#1413)

> "We are thankful for the opportunity that the paper "La Tercera" gives us to express our happiness and satisfaction over the historic events we are witnessing." (#1273)

At times it became obvious that it was the act of writing the letter and sending it off to *La Tercera* that was more important than the actual publication. This can be seen in the following submission. The author maintains a very polite tone in his note to *La Tercera*, which contrasts sharply with the anger towards the Spanish in the actual forum letter.

> ">Mr. Director,
> >I'm sure that you will never publish this letter, but just as well I'm sending it to vent my anger; in any case I'm grateful to you for the opportunity.
> >Spanish friends,
> >Don't come to Chile any more.
> >Don't come as tourists, or as investors or as businessmen from telephone, drinking water, electricity or road companies; or even less as arms merchants; not even as immigrants escaping your own civil wars.
> >Just don't come.
> >You are not now welcome in this country.

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> >Juan Vadell Gana
> >RUT 3.673.523-6" (#779)

As seen throughout the submissions, perhaps one of the most important aspects of the forum for participants was the value of self expression.

The second way in which the forum was valuable was because it provided a way for previously "unheard" voices to be heard. It brought together people who probably would not be interacting in other aspects of their lives. As part of this, it allowed Chileans living outside Chile to maintain contact with their country and other people. The following participants showed their appreciation for the space in which common people could express themselves:

> "Well, this has been my humble commentary, thanks for the opportunity to reveal the opinions of the people, I'm only a 19-year-old young man and I hope that this commentary serves for something." (#934)

> "I hope that my commentary serves to show you that those of us who don't have a voice, nor means to reveal our opinion we think that pinochet should be judged. AT LEAST I BELIEVE THAT MORE THAN 70% OF THE COUNTRY THINKS SO." (#1439)

Internet also offers people who otherwise are formally restricted from sharing their opinions an opportunity to express their views.

> "I am a current member of the Chilean Carabineros [national police force], obviously I will not give my name because you know what happens to us if we say what we think. I'm thankful for Internet which allows you to express yourself just like the rest of the people our real situation." (#830)

The forum and the on-line publication was especially important for Chileans living outside of Chile, since it allowed them to keep in contact with local events and people. The information was useful for them, kept them informed of events important in Chile, and allowed them to maintain contact with people.

> "Lastly, let me congratulate you for the good and complete way in which you do your journalism over Internet, since the information is complete, and very lively; because of which, for those Chileans who find ourselves abroad, is very useful." (#769)

> "Congratulations and thanks to La Tercera for the excellent coverage it offers across Internet and for keeping in touch with Chile." (#1120)

> "First of all I want to tell you that we Chileans who are living abroad, by Internet we have contact with our Beautiful Country and our people." (#558)

This information from *La Tercera* was used in different ways, though usually for discussions, as indicates this writer:

> "—Through CNN and the publication La Tercera we have informed ourselves of what is happening with Chile's ex-dictator. Together with other Chileans we have debated the case..." (#180)

Before about 1994 and the growing use of Internet, it was much more difficult to obtain news of Chile if you lived outside the country. Sometimes you could obtain copies of old Chilean newspapers or follow events through phone calls and letters. However, mostly people had to rely on foreign news coverage, which does not provide the same type of coverage or depth that is possible with local media.

A third value of the forum was in its potential to help the Chilean reconciliation process and strengthen civic life. This was discussed in a variety of ways by forum participants. Some writers saw freedom of expression as a fundamental liberty.

> "Only long live Chile and long live freedom of expression!!!!" (#30)
>
> "Congratulations for the freedom to voice opinions over an historic event." (#392)

One participant spoke of his right as a citizen to express or publish his opinion.

> "I'm going to take advantage of this excellent virtual forum to exercise my right as a citizen to express my opinion over the famous letter of general Pinochet." (#543)

This right, though, was not viewed as absolute; rather it was important to most forum participants that the discussion be civilized or polite. When a variety of viewpoints were presented, readers would then be able to formulate their own conclusions.

> "Fernando Cardoch, I ask you to have the goodness to publish the letters sent with the date 21 of December of 1998 over "The Globetrotters" and "In Search of Resources" the truth is that I have tried to synthesize but it loses the essence of what I'm trying to communicate the idea is that each of the readers of this medium form his own conclusions from the things expressed here." (#250)

Participants emphasized the importance of communication, especially when dealing with the topic of Pinochet and the legacy of the military government. The ability to debate history, human rights, democracy, and other topics was seen as essential to the reconciliation process in Chile.

> "Does a better system exist where the people can openly write or talk without repercussions or fear? Thanks to God that Chile has been able to debate the problem of Pinochet. His punishment or freedom is not as important as the opportunity to openly debate the topic. Congratulations!" (#1449)
>
> "Imagine that you have a wound, a deep wound, pain in your body, in your soul, everywhere. Imagine that the only thing you want to do is cry, shout, protest, because you feel that what happened was infinitely unjust. Imagine that you can't do it and while other laugh, celebrate, laugh and celebrate over and over, you have to be quiet, not cry or cry quietly, not talk, not talk. And suddenly a loved one disappears; you suspect what has happened to him, but it is dangerous to even ask, they say that, they talk in half whispers, fear, rumors, danger, death, everything is dangerous. And if they had let me cry out loud, protest, debate, dissent, criticize, think differently? My God, how much hatred would have been avoided!" (#1186)

Not only could some of the problems possible have been avoided, the experience of the forum debate was seen as enriching the civic and social fabric in Chile.

> "Mr. director: I'm sorry that in your publication and in this forum censorship is applied. Let's grow up. Let's be free. Let's be capable of talking without having our emotions dominating our reason. We need to grow civically and this means being able to tolerate one another as people who think differently but who have this right." (#836)

One reader drew comfort from the forum, stating that the liberty of expression is fundamental in the reconciliation process.

> "After having criticized the impartiality of La Tercera, I'm obligated to praise this site ("the English patient"), the most democratic of the moment, since it reflects the opinions, without censorship, of Chileans and foreigners. Even though it is disconcerting to know the ignorance, insecurity and insensibility of some; such as those who want to censor the audio files (another bad habit from those that, yes, were traitors to sovereignty). It is, however, refreshing to know that, despite everything, there are in this page, beautiful and sometimes

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> terrible testimonies of those who have faith in reconciliation. Because liberty and justice will make a free of the hate and hypocrisy, an embrace to women and men without distinction." (#130)

Another wrote in to say that the forum was an example of democratic communication, an ideal that plays an important role for Chileans as they construct their future through reconciliation with the past.

> "In these days so special for all of humanity, in which bitterness gives way to the always eternal reconciliations products of conflicts that are difficult to leave behind, we have followed this story hoped for by many and also feared by some others. But besides the debate that was produced, [we] must rescue and value attitudes and consequences, it is not possible to negate the impartiality of this medium to publish those opinions even publishing those that were overly critical of its own interests. I believe that this publication in this space begins to apply the democracy in regards to the liberty of opinion and because of this I want to congratulate this medium, you have fulfilled a mission that we know is not easy, ... it is necessary to analyze what has happened, an analysis that allows us to look to the future with optimism, opening the channels of forgiveness and reconciliation, to dry one's tears, look ahead, and proudly say, "Our dead can rest in peace" the past is left behind, it is time to go on." (#1467)

Forum participants thus valued the space since it allowed them a way to vent or express their feelings, it provided a way for people to interact and communicate when they usually would not have this opportunity, and it had to possibility to help in the reconciliation process. The overall importance was emphasized by the demands for access and the charges of censorship when *La Tercera* delayed publishing the submissions.

Conclusions

In this paper I briefly reviewed the events surrounding the arrest of Pinochet and the structure of an on-line forum dedicated to this theme. Almost all the forum participants were Chileans, scattered around the world, but brought together to discuss a topic important in their personal lives and the history of their country. I found that the letter styles fit five different categories, which I called commentaries, exclamations, site housekeeping, responses, and testimonials. Since this paper was focusing on the forum itself, some of the most interesting letters were the responses because these illustrated interaction among participants.

Three types of interaction evident in the forum were the reactions or responses among participants, the dialog between the readers and *La Tercera*, and the indications of contacts among participants outside the forum. The responses to previous forum submissions demonstrates that at least some of the participants are reading the letters and are willing to send in their comments. Some readers also managed to establish a more personal relationship with the on-line publication and its staff as the readers sent in material for the Web site, criticized, and apologized. The forum also provided a brief glimpse of larger interactions and communication networks when participants mentioned email contacts and other media.

La Tercera and the forum participants created a virtual space that was important to the people who were reading and submitting letters. In this space they were able to express their personal feelings. The space differed from other media in that it allowed contact among Chileans around the world. It also allowed people who were not famous, nor politicians or public figures, a chance to contribute to the debate about Pinochet in some way. An important theme that emerged was that forum participants saw this communication as essential to the Chilean reconciliation process and a way to strengthen civic life. A key to the success of the forum seems to be its location: it is embedded in an active news site that provides spaces for readers to debate and suggest solutions to current social problems.

The public sphere concept allows people to identify social conditions that would allow argument or "rational-critical debate" to become basis for political action and thus democracy.[1] In other words, the public sphere tries to explain the social foundations of democracy by looking at the specific organization within civil society of social and cultural bases that can develop an effective rational-critical discourse aimed at resolving political disputes. The strength of the idea might be in that "it identifies and stresses the importance for democratic politics of a sphere distinct from the economy and the State."[2] James Curran writes that through the public sphere, citizens exercise formal and informal control over the state: "formal control through the election of governments and informal control through the pressure of public opinion. The media are central to this process. They distribute the information necessary for citizens to make an informed choice at election time: they facilitate the formation of public opinion by providing an independent forum of debate: and they enable the people to shape the conduct of government by articulating their views."[3] The forum on Pinochet can be seen as an example of "independent debate" with the purpose of addressing current political topics.

An important part of public sphere studies, pointed out by Habermas and many of the critics, are the challenges or constraints to the public sphere. The *La Tercera* forum faces some specific challenges, one of which is limited access to the technology in Chile. As mentioned earlier, about 1% of the people in Chile have access to Internet. On-line forums could have interesting implications in Chile if access to Internet were expanded dramatically. Chilean government, academics, and the private business sector are all aware of the access issues to new communication technologies. The first major proposal in the 1999 report of the Presidential Commission on New Information and Communication Technologies was to secure universal access to Internet and other new media for Chilean citizens. The recommendation was to ensure "equal, universal access at *a reasonable cost*, promoting participation in the political, social, and cultural life of the nation."[4]

Related to access issues is a second challenge for the on-line forum. This difficulty would be to transfer the on-line debates into the larger political discussions in the country. One way *La Tercera* is addressing this problem is its publication of on-line comments in the print version of the paper.

A third challenge would be the quality of the debate. As illustrated by some submissions to the Pinochet case forum, the discussion has the potential to degenerate into name-calling and insults. The participants, however, seemed to police the quality of the submissions themselves, calling for a more "civilized" debate on the important issues. Despite the many problems and constraints on the forum communication Cecilia Alejandra maintained a positive view:

> "At first I read everything; now, some opinions here and there I skip, because I have now identified the common ground and the set phrases.
>
> From this perspective, all of this will help the country. Let's grab each other's hair, brothers, and throw the plates at each other. "Let it out, let it out!" as you can, as you wish, but take out the rottenness from your heart, get this venom out that has been locked up for so much time... And then we will rest, then we will be calm, and perhaps, sometime, someday, we can converse seriously and in peace. Of course, brother, always and when the "fathers of the homeland" don't impose their cowardly force and leave us as enemies, until when?" (#1182)

Many Chileans in the forum expressed a desire to move beyond the legacy of the military years and construct a better country and future for themselves and their families. They saw any small advance, such as the opportunity to debate and communicate, as at least a step in the right direction.

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Primary Sources

The textual analysis was based on 1670 letters sent to the Pinochet case on-line forum of *La Tercera en Internet* between 16 October 1998 and 23 January 1999. In the text the letters are refered to by number. The numbering system is from a database and does not necessarily reflect the order in which the letters were received by *La Tercera*. The letters are available in the original Spanish on the web site at www.tercera.cl. In the translations I attempted to stay as close to the original punctuation and capitalization as possible.

Other primary news sources consulted since October 1998 and the present include the following:

BBC and BBC online (www.bbc.co.uk)
CNN and CNN en español (cnnenespanol.com)
El Mercurio and *El Mercurio on-line* (www.elmercurio.cl)
La Hora
La Segunda
La Tercera and *La Tercera en Internet* (www.tercera.cl)
Las Últimas Noticias
Radio Cooperativa
Televisión Nacional (TVN)
Universidad Católica Televisión (UCTV)

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[1] See discussion in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).

[2] Nicholas Garnham, *Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economy of Information* (London and Newbury Park, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1990), 109.

[3] Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, eds., *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 29.

[4] Chilean Presidential Commission on New Information and Communication Technologies, 1999 report to President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Santiago, Chile), 29.

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MEDIA OF THE WORLD AND WORLD OF THE MEDIA:
A CROSSNATIONAL STUDY OF THE RANKING OF THE "TOP 10 WORLD EVENTS" FROM 1988 TO 1998

By Zixue Tai

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Zixue Tai is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Journalism
and Mass Communication
at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus.

Please address correspondence to: Zixue Tai, 111 Murphy Hall, School
of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Minnesota-
Twin Cities, 206 Church Street S. E.
Minneapolis, MN 55455-0418
Fax: (612) 626-8251; Phone: (651) 917-7120.
Email: taix0003@umn.edu

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A CROSSNATIONAL STUDY OF THE RANKING OF THE "TOP 10 WORLD EVENTS" FROM 1988 TO 1998

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the ranking of the top 10 world events from 1988 to 1998 by 11 media representing eight countries and examines the similarities as well as differences between/across media and nations. Findings indicate that all media display bias of their own in their ranking of the top world events and are myopic to those stories that are culturally, geographically and psychologically close. Media from the same national setting show strikingly similar patterns in their evaluations of world news. The U.S. media are the most provincial in their approach to world news while the United States is the top newsmaker with all media. The study also reveals some general patterns among media from different national contexts in their approach to evaluating world events.

MEDIA OF THE WORLD AND WORLD OF THE MEDIA: A CROSSNATIONAL STUDY OF THE RANKING OF THE "TOP 10 WORLD EVENTS" FROM 1988 TO 1998

Introduction

A central issue in discussions of world news flow is the imbalance of information flow among nations and the dominance of global news by a few world powers, typically a small number of industrialized nations in the West. Furthermore, the media have been criticized for a biased and unfair representation of the majority of developing nations and for being oblivious to expressed concerns of third-world countries. International media scholars have been a leading force in documenting the process of global news flow and formulating theoretical paradigms in studying journalistic news productions and representations by world news agencies in different political, economic, and cultural settings. A continuous theme in the research agenda has been the empirical examination of the complex social networks of factors through which production and presentation of world news take place.

The majority of past research projects have been conducted in such a way that data over a certain period of time (typically a week or a limited number of days within a month or year) are collected in different national/media settings and comparisons are made between nations and/or media. These cross-national comparisons have yielded some persistent patterns in international news coverage and contributed to our understanding of systematics in the selection and presentation of world news across national and cultural contexts. However, nearly all of the past studies focus their analysis and interpretations on "international news" only, whatever their operational definitions may be. Therefore, as an example, news in the US is excluded from the analysis of US media coverage of international news since it does not fit into the domain of international news as defined by those studies. There is an inherent deficiency and bias in those studies then, because they do not adequately address the issue of how different national media address their domestic news stories within the larger parameter of their global impact and relevance.

This study compares the ranking of the "Top Ten World News Events" among 11 news organizations representing eight countries within the last 11 years. In particular, the study explores the questions of "what makes important news stories" globally in different cultures and media systems. What makes this study different from past international news flow studies is that the ranking of top international news events reflects the specific values and criteria among the media in the different nations and very often includes the evaluations of domestic events in the context of global reach and impact, while traditional research in international news flow generally focuses on the amounts and variations in coverage world news events (generally excluding news stories which take place within the domestic settings of the specific media under study). Moreover, a period of 11 years covered by this study can tell us more about the persistent patterns and paradigms in the evaluations of global news by the media under investigation.

Review of Literature

Views on what makes news, especially in the coverage of global events, vary substantively across different media systems. Not surprisingly, the nature and the process of international news coverage by mass media in different nation-states have been a focus of academic discussion and debate and have triggered an abundance of international communication scholarship in the past decades. Much of the research has been conducted in the exposition of the imbalances and inequalities of global information flow. Meanwhile, the variation in origin and destination of international flow of information has been empirically attributed to several influential determinants.

Central to this line of research are the different approaches to defining news in various societies and cultures, among them the controversies between the Western the-exceptional-makes-the-news approach, the Third World development news philosophy, and to a lesser extent, the Communist system of adopting news as a mass mobilization and propaganda tool. In the Western world, led by the United States, textbook definition of news in terms of news in terms of timeliness, impact, prominence, proximity, conflict and unexpectedness or novelty (e.g., Brooks et al., 1992; Mencher, 1994). It is treated as a commodity and is generally regarded as what the audience wants to know. Market is the driving force for news selections. In most Third World countries, national development and certain educational goals are decided by the powers that be, the government and news is a tool to meet these goals through direct control and indirect influence from the government in the news reporting process. In the Communist system, censors representing the Communist Party interpret news stories and determine what they need to know. What people want to know is largely irrelevant. However, with the collapse of communism and subsequent dramatic changes in the former Soviet blocks and Eastern Europe, and massive transitions to a market economy and unprecedented reforms in the mass media in China in the last two decades, it is hardly appropriate to describe any media system in the globe now as following the Communist system (perhaps with the exception of North Korea). The effect of market forces is increasingly manifest in the media sector in the former Soviet blocks and China.

More than two decades ago, the quest for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) was the hallmark of global debate in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, especially in UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

Organization), as well as among many nongovernmental organizations, academia, and the world's media. This debate has involved scathing attacks from the Third World countries, beginning in the 1970s, on the West's traditional methods of collecting and distributing international news and popular entertainment, and has led to repeated calls for a radical but vague reordering of the international communication system. On critic of NWICO called a "slogan in search of a program" (Hachten, 1992, p. 174).

NWICO advocates point out that a few Western powers provide most of the world's news coverage, entertainment, and advertising. They argue that much of the news is controlled by a few multinational news agencies which devote little attention to the reporting of developing nations; moreover, the news fosters a negative image of the developing countries (Alleyne, 1995; Hachten, 1992; Stevenson, 1988). It seems to many that most of the news Western countries circulate about Third World nations focuses on sensational and disastrous events while ignoring positive stories, particularly development issues. This phenomenon has been called the "coups and earthquakes" syndrome (Rosenblum, 1979). However, news satisfies or feeds the basic human curiosity to know and there is reason to believe that curiosity is a universal human trait, which shares more than it differs. Audience interpretation and consumption of news may display similar patterns across media systems and cultures. Cultural, ideological, and other constraints may not always override the human need to be informed. Therefore, what is deemed newsworthy in one country may also often be the case in another. It is enlightening to find out these universal patterns of newsworthiness across national and cultural borders.

Partly triggered by the global NWICO debate, communication scholars worldwide have conducted a vast amount of research concerning the international information flow. Within the last two decades, studies have consistently confirmed the preponderance of media resources and capabilities in the industrialized nations, particularly the United States, and the lack of attention to Third World countries among the Western media agencies (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979).

Not surprisingly, international news has been the most contentious and controversial aspect of the NWICO argument. In their seminal "The 'World of the News' Study" of 29 national media systems, Sreberby-Mohammadi et al. (1984) found that world news everywhere shows a similar selection process. The study also shows that regional news is emphasized in the media of all countries and behind the dominance of the media system's own region, news from North America and Western Europe comes next. A study of foreign news by two U.S. wires, the Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI), supported the claim that Western news agencies tend to focus on conflicts and crises when reporting about the less developed or Third World countries (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1981). This study also suggests that basic questions of news values among Western journalists may be more fundamental to understanding and, in the long run, more central to the NWICO debate.

Some scholars have also tried to determine the factors underlying the variation in origin and destination of international news flow. Kariel and Rosenvall (1984), in studying the factors influencing international news flow in the Canadian press, found that the eliteness of a nation as news source is the most important criterion for news selecting; some other factors are distance, cultural affinity, population, trade, and Gross National Product (GNP). Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger (1987) used a new approach to study international news coverage in the United States by going beyond the description of media content. They placed media coverage of world affairs in a broader theoretical framework by examining some determinants that have been considered important in previous research. Using stepwise discriminant analysis, they identified four variables that contribute significantly to distinguishing between events that are covered in the

U.S. media and those that are not: normative deviance of an event, relevance to the United States, potential for social change, and geographical distance.

A recent study, using network analysis to examine the structure of international news flow and its determinants, reveals that the inequality in news flow between the core - the Western industrialized countries, and the periphery - most African, Asian, Latin American, and Oceanian countries (Kim & Barnett, 1996). This study indicates that the structure of international news flow is influenced by a country's economic development, the language(s) its people speak, its physical location, political freedom, and population.

A closer look at the different approaches to defining news in a global context will perhaps contribute to understanding some of the conflicting concepts in international news flow. Two typical approaches that have dominated the global controversy are the Western the-exceptional-makes-the-news view and the Third World development news philosophy. The former can be best exemplified by the pioneering study by Galtung and Ruge (1965) of what Norwegian editors thought was newsworthy for four newspapers in Norway. This study identifies a set of criteria of news values: News should be recent, intense, or splashy, unambiguous of interpretation, directly related to national interests, predictable but slightly unexpected, involving elite persons or countries, individualized or personalized, and negative or conflictual. The generalizability of their structural model is limited by the number of countries (four newspapers in Norwey) and the cases (three international crises: the Congo and Cuba crises in the summer of 1960 and the Cyprus crisis of 1964) examined. However, Galtung and Ruge argue that their general theory is also applicable to most nations in the world. Many later studies have found that similar criteria are followed by the U.S. media and other industrialized nations (e.g., Edelstein, 1982; Ogan & Fair, 1984).

In contrast, the majority of the Third World countries have long defined news as that which contributes to social development. Although it is difficult to find an all-inclusive definition of development news which covers the entire spectrum of socio-economic and cultural development, this genre of reporting puts a great emphasis on work goals, success stories, and positive role models (Aggarwala, 1978; Ogan, 1982). Robert Stevenson (1988, pp. 145-149) gives development news another name, "protocol news," in which media are legitimately mobilized to support development in all of diverse components.

Although news is wedded to the everyday world we live in, it is necessarily a different kind of reality than the actual world (c.f. framing and social construction of reality). The process of newsmaking has been the theoretical focus of gatekeeping studies. In a recent review of gatekeeping research, Shoemaker (1991) critically examines the process of gatekeeping at five different levels of analysis: the individual communication worker (e.g., attitudes, values), the routines of the profession (e.g., deadlines, standardized news values, inverted pyramid style of reporting), social/institutional level (e.g., audiences, markets, other media), social system level (e.g., culture, ideology). The similar theme is echoed in Shoemaker and Reese's (1991) effort to develop a comprehensive theory of influences on mass media content.

Of all the mediating factors affecting mass media content, the editors/reporters are the immediate decision-makers in determining what becomes news, both domestic and global. Since the rankings of the top 10 world news events under study are results of survey of editors and reporters in different countries, this research may shed new light on gatekeeping studies. In addition to some other social, institutional, and cultural factors, editors are the main gatekeepers and decision-makers as to what is printed (or broadcast) as news.

This study follows the general path of many previous studies reviewed in the paper but slightly differs in significant ways. The vast majority of past studies have concentrated on comparing what is actually covered among different media systems in terms of world news reporting, particularly within a certain chosen time frame. Those studies typically exclude home news of the source media from their analysis since they define international news as either foreign to the country of the source media or involving at least another party in addition to the home country. Instead, this study focuses on what is ranked as important in world news events. What is deemed important will certainly be covered by the media, but what is covered by the media may not be considered to be of equal importance across media systems. To achieve that goal, a theoretical framework is developed under the umbrella of past research (see Figure 1). The model includes what are the predicted determinants of the rankings of news events and what are the possible explanations of cross-national variations in media coverage of global events. In the model, every country is expected to rank high events which take place within that country or in which the country plays a part (i.e., self-centerness or ethnocentrism). Other factors which may influence the rankings of the importance of events are: (cultural and geographic) proximity or distance, power and world influence (eliteness) of the country, and so on. Thus in this model every country will pay more attention to its neighbors so that news in China tends to be more important to Japan than to the United States and Hong Kong shares more with Britain than it does with Canada. Within this framework, a lot of comparisons can be made across the countries. Because the United States is the sole world power now, every media system is expected to pay more attention to events involving the United States. On the other hand, media in the United States are expected to feature much more events originated in that country because the United States considers itself to be the center of world politics and world media focus.

(Figure 1 about here)

This model applies to different media systems, whether they are free or controlled, but the mechanisms of the various determinants operate differently. In a controlled media system such as the Chinese, the state power structure is more determinant than that in a free media system such as that of the United States, while market forces are playing a subdued role in shaping the ultimate media products in China. In a free media system such as the United States, media selection and presentation of world events are more likely to be limited by market forces, audience factors and peer pressure. In all authoritarian societies, the media may be closer to the state than the market. In all media systems, some universal values are at work so that it is possible to find some consensus to a varying degree between different media contexts. In the last two decades, revolutions in modern communication and satellite technologies have made cross-border information flow much easier than before on the one hand, and have increased the costs of first-hand gathering and circulation of information to formidable highs to media for most developing nations. All this has perhaps made it necessary for most media systems to depend on a few Western powers for world news. Therefore, cross-cultural differences may have been narrowed down by the increasing cultural and information diffusion primarily dominated by the U.S.-led Western cultures.

The final stage in the model is audience perception of news presented by the media. This in turn affects the selection and presentation of news events by the media. Audience is an important factor for the media primarily because they are the ultimate consumers of all media products and they define the commercial interests of the media through the sales of advertising time/space. How audience perceives and responds to media content is the focus of media reception studies, which has been the topic of some recent cross-national comparative scholarship in international media research (e.g., Cohen et al., 1995; Jensen, 1998). However, the present study focuses on the editorial side of the news production process and their variations within different national and cultural settings.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

As has been proved in past studies, although mass media differ from each other from country to country in their news values, there are some shared core values in their selection of news items from the vast reservoir of world events. Therefore, with the data we have in the study, we would like to find out in this study:

Research Question 1: How much do the media from different countries agree with each other in their rankings of top 10 world news events?

Different media in a single country may share more than with each other than they do with media from any other country since there may be some news values within the national, cultural and social context. Since data is available for two media sources at the national level for three countries in the study, we want to test the hypothesis that:

Hypothesis 1: Media sources in a single country (i.e. the US, China, Japan) share more with each other than they do with media from any other country in their rankings of top world events.

Also included in the data is the annual survey by the Associated Press of international editors and subscribers outside of the US from about 40 countries about their opinion of the biggest news events of the past year. This is perhaps so far the only data available which covers such a wide range of countries. Although the survey samples cannot be claimed to be truly internationally representative, the results are expected to be the most metropolitan of ail the surveys covered in the study. Thus the hypothesis,

Hypothesis 2: The Associated Press international survey of editors agrees the most with other media sources than the other media agree with each other.

A strong, persistent pattern has been found and reverberated by past studies in international news flow. The pattern is expected to be also true in the media's ranking of top world events. Many of the determinants of global news content are expected to exist in this study, too. However, the ranking of self, that is, the home country of the source media, has not been included in most of the past studies in international news flow because of the operational definition of international news discussed above. Self-centerness may be true with media in any national context. It is expected that all countries will be likely to consider news stories in relation to itself to be more important and newsworthy than others. So,

Hypothesis 3: Every media source tends to rank events which involves the source country as a participant more important than media from other countries rank the same events.

Although this can be true with media in every country, it is expected to be particularly so with the Unites States. Now as the sole superpower in the post-cold war era, the United States will dominate world affairs and world politics. The United States has been considered to be self-centered and ethnocentric in its foreign policy and social research (e.g., Wiarda, 1985) and this is equally true with media and audience response to foreign news (Hoge, 1997). So it is hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 4: Media in the United States tend to rank considerably more U.S. originated or U.S. related news stories to be more important than any media from other nations will do with news about itself.

Because of the dominant role the United States plays in world affairs, the United States will stand out among all countries in world news. So

Hypothesis 5: The United States stands out more than any other country in the rankings of world news as a participant country among all nations.

And we try to answer these research questions:

Research Question 2: What are the top 10 countries that are most frequently ranked by the media in world newsmaking?

Geographically speaking, all countries will pay more attention to its neighbors in reporting world news. In other words, geographical location is an important determinant in all media's rankings of top 10 world events. Therefore,

Hypothesis 6: All countries are more likely to rank events involving their region more important than others.

In addition to examining the rankings of news in terms of geographical location, mass media in each country may pay more attention to events in certain countries in a region instead of others. So it is also interesting to find out:

Research Question 3: What are the top 5 countries in the rankings of top world events by the different media?

News values are not only determined by the countries the media tend to pay attention to, but also by the types of stories they are more likely to report. Thus another question to be addressed is:

Research Question 4: What are the types of news stories that are ranked important by the different media?

Finally, mass media across all nations may display some persistent patterns and frames in reporting different regions and countries in the world. Killings in one region may have a different connotation to the media from the similar events in others.

Research Question 5: What are some of the persistent images that the countries in the world tend to be projected by the media in their rankings of top world events?

Method and Data Collection

What makes data collection difficult is the availability of data sources about media ranking of world events in the past 10 years. Most media in the majority of countries do not do the annual ranking of top 10 world news events and media in some countries do the ranking, but not on a regular basis. In the study, data is collected in 11 media sources representing eight countries in their ranking of top 10 world news stories from 1988 to 1998. Data is collected for 11 years for seven of the media sources and data is available for 5 to 10 years for the rest of the media. These media are the Associated Press (AP) (11 years) and United Press International (UPI) (8 years), Xinhua News Agency (10 years) and *China Daily* in China, Jiji Press Limited (11 years) and Kyodo News Service (11 years) in Japan, *Asiaweek* (11 years) in Hong Kong, Gemini News Service (11 years) in the UK, *Jeune Afrique* (7 years) in France, *La Nación* (11 years) in Costa Rica, *Newswatch* (5 years) in Nigeria. Data for less than 5 years is available for some other countries but is excluded from comparisons. Data about the ranking of top 10 world news events from *Asiaweek*, Gemini, *Jeune Afrique*, La Nación , *Newswatch* is collected from the annual survey of editors of those news media by *World Press Review*, a US-based monthly news magazine published by The Stanley Foundation in New York . Also available in the data is the annual survey by the Associated Press of international editors in about 40 countries outside of the US for 11 years.

Of the media included in the study, the Associated Press has gained its reputation for covering the world and the United Press International has been a valuable source of information about world news for many of its global subscribers. Xinhua News Agency is the official Chinese news organization and represents the mouthpiece of the Chinese government while *China Daily* is the semi-official national English-language newspaper with an orientation to non-Chinese readers. In Japan, Jiji and Kyodo are the two biggest and most influential news services. *Asiaweek* is a Hong Kong-based news magazine with a heavy focus on Asia. Although Gemini News Service and *Jeune Afrique* are located in London and Paris respectively, they have a strong orientation toward Third World countries, particularly in Africa. In fact, *Jeune Afrique* literally means African youth. Therefore, Gemini and *Jeune Afrique* do not belong to the mainstream media in Britain and

France and should not be interpreted as such. However, this may have an added advantage since they provide the opportunity to see whether these marginal media sources display similar patterns as mainstream media in other countries, to which all the rest belong in the list. Both *Newswatch* and *La Nación* constitute reputable media sources in Nigeria and Costa Rica.

Data Coding Procedures and Findings

The news items are coded by the author in multiple ways for inter-media comparison. Table 1 provides answers to Research Question 1 and to test Hypothesis 1. In coding news items for Table 1, the ranking of 10 news items each year by one news source is compared with that of the other news source for all the 11 media. When one news event is both included in the two media under comparison, the agreement is coded as one. Thus agreement in their rankings of the top ten events range theoretically from 0 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest) out of ten news items. The actual numbers range from 0 between *Asiaweek* and Gemini News Service in 1996 to 8.5 between Jiji and the AP poll of international editors in 1994. In some instances, two related events are treated as one item by one news source but receive separate mentions by another. For example, the North Korea nuclear crisis and the death of Kim Il Sung are mentioned as one story by the AP international poll but are listed as two events by Jiji Press in 1994. Whenever this happens, the agreement between the two media on those items are calculated as (1+2)/2=1.5. Therefore half points exist in some comparisons. Each value of agreement in each of the years compared are added to arrive at a total, which is then divided by the number of years available for comparison. This mean is listed as the general between-media agreement in Table 1. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Cross-year examination of the between-year agreements indicates no highly skewed longitudinal patterns. Since data are available only for one year for comparison between *China*

Daily and *Newswatch*, the cell is not treated as a reliable result and is thus excluded for succeeding calculations. As Table 1 shows, the agreement varies from 2.90 between Xinhua and AP to 7.36 between Jiji and Kyodo. Thus Table 1 provides answers to Research Question 1 - how much each news source agree with the other in terms of its means over the years under study.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Hypothesis 1 finds support in the findings in Table 1: agreement between AP and UPI from the United States is a mean of 7.13 out of ten stories; Xinhua and *China Daily* from China share a mean of 6.13 while the consensus between Jiji Press Limited and Kyodo News Service from Japan reaches a mean of 7.36 among 10 items. All three numbers exceed any of the means between the six media and any other listed news source. This indicates that in all three nations media from the same national setting indeed share more than they do with any medium from another national context. This finding suggests that media within a single nation share more core values than they do with media from other nations.

The first research question, how much the media agree with each other, if at all, also finds clearer answers in Table 2, which shows the mean of consensus among 10 items between the listed news source and other media in the study.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

In calculating Table 2, the unweighted mean, instead the weighted one, is used since the latter may skew the result toward the direction of the media whose data are available for all of the 11 years than those media for which data are included only for a limited number of years. The standard procedure for the calculation of the unweighted mean of agreement between any single news source and the other media in the list is the sum of all the means of agreement between the specific media and the seven other media representing seven other nations listed in Table 1, then divided by seven. Since data included in the analysis represent eight nations among 11 media sources, only one news source is chosen out of each of the three countries where two media are listed - the United States, China and Japan. The Associated Press, Xinhua News Agency, and Kyodo News Service are used in the calculation instead of the other three since the former three all have more subscribers both nationally and internationally and are perceived to be more influential in the three countries respectively. The Associated Press annual international poll is excluded for the reason that this does not represent any single nation. However, the overall mean is also calculated for the AP international poll to show how much the poll of international editors generally agrees with the media from the various nations.

To sum up, the mean of means of between-media agreement is calculated by adding up the means of agreement between the calculated news source and the rest in the group of AP, Xinhua, Kyodo, *Asiaweek*, Gemini, *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación*, and *Newswatch*, then divided by seven. Although they are not chosen to represent their countries of origin, UPI, *China Daily*, and Jiji Press are also calculated by following the above formula. The difference with these three is that in their calculations, the media from their countries are excluded because otherwise the means would be significantly increased for these three because of the inclusion of the news source from their countries, as these media are expected to agree more with the media source in the same national setting, as shown by Table 1. Others may argue that the choice of UPI instead of AP and *China Daily* instead of Xinhua may generate different findings and therefore make the results of Table 2 controversial to interpret. As a matter of fact, the choice of the other news media to replace AP, Xinhua or Kyodo will produce a different mean, but only slightly, and the alternative does not at all change the patterns of findings in Table 2. For example, were UPI, *China Daily* and Jiji put in the place of AP, Xinhua and Kyodo in the above calculation, the results would be a mean of 3.73 and standard deviation of 0.64 for *Asiaweek*, and a mean of 4.43 and standard deviation of 0.50 for Gemini News Service. The same test has been done with all the other media and no significant deviation from the listed findings in Table 2 has been determined.

From Table 2, we can see more obviously to what extent each of the media generally agrees with the others. The Associated Press agrees the least with its international counterparts and thus can be said to be the most provincial one in its evaluation of world events if provincialism is defined as how much one sees eye in eye with others. Next on the list are *Asiaweek* in Hong Kong and *La Nación* in Costa Rica. Indeed, the AP annual survey of international editors in about 40 countries outside of the United States is more international than any of the media in a single country context. Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported. We can conclude that the AP international poll represents a more global view on world events, since the number of responding international editors range from 84 to 139 editors outside of the US in about 40 countries. No specific mention is made by AP of the regional locations of these countries. However, it could hardly be said that this view unbiasedly represents world editors. It would be a daunting task, if not impossible, to find a truly representative view of editors worldwide.

Hypothesis 3 posits that media from all countries tend to pay more attention to self-related events, which are defined as news events which either take place within the national boundary of the media origin or directly involve the countries of the source media. This is true with the two US media - AP and UPI, but not with the other media. However, analyzed in the other way round to see what are the likely media to mention events related to a particular country, the data show that events that involve a particular country are most likely to be mentioned, if at all, by the media from that particular country with the exception of the Japanese news sources and the Costa Rican press. As mentioned just before, the US media are the most self-centered in their ranking of the top 10. This is also true with Xinhua, *China Daily*, Gemini, *Jeune Afrique*, and *Newswatch* - if self-centerness is defined as attention to oneself. Where events are mentioned in relation to the countries from which the above media come from, they are more likely to appear in the media of the country origin. Proportionally, Xinhua devotes 19.0% and *China Daily* 14.0% to China, *Asiaweek* 3.6% to Hong Kong, and *Newswatch* 4.0% to Nigeria whereas Hong Kong and Nigeria are seldom mentioned by others. These percentages rank higher than those of the same countries by any other media. Noticeably, Gemini and *Jeune Afrique*, both marginalized media in countries of their physical location, also display the same pattern - 8.2% of Gemini and 3.8% of *Jeune Afrique* stories originate from their origin countries (UK and France) while those same two countries only infrequently hit the top 10 list of media from other countries. As Table 3 indicates, Gemini's attention to the UK is the highest of all media. In the case of France, the next highest mention is by Japan's Kyoto (1.8%). Therefore, even non-mainstream media can find stories relevant to their interest in the mainstream society. In contrast, *La Nación* makes no direct mention of Costa Rica at all while Jiji and Kyodo's attention to Japan-related stories is exceeded by that of Hong Kong's *Asiaweek* and the two media from China. Thus Hypothesis 3 is only true with media from six of the eight countries.

As expected in Hypothesis 4, the AP stories are predominantly US or US-related. 73.6% of all the stories that are ranked top 10 in the 11 years involve events that take place within the US boundary or in which the United States is a major player (See Table 3). This is also true, although to a lesser degree, with the UPI, which devotes 56.3% of its top 10 to US-related stories. It seems that world events hardly interest the American press unless the U.S. is directly involved. Although the same is also observed with media from some other countries, such as China's Xinhua Agency which ranks 19.0% of China-related events in the world top 10, they all pale before the U.S. media in this pattern.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

Table 3 lists the top 10 individual countries which are mentioned most by the media in terms of frequency: the U.S., Russia, China, Israel-Palestine, South Africa, the UK, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Japan, and Iran. The mean for each nation is calculated by the total number of stories mentioning of that nation divided by the overall number of stories from the Associated Press, Xinhua News Agency, Kyodo News Service, *Asiaweek*, Gemini News Service, *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación,* and *Newswatch*. The total number of stories in this analysis comes to 780 from the eight media. The above procedure is adopted for the same rationale assumed in calculating for Table 2. As the findings show, the United States catches the attention of all media in the study, with a mean of 23.8% (21.9% if unweighted) and significantly taking up a larger percentage of global focus than any other single country in the list. The United States comes at the top in all single country profiles with the AP, UPI, Kyodo and *China Daily*, *Asiaweek*, Gemini, *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación*, while it comes the second place with Xinhua (second after China and tied with Russia) and *Newswatch* (after South Africa). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is proved to be true. This is even true when AP is excluded from the calculation. As a comparison to the above findings, the top 10 most-mentioned countries by the AP international poll are the US, Russia, Israel-Palestine, the UK, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Iraq, Iran, China, Germany and India (the actual result is 11 because the last three are tied).

Table 4 tabulates the percentage of stories devoted to geographical locations by each news source. Hypothesis 6, which predicts that all media are likely to pay more attention to stories in their regions, is true with all the media except *Jeune Afrique* and Gemini News Service. This exception is no surprise in consideration of the fact that although both are located in Europe (Paris and London respectively), they are primarily oriented toward Africa and do not belong to the mainstream media in their location countries (which would be AFP and Reuters). Major subscribers to *Jeune Afrique* and Gemini News Service are either in Africa or identified with Africa. Therefore, the finding their main attention is shifted toward Africa cannot be said to be deviating from the general pattern. Thus with these two media, psychological or cultural identification is a more important factor than geographic location of the media. Even so, they are not isolated from Europe, which comes second in both media. With the other media, the general pattern seems to be obvious: 70.9% and 56.3% of the stories by AP and UPI respectively give prominence to North America (predominantly the US); Xinhua (39%), *China Daily* (34%), *Asiaweek* (58.2%), Jiji Press Ltd. (40.9%) and Kyodo News Service (36.4%) pay the most attention to the Asia-Pacific area; Latin America, though downplayed by all other media, tops the list of news items with the Costa Rica-based *La Nación* (20%) while *Newswatch* of Nigeria puts Africa on top of its agenda (34%).

(Insert Table 4 about here)

The pattern is demonstrated in Table 5 in another way, which answers Research Question 3 - what are the top five mentions by each media source. There are some ties in the ranking and the pattern is obscured with *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación*, and *Newswatch* because of their diversified attention to a larger number of countries. Noticeably, the United States tops the agenda of most media and occupies the second place of the rest. Russia gets the attention of all media, irrespective of their national origins with the exception of *Asiaweek*, which is dominated by Asia-Pacific news.

A strikingly similarity can be observed in Tables 3, 4, and 5 between the two media in the United States, China, and Japan - media from the same country demonstrate the same pattern in the amount of attention they pay to regions and countries in the world. The only slight difference between Xinhua and *China Daily* may be attributed to the small number of years of data from *China Daily* (only 5 years). This points to some consistent and consensual pattern among media behavior within a single national context in responding to world events.

News values are not only determined by the focus on regions but by attention to specific types of news events as well. Table 6 provides answers to Research Question 4, what are the types of news each news source tends to pay attention to. From the table, it can be easily seen that all media universally pay a significant amount of attention to internal politics of some major countries (e.g., U.S. domestic politics, political transitions in Russia, move toward democracy in South Africa), international diplomacy (e.g., the Middle East peace process, international agreements, the Northern Ireland Peace negotiations), political campaigns and elections, wars, conflicts and military affairs. This indicates a general pattern of interest among all the media. Some significant differences include the heavy focus on natural disasters by the U.S. media and lack of attention to human interest stories by the Chinese media (such as the death of Princess Diana) as compared with other media. But no media in any country seems to significantly deviate from the general pattern, which suggests a possible global diffusion of news values and an effect of "Galton's problem" in social science research - the issue whether something is caused by a culture or a result of diffusion across cultures (Ross & Homer, 1967; Scheuch, 1992).

(Insert Table 6 about here).

Media focus on regions of the world varies in terms of the types of news events throughout this period. Galtung and Ruge (1965) in their well-known article on the structure of foreign news theorizes that when something is expected or predicted to happen, this "creates a mental matrix for easy reception and registration of the event if it does finally take place" (p. 67). In such instances, these news stories easily hit media headlines because they correspond to what is expected and are therefore consonant with what the media seek. This theory of media consonance finds support in the ranking of the world top 10 by the media. All the media display an unbalanced and intentional selection of the types of news stories with each of geographical regions and countries of the world. Coding of all the ranked stories is done to find out this pattern of media selection. All the stories from the eight media - AP, Xinhua, Kyodo, *Asiaweek*, Gemini, *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación,* and *Newswatch* - are analyzed for the same reasons rationalized for Tables 2 and 3. However, in this particular analysis, the media's ranking of self, that is, the origin country, is excluded because the primary interest is in media attention to others.

In news about Africa, main attention is on the political transition in the region (34.% of all stories), especially in South Africa, while wars, ethnic conflicts also are big topics (22.4%). Local elections (9.2%) and natural disasters 8.2% are also frequently mentioned. In Asia-Pacific, stories about political transition and change also makes the largest chop of news events (25.7%), followed by diplomacy and negotiations (19.1%) and wars/conflicts (7.9%). Military affairs (6.6%), such as nuclear tests, troop withdrawals, terrorism and violence (6.6%), and financial crises (6.6%) are also big stories in this region. Wars and conflicts, particularly ethnic tensions in Bosnia, top the list of news about Europe (31.2%), with political change (mainly in Eastern

Europe) second on the list (19.3%). Other main stories include international diplomacy (11.9%) and local elections (6.4%). Noticeably, in Europe, no mention is made of natural disasters and science is mentioned the most (6.4%) of all regions - 70% of all science-related stories in all regions.

All of the stories related to North America involve the United States, either as a single player or as a major participant (For details, see Table 7). International conflicts and interventions of which the United States is a major player and political elections, presidential or congressional, represent the two most frequently mentioned stories (20.3% and 12.7% respectively). In Latin America, local elections (20%) and terrorism/violence stories (17.8%) are most frequently mentioned, followed by political transformations (15.6%) and war/conflicts (8.9%). The pattern is most unusual in the Middle East, with 77.6% of the stories related to wars, conflicts and the Israel-PLO peace process. The next type of news, far trailing behind, is terrorism and violence (8.2%). In the former Soviet republics, 33.8% of all stories are related to the political instability and transition in the region, particularly Russia, while 26.5% of all news events are about military affairs - troop withdrawals and weaponry reductions. Natural disasters (10.3%) and regional conflicts (8.8%) are also perceived important in this region.

The similar pattern can be observed in single country profiles in the top 10 most mentioned countries by the media, displayed in Table 7. As is the case in the above calculation, data from eight of the 11 media are the sources of the analysis. News about the United States is diversified and covers more areas than any other single country, which suggests that anything US-related can be newsworthy . In Russia, the media generally focus on its political instability and transformation (51.2%) and military affairs (24.7%), such as troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, arms reduction, followed by its international diplomacy (12.9%). Chinese diplomacy seems to be the major eye-catcher (41.1%), as is Chinese domestic politics (23.2%). Meanwhile, the booming Chinese economy gets the attention, especially media from third-world countries, and China's conflicts with its neighbors are also followed by the Asian media.

Media focus seems to be narrow with Israel-Palestine, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Iraq and Iran, which are more likely to be each associated with a dominating type of stories - the Middle East peace process in Israel and Palestine, democratization and steps toward multi-party system in South Africa, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, conflicts and war in Iraq and Iran. However, the pattern is different with Britain and Japan, which are mentioned in connection to multi-types of news events.

An examination of the "top 10" news stories in relation to third-world countries (in addition to those already mentioned in the "top 10 countries" list in Table 3) reveals that the "coups and earthquakes" syndrome is generally true - wherever the Third-World countries are mentioned by the media (i.e., Somalia, Armenia, El Salvador, Peru), they tend to be associated with wars, natural disasters, ethnic/factious infighting, military coups, and venues of international interventions (67.3% of all stories). Political elections and terrorism make up about 10.6% and 4.4% of the stories. Even for the rest of the stories (17.7%), a majority either involve a major political power (the U.S., Russia, China) or a peace-negotiating process (e.g., rapprochement in the Korean Peninsula). However, it is worth noting that this pattern about the Third World is true not only with the Western media, but also with media from the Third World.

News values of the media in a particular country are determined not only by what and how much the media see eye to eye with their counterparts in other countries, but by what and how much they disagree as well. In that sense, it is particularly revealing to examine the cases where a certain media source deviates from the others. For example, natural disasters frequent the top 10 list of all media but a clear regional bias exists. In 1998, the devastating hurricanes Georges and Mitch in the Caribbean and Central America are mentioned by the Associated Press and the Costa Rica-based *La Nación* but *Asiaweek* in Hong Kong includes in its top 10 list the destructive summer floods in China and some other Southeast Asia nations in the same year. On the other hand, the Chinese official Xinhua News Agency only mentions the natural disasters which victimized millions of Chinese civilians to underscore another victorious theme- - "Chinese economy maintained rapid and healthy development" - while the pro-government *China Daily* makes no mention of this at all.

The St. Louis Cardinals slugger Mark McGuire's new single-season record of 70 homers is No. 2 in AP's top 10 of 1998. This also makes to the top 10 list with the two Japanese media, Jiji Press and Kyodo News Service (both No. 9 on their lists). It is no surprise in consideration of the fact that baseball is the most popular sport in Japan. As a contrast, baseball has not been elevated to the status of a major sport in all the other countries whose media are included in this study and therefore the McGuire-Sosa home run race is not mentioned by any of the other media. However, another major world sport event took place in 1998 - the France soccer World Cup - which is listed in the top 10 by *Jeune Afrique* and *La Nación*.

There were three Olympic Games during the 1988-1998 period hosted in three countries - Seoul of South Korea in 1988, Barcelona of Spain in 1992 and Atlanta of the US in 1996. All three are mentioned in the world top 10 stories, but by different media. Not unexpectedly, the Atlanta Olympic Games has the most mentions - by the Associated Press, *Jeune Afrique*, *La Nación*, and Gemini and Kyodo News Service. The Barcelona one is mentioned the least - by *Jeune Afrique* only. The Seoul Olympic Games appear on the top 10 list of three Asian media - *Asiaweek*, Jiji and Kyodo. As a contrast, China's Xinhua mentions none of the three Olympic

Games but has the 1991 Beijing Asian Games on its top 10 list, which is not echoed by any of the other media.

Ideology also plays a role from time to time. The drastic transformations in the political structure and the defeat of the Communist Party in the national elections in Eastern Europe in 1991 is ranked to be one of the top 10 world events by most other media but not the Chinese ones - either *China Daily* or Xinhua. Even though Xinhua agrees with the other media in listing the change in the Soviet Union as one the top 10, it sees things differently. "The 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was held in Moscow to adopt a pragmatic statement of the Party," Xinhua says, while others see this as clear indication of the failure of communism. The efforts of the Soviet hard-line communists through military means to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev in 1992 was characterized by the media as a "failed coup" except for China's Xinhua (Data for China Daily were not available for that year), which instead calls it the "August 19 incident." The change in the terms is significant, considering that fact that the official Chinese media call the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy student movement an "incident," too. Another two instances are also worth mentioning with Xinhua. It is the only news agency which singles out two events in the United States to be on the top 10 - the parade and rally of about 350,000 people in Washington, D.C, on August 31, 1991, which called the US government to pay more attention to domestic problems, and another demonstration of about 400,000 blacks against racial discrimination in the U.S. capital on October 16. Because of the repeated criticisms by the U.S. government about China's suppression of dissidents and its human rights records in recent years, the Chinese government has been retorting with the U.S. domestic problems and has cited racial discrimination as violations of human rights in the United States, Xinhua is clearly toeing the official line of the Chinese government in the above two cases.

Conclusions and Discussion

This study examines the rankings of the top 10 world events from 1988 to 1998 in 11 media representing eight countries and finds some similar patterns as well as differences across media and across nations. Despite the national affiliations of the media, one thing seems clear from this study - if our earth can be called a "global village," all the villagers are myopic to those who are culturally, geographically and psychologically close. Thus it can be concluded that all media display provincial bias of their own in their selection of top world events. However, this is particularly so with the American media. AP devotes 73.6% of all stories while UPI contributes 56.3% of all news to the United States and generally tend to ignore all other regions unless the United States is directly or indirectly involved. This is consistent with the general consensus that the U.S. media only show limited interest in international news. This media chauvinism is an embarrassment for a nation which enjoys unchallenged world leadership in global affairs.

The study also confirms that media from the same country share much more in common than they do with others in interpreting world events. They also display similar patterns in the countries they pay attention to and the types of news they focus on. This indicates that national settings are important factors in influencing media behavior in covering world affairs, both in free (e.g., the U.S. and Japan) and in controlled (e.g., China) media systems.

Media across all nations show a similar approach to world news - they are all attentive to major changes in selected countries of the world, they all focus on wars, conflicts, international disputes and negotiations, and they all give prominence to political campaigns and elections. No matter where and what country they are from, they highlight news developments in major world powers such as the United States and Russia. Except for a few elite nations, news in all media about small Third-World nations tends to focus on limited genres of events - natural disasters, coups and conflicts, and involvement of elite nations.

The strength of this study over past research in international news reporting is that the rankings of top 10 world stories include the evaluation of events involving the country with which the media source identifies itself within the parameter of world events. However, this study is limited in a sense that only a small number of media from a few countries are selected. More cases need to be examined in the future to confirm the findings in this study. The data also have their limitations both because not all data are available for all the media in the period under study and because the polls of editors in the different media are done in different times (either the middle or the end) in December of every year so that some late-breaking events at the end of the year fail to be but could have been included in the top 10 rankings. For example, the U.S. and Britain air attacks on Iraq in late December of 1998 took place after Kyodo's survey of its editors and thus is not included in the top 10 list. However, in most years, the pool of events editors choose from are not considered very different from each other. Since all the media included in the analysis are either print (newspapers or magazines) or news agencies, whether the findings are applicable to electronic media in those countries need proof from future research.

This study only chooses to study the media so that its findings cannot be interpreted as representing the views of readers in the countries where the media come from. News editors may not truly speak for the readers they intend to serve. Future studies need to look into the perceptions on the part of the audience in different national contexts. One way to do that will be to use survey results of the public in their interest in and rankings of world events. A valuable source in the United States is the survey conducted by the Pew Research Center on public news interest from 1986 to the present, which reports how intensely the public follows major domestic and foreign news stories. A comparison between views of the news editors who influence the press agenda and the perspectives of the public will be an interesting topic for further exploration.

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TABLE 1: NEWS OF THE WORLD: TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE MEDIA AGREE?

(The mean agreement out of 10 items for the years under comparison. Standard deviations are parentheses. Number of agreed items between media is read as the cross-cell between the row and the column)

	AP	UPI	Xinhua	China Daily	Jiji Press	Kyodo News	Asia-week	Gemini	Jeune Afrique	La Nación	News-watch	AP Int'l Poll
ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) (USA)	10.00	7.13 (1.36)	2.90 (0.70)	4.00 (1.14)	3.18 (1.19)	3.59 (1.29)	3.32 (1.32)	3.14 (1.32)	2.75 (0.83)	3.68 (0.91)	3.60 (0.49)	4.64 (0.98)
UNITED PRESS INT'L (UPI) (USA)		10.00	4.07 (1.27)	4.83 (1.03)	4.31 (1.14)	4.50 (1.50)	3.69 (0.83)	4.00 (1.30)	3.80 (1.12)	4.44 (0.88)	4.00 (1.41)	5.88 (2.01)
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (CHINA)			10.00	6.13 (0.22)	4.80 (1.66)	4.45 (1.80)	4.70 (1.44)	4.80 (1.40)	4.00 (1.49)	4.45 (0.96)	4.70 (0.75)	4.95 (1.42)
CHINA DAILY (CHINA)				10.00	4.60 (1.36)	4.00 (1.27)	3.60 (0.49)	4.80 (0.40)	3.75 (0.83)	4.50 (0.63)	[5][1]	5.5 (0.63)
JIJI PRESS (JAPAN)					10.00	7.36 (0.88)	5.18 (1.53)	4.45 (0.99)	3.63 (1.22)	4.32 (1.28)	5.00 (0.89)	5.64 (1.19)
KYODO NEWS SERVICE (JAPAN)						10.00	4.45 (0.99)	4.45 (1.16)	3.69 (1.09)	4.37 (0.88)	4.60 (1.02)	5.64 (0.98)
ASIAWEEK (HONG KONG)							10.00	3.73 (1.47)	3.06 (1.33)	3.73 (1.14)	4.50 (1.61)	4.68 (1.17)
GEMINI NEWS SERVICE (UK)								10.00	4.69 (1.68)	4.05 (1.25)	5.30 (0.98)	5.18 (0.83)
JEUNE AFRIQUE (FRANCE)									10.00	4.63 (0.48)	5.00 (0.82)	4.63 (1.14)
LA NACIÓN, SAN JOSÈ (COSTA RICA)										10.00	4.30 (0.98)	5.36 (0.77)
NEWSWATCH, LAGOS (NIGERIA)											10.00	6.10 (0.80)
ASSOCIATED PRESS INT'L POLL												10.00

NOTE: Between-media comparisons are made in the years where data is available for both.

[1] Data is available for one year only (1990).

TABLE 2: MEDIA IN EACH COUNTRY: HOW DO THEY DIFFER FROM OTHERS?
(Unweighted mean of means across different media in the nations. Number of agreements out of 10 news stories)

News source	Mean of means	Standard deviation
Associated Press	3.28	(0.34)
United Press Int'l	4.07	(0.28)
Xinhua News Agency	4.29	(0.62)
China Daily	4.11	(0.42)
Jiji Press Limited	4.37	(0.68)
Kyodo News Service	4.23	(0.38)
Asiaweek	3.93	(0.59)
Gemini News Service	4.31	(0.67)
Jeune Afrique	3.97	(0.79)
La Nación, San José	4.17	(0.34)
Newswatch, Lagos	4.57	(0.50)
AP Int'l Poll	5.15	(0.50)

TABLE 3: THE NEWSMAKERS: WHO ARE THEY?
(Top 10 individual countries that are most mentioned by the media: mean percentage)

	US	Russia	China	Israel-Palestine	South Africa	UK	Yugoslavia	Iraq	Japan	Iran
AP	73.6%	6.4%	0.9%	4.5%	0	2.7%	3.6%	3.6%	1.8%	2.7%
UPI	56.3%	8.8%	1.3%	6.3%	3.8%	2.5%	5.0%	3.8%	2.5%	2.5%
Xinhua	23.0%	12.0%	19.0%	7.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	5.0%	6.0%	3.0%
China Daily	18.0%	12.0%	14.0%	6.0%	2.0%	6.0%	4.0%	6.0%	10.0%	2.0%
Kyodo	22.7%	20.0%	9.1%	4.5%	1.8%	3.6%	4.5%	2.7%	5.5%	0.9%
Jiji	24.5%	13.6%	9.1%	6.4%	3.6%	4.5%	4.5%	3.6%	4.5%	1.8%
Asiaweek	16.4%	4.5%	11.8%	3.6%	0.9%	3.6%	4.5%	2.7%	6.4%	2.7%
Gemini	14.5%	12.7%	6.4%	4.5%	9.1%	8.2%	2.7%	3.6%	1.8%	1.8%
Jeune Afrique	15.0%	10.0%	5.0%	7.5%	13.8%	6.3%	3.8%	5.0%	1.3%	2.5%
La Nación	17.3%	11.8%	2.7%	7.3%	4.5%	2.7%	3.6%	3.6%	0.9%	3.6%
Newswatch	12.0%	6.0%	0	8.0%	14.0%	8.0%	6.0%	6.0%	0	2.0%
AP Int'l Poll	20.9%	12.7%	2.7%	9.1%	4.5%	7.3%	6.4%	3.6%	1.8%	3.6%
Overall Mean*	25.6%	10.8%	7.4%	5.6%	5.1%	4.6%	4.0%	3.8%	3.2%	2.4%

NOTE: * The overall mean is calculated by the total number of stories involving each country divided by the overall number of stories mentioned by the eight media: AP, Xinhua, Kyodo, Asiaweek, Gemini, Jeune Afrique, La Nación, and Newswatch.

TABLE 4: THE TOP NEWSMAKERS: WHERE ARE THEY? (Regional Profiles)*

Percentage of these top news events ranked by the media in terms of regions

Region / News Source	Africa	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Latin America	Middle East	North America	Former Soviet Republics	UN/ Global
Associated	3.6%	4.5%	10.0%	3.6%	11.8%	70.9%	7.2%	3.6%
United Press	10.0	3.8	11.3	2.5	12.5	56.3	8.8	8.8
Xinhua News	11.0	39.0	23.0	2.0	13.0	22.0	11.0	11.0
China	6.0	34.0	18.0	4.0	18.0	20.0	12.0	12.0
Jiji	5.5	40.9	20.9	1.8	10.9	22.7	14.5	7.3
Kyodo	4.5	36.4	20.0	2.7	8.2	22.7	20	12.7
Asiaweek	3.6	58.2	13.6	1.8	8.2	16.4	5.5	9.1
Gemini News	23.6	17.3	21.8	3.6	8.2	13.6	14.5	10.0
Jeune	28.8	13.8	18.8	8.8	12.5	16.3	10.0	8.8
La Nación, San	10.0	6.4	17.3	20.0	13.6	17.3	12.7	10.0
Newswatch,	34.0	12.0	16.0	6.0	14.0	10.0	6.0	4.0
AP	9.1	13.6	24.5	6.4	17.3	20.9	14.5	5.5

Note: * The total percentage may not add up to 100 for each news source since some news items involve more than one region.

TABIE 5: WHO GETS THE MOST ATTENTION: THE TOP FIVE MENTIONS BY EACH NEWS SOURCE

News Media	Countries Mentioned Most (Top 5) (Ranked in Order of Decrease)
Associated Press	**1. US 2. Russia (Former Soviet Union)[1] 3. Israel-Palestine[2] 4. Yugoslavia 4. Iraq**
UPI	**1. US 2. Russia 3. Israel-Palestine 4. Yugoslavia 5. Iraq 5. South Africa**
Xinhua News Agency	**1. US 2. China 3. Russia 4. Israel-Palestine 5. Japan**
China Daily	**1. US 2. China 3. Russia 4. Japan 5. Israel-Palestine 5. Iraq 5. UK**
Kyodo News Service	**1. US 2. Russia 3. South Korea 3. China 5. North Korea**
Jiji Press	**1. US 2. Russia 3. South Korea 4. China 5. North Korea**
Asiaweek	**1. US 2. China 3. Japan 3. India 5. Cambodia 5. Yugoslavia**
Gemini News Service	**1. US 2. Russia 3. South Africa 4. UK 5. China**
Jeune Afrique	**1. U.S. 2. South Africa 3. Russia 4. Israel-Palestine 5. UK**
La Nación	**1. US 2. Russia 3. Israel-Palestine 4. South Africa 5. Iran 5. Yugoslavia 5. Iraq 5. Chile**
Newswatch	**1. South Africa 2. US 3. Israel-Palestine 3. UK 5. Russia 5. Yugoslavia 5. Iraq**
AP Int'l Poll	**1. US 2. Russia 3. Israel-Palestine 4. UK 5. Yugoslavia**

Note: Only one news source is chosen from one country. Order is decided by the totoal numbers of items mentioned in relation to a specific country in the media source.

[1] Prior to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Russia was often mentioned the same as the Soviet Union in some news items. This is decided by whether Russia played a major part in the event. A few items, such as the earthquake in Armedia in 1988, were not coded as belonging to this category.

[2] Israel and Palestine almost come together in the news events mentioned by the media, so they are coded as one category.

TABLE 6: THE NEWS STORIES: WHAT INTERESTS THE MEDIA?

(Categories of news stories in percentages)

Categories of News	AP	UPI	Xinhua	China Daily	Jiji	Kyodo	Asia-week	Gemini	Jeune Afrique	La Nación	News-watch	AP Int'l
Internal politics	10.0%	14.3%	14.0%	12.0%	10.9%	12.7%	9.1%	12.7%	20.0%	12.7%	24.0%	13.6%
Int'l politics/disputes/ negotiations/diplomacy	8.2	14.3	23.0	24.0	22.7	22.7	16.4	11.8	25.0	14.5	22.0	19.1
Political campaigns/elections	7.3	10.0	8.0	4.0	10.0	9.1	10.0	10.0	10.0	16.4	8.0	11.8
War/conflicts /political turmoil	11.8	18.6	13.0	12.0	11.8	11.8	14.5	14.5	7.5	16.4	18.0	23.6
Military/int'l interventions	5.5	11.4	5.0	6.0	11.8	14.5	10.9	11.8	8.8	4.5	4.0	8.2
Economy	9.1	4.3	6.0	8.0	3.6	2.7	6.4	3.6	12.5	3.6	2.0	1.8
Violence/terrorism/ crimes/assassinations	11.8	10.0	3.0	10.0	4.5	3.6	6.4	9.1	1.3	2.7	4.0	9.1
Protests/suppressions /racial tensions	2.7	5.7	3.0	2.0	0.9	0.9	3.6	0.9	1.3	0.9	0	0.9
Scandals	3.6	2.9	1.0	2.0	0.9	0.9	2.7	2.7	0	1.8	0	3.6
Natural disasters/accidents	11.8	14.3	3.0	6.0	1.8	4.5	5.5	1.8	2.5	4.5	2.0	4.5
Human interest/VIPs /Royals/Elites	7.3	4.3	0	0	4.5	2.7	6.4	5.5	1.3	1.8	2.0	6.4
Environment/ ecology	1.8	1.4	2.0	2.0	2.7	4.5	1.8	3.6	2.5	0	0	1.8
UN/international organizations	0.9	4.3	15.0	2.0	10.9	7.3	6.4	5.5	2.5	11.8	4.0	1.8
Trade/commerce	0	0	0	2.0	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sports	1.8	0	1.0	0	1.8	2.7	0.9	2.7	2.5	0	2.0	0
Science/technology /space	1.8	1.4	4.0	2.0	0	0	0.9	2.7	2.5	4.5	0	0.9
Health/medicine	1.8	0	0	0	0	0.9	0.9	0.9	2.5	0.9	0	1.8
Religion/cult	1.8	2.9	0	0	0	0	0.9	0.9	0	2.7	0	0.9

Note: * The categories for each media source may not add up to 100% because of multiple coding.

TABLE 7: COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HOW ARE THEY PORTRAYED? (News Stories about the Top 10 Countries in Percentages)

Country	News Stories Mentioned in the "Top 10 Events"			
US	Global Conflicts/International Interventions	20.3%	National Elections	12.7%
	Domestic Politics	10.7%	Int'l Diplomacy	9.1%
	Natural Disasters	6.6%	Other stories	40.6%
Russia	Political Turmoil/Political Transformation	51.2%	Military/Arms Reduction	24.7%
	International Diplomacy	12.9%	Other Stories	10.1%
China	International Diplomacy	41.1%	Domestic Politics	23.2%
	Economy	14.3%	Int'l/Regional Conflicts	12.5%
Israel-Palestine	Middle East Peace Process	75.6%	Assassinations	14.6%
	National Elections	7.3%	Diplomacy	2.4%
South Africa	Political Change (Democratization)	82.9%	Economy	8.6%
	Violence	2.9%	Natural Disaster	2.9%
	Other	2.9%		
UK	Royals	25.0%	Domestic Politics	25.0%
	Science	17.9%	Northern Ireland Peace Talks	14.3%
	Others	17.9%		
Yugo-slavia	Ethnic Conflicts/Civil War	100%		
Iraq	International Conflicts/War	96.9%	Domestic Politics	3.1%
Japan	Terrorism	25.0%	Domestic Politics	20.8%
	Conflicts	20.8%	Economy	12.5%
	Scandals	12.5%	Natural Disasters	8.3%
Iran	International Conflicts/War	70.6%	Domestic Politics	17.6%
	Religion	5.6%	Natural Disaster	5.6%

Figure 1: An Equilibrium Model of Determinants of International News Coverage


Events - Potential News Sources
(What is happening or has happened)
Power (Hegemonic) Structure
(Level 1: Domestic: Foreign Policy, Ideological Affiliations, etc.)
(Level 2: Global: Political Influence, Global Dominance, Eliteness, etc.)
Peer Pressure & Competition
(Domestic Level & Global Level)
Institutional Factors
(Routines of newsgathering, technological & budget factors, etc.)
(Cultural, Geographic, Trade, and Language) Proximity
Universal Values, Professional Values
(e.g., Significance of events, entertaining value, novelty)
Gatekeeping and Filtering
(Journalists and Editors)
Media Output - News
(Rank of importance, presentation and framing of events)
Audience Receptance
(Consumptions, perceptions, interpretations of news stories)
Commercial Interests
(Ratings, Advertising Income, etc.)

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Is the System Down?

The Internet and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

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By Dane S. Claussen, Ph.D., M.B.A.

Assistant Professor of Communication and Mass Media
Southwest Missouri State University
901 S. National Avenue, Springfield, MO 65804
417-836-5218

&

President/Principal
American Newspaper Consultants, Ltd.
1619 E. Lombard St., Springfield, MO 65802
417-831-7705/800-554-3091 (H);dsclaussen@hotmail.com

As an international communications medium, the Internet is subject to regulation both domestically--ultimately in every country (for a preliminary look at domestic measures in other countries, see Brown, 1998) and internationally. It is neither possible nor necessary --depending on one's point of view--for Internet regulation to emerge out of thin air; the world has been through much of the issues before, with earlier new technologies or communication systems (the latter referring to postal treaties, customs treaties on printed media, etc.). Yet the impulse to treat Internet differently persists primarily because of concerns over widespread copyright infringement. This paper concerns international intellectual property law affecting the Internet, primarily implemented by the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Intellectual property has been defined as "patents to protect new technologies, copyrights to protect literary and artistic works as well as computer software, trademarks to assure orderly commercial development and consumer protection. New systems of intellectual property law protect, for example, integrated circuits and automated databases. Intellectual property also drives the 'Global Information Infrastructure'--including the Internet" (Mossinghoff and Oman, p. 692).

Philosophically, intellectually property is (Boyle, 1996), a "bundle of assorted entitlements that changes from moment to moment as the balance of utilities changes," which results in

> "attempt[s] not only to clothe a newly invented romantic author in robes of juridicial protection, but to struggle with, mediate, or repress one of the central contradictions in the liberal world view....[I]ntellectual property law...must accomplish a number of tasks simultaneously....[I]t must give some convincing explanation as to why a person who recombines informational material from the public sphere is not merely engaging in the private appropriation of public wealth. It must explain how it is that we can motivate individuals--who are sometimes postulated to be essentially self-serving, and sometimes to be noble, idealistic souls--to produce information. If the answer is, 'by giving them property rights,' it must also explain why this will not diminish the common pool, or public domain, so greatly that a net decrease in the production of information will result. (Think of overfishing.) It must reassure us that a realm of guarded privacy will be carved out for the private sphere and at the same time explain how it is that we can have a vigorous sphere of public debate and ample information about a potentially oppressive state" (pp. 49-50).

And with the global economy both producing and presumably consuming more information (part of which is bonafide intellectual property) than ever, international protection and regulation of intellectual property may be more important than ever.

The role of international law in today's world often seems vague and/or contradictory. A reading of any introductory book such as Brownlie (1990) quickly demonstrates this. But major treaties of the past 20 years have dealt with terrorism and other major crimes, laws of the seas (fishing, whaling, pollution, etc.), biological and chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, human rights, etc. Going back into history, the Kellogg-Briand treaty of 1928 attempted to outlaw war, obviously fruitless then and apparently still fruitless now, but perhaps symbolically important. But the 1967 Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies is perhaps more important than ever with the space for satellites above the equator full or almost full, and the recent discovery of water ice on the moon makes colonies there more likely.

More importantly for this paper, the Internet is an area in which it is extremely difficult to maintain nuanced distinctions between, and balances of, domestic and international law. It may have been relatively easy for citizens of the United States to adhere to one set of laws while fishing in the Columbia River and another set of laws while fishing in international waters miles off the coast of Oregon. But the Internet potentially creates potential problems when child pornography from the Netherlands accessible by computer in the U.S. evades postal inspectors and customs officials, when a company's (or a country's) secrets can be stolen anonymously by a hacker and then distributed widely and instantly all over the world, or when even discovering every instance of infringement of a company's trademark by unauthorized use on websites is nearly impossible.

The Internet also potentially fails to fulfill its widely-hyped potential of finally creating what Marshall McLuhan called a "global village," when, for example, "China and Singapore are placing direct controls over their in-country users" (Brown, 1998)--e-mail to this author from Prof. Guo Ke of Shanghai International Studies University sometimes is held up two weeks. Nor does the Internet seem likely to fulfill its Gore-y prophecy of savior of both democracy and public education as the U.S. courts continue to lean heavily toward copyright owners in rulings on domestic copyright laws--known for their "strict liability" enforceability and preference for the rights of publishers, producers, and distributors over those of artists, authors, and the public. (Perhaps someone should have told the vice president that "Cyberspace is Republican" [Shenk, p. 11].) The demands of U.S. companies involved in intellectual property products make it unlikely that this posture will change, either. In other words, as indicated in more detail below, U.S. positions in international law negotiations haven't made new challenges any easier or the new opportunities more realized.

History of WIPO

WIPO, which counts today as members about 80% of the world's countries, was founded in the 1960s. It administers about 20 major treaties, works to make amendments in them as members see fit, and promotes new treaties that member nations support. Some of the 20 are fairly old, such as the 1883 Paris Convention on patents and trademarks--which was last amended in Stockholm in 1967--or the 1886 Berne treaty on copyrights--which was last revised in Paris in 1971.

More recently, WIPO--in addition to two more major treaties (Copyright and Performances/ Phonograms) completed on Dec. 20, 1996--has been providing legal and technical assistance on intellectual property to developing countries. Because of what they perceived as an urgent need for WIPO, many successes and few failures, Mossinghoff and Oman (1997) consider WIPO to be a "United Nations success story." They cited the "extraordinary achievements of the UN's most effective specialized agency." But such a description depends on what one's philosophy is of intellectual property, one's measurement of such words as "effective" or "success," and what one knows or believe one knows about what is going on in the real world, not simply the often arcane world of state departments and foreign ministries. For example, Mossinghoff and Oman says "WIPO has done more to harness human creativity for social progress than any other international organization in history." One can only wonder why, to make "social progress," that "human creativity" needs to be "harness[ed]" at all, let alone to a greater ("more") rather than lesser extent.

The U.S. Role in WIPO

It would seem obvious that the United States would or at least should play a major role in WIPO. The United States is, after all, the largest producer of intellectual property in the world. As Mossinghoff and Oman (1997) point out, "The United States, as a world leader in sectors highly dependent upon intellectual property protection--including aerospace, publishing, computer technology, industrial electronics, pharmaceuticals, motion pictures, and sound recordings--naturally plays an active role in the work of WIPO." Mossinghoff and Oman chose their language well in tying the U.S. to WIPO's "work." For unlike the United Nations overall budget, of which the U.S. pays (when it pays, that is) about 25% (the U.S. was obligated to pay a total of $595 million to the U.N.'s general and peacekeeping budgets for fiscal year 1997!), the United States pays only about 1% of WIPO's budget (Mossinghoff & Oman, p. 699).

The probably much more significant fact about the U.S. and WIPO is that for all of the United States' interest in protecting intellectual property and actively negotiating at WIPO, the United States has not signed numerous intellectual property treaties in the past.

After reviewing the tortured history of copyright law generally, and in particularly the U.S. role, Goldstein (1994) summarized the end of the U.S. refusal to ratify the key 1886 treaty:

> "[I]n the 1980s, Americans began to realize that the United States was a copyright outcast, and that its failure to join the Berne Union was undermining its efforts to negotiate trade agreements that protected American intellectual property in other countries. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge testified at congressional hearings that Berne membership would strengthen America's hand, and finally, on March 1, 1989, the United States formally adhered to the Berne Convention....
>
> "Adherence to the Berne Convention raised a new and troubling question for American copyright owners: Is any convention that is willing to have the United States as a member worth joining?" (p. 186)

As even Mossinghoff and Oman final admitting at the end of their upbeat 1997 article:

> "the United States is a member of the Paris Convention and TRIPs--which include important standards for trademark protection--[but] it is not currently a party to any international trademark registration system....To provide an international registration system that the United States can adhere to--given its unique legal regime for trademarks--an amendment to the Madrid Agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the WIPO in 1989. Legislation to implement this 'Protocol' in the United States went before Congress in 1994--with the support 'in principle' of the Clinton Administration and of U.S. trademark owners speaking through the International Trademark Association. The Protocol is currently mired in a technical dispute over vote counting that most experts expect to be resolved soon."

Amazingly, Mossinghoff and Oman report this fact without apology and with little explanation. Neither does any guarantee exist that the United States will sign either of the Dec. 20, 1996, treaties (see below); as of October 1998, the U.S. House had approved only the Copyright Treaty, and the Senate had approved neither.

Recent WIPO Treaties

WIPO's latest major actions were approving two new treaties--apparently just barely (Vinje, 1997)--on Dec. 20, 1996. Mossinghoff and Oman, the uncritical WIPO champions who obfuscate what WIPO does and doesn't do and what the U.S.'s role has and hasn't been, describes the new WIPO Copyright Treaty as simply "mak[ing] clear that authors get full copyright protection for their music and literary works in the digital environment, especially when these works appear on the Internet." Commentators such as Fraser (1997) are not as enthusiastic, fearing that the "impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on international copyright law could prove as breathtaking as that of TRIPs" (p. 773).

The primary provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty are: "computer programs are protected as literary works" (Art. 4); databases are protected to the extent that "the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations" (Art. 5); "authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership" (Art. 6); "authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them," (Art. 8) subject only to "limitations...or exceptions" made "in certain special cases" by "national legislation" (Art. 10); signatory countries to the treaty must provide "protection and...remedies" to authors exercising their rights under the treaty (Art. 11); signatory countries must have legal remedies against persons who infringe on rights related to "electronic rights management information," which is defined as "information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the communication of a work to the public" (Art. 12); and signatory countries must enforce all aspects of the treaty, not only through remedies to previous infringements but measures to prevent future infringements as well (Art. 14)(WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996). If some of these treaty articles raise concerns about their compatibility with U.S. copyright law, the possibility of harmonizing national copyright laws all over the world, and/or what's known in the U.S. as "fair use" of copyrighted materials, they should.

U.S. Positions in WIPO Treaty Negotiations

To understand what the Clinton administration tried and failed to accomplish in Geneva at the WIPO treaty negotiations, one must have a little background in what the Clinton administration has been trying to accomplish in Congress. In July 1994, the Intellectual Property Working Group of the National Information Infrastructure Task Force, chaired by Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman, issued the so-called Green Paper, proposing changes in U.S. laws ostensibly to promote new communication technologies. It was revised, and in September 1995 an amended version, the so-called White Paper, was released. The administration quickly proposed legislation to implement White Paper recommendations, including what the administration called "a minor modification of the current [copyright] law"; it later proposed the Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, not been directly suggested by the White Paper.

The proposed copyright law modification was billed as "minor." But contrary to the usual Clinton/Gore rhetoric about the Internet's potential for education, democracy, economically helping all classes, peace on earth, and good will towards men, Samuelson (1996) denounced the copyright bill as a "copyright grab" and a "wholesale giveaway of the public's rights." Boyle (author of Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society) and 105 other law professors sent an "Open Letter" to Gore, Senators Hatch and Leahy, Rep. Carlos Moorhead, and the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown calling the White Paper "radical," adding it:

> "(i) would make reading a document on the screen of your Web browser a copyright violation; (ii) privatize much of the public domain by overturning the current presumption of fair use...; (iii) make on-line providers...strictly liable for violations of copyright by their members,...; (iv) [make individuals] civilly liable for attempting to interfere with any copyright protection device or system...; and (v) Make it a federal crime to remove, for whatever reason, any of the copyright management information embedded in any document."

In others words, while Lehman called the Clinton bill a "minimalist approach," Samuelson called it a "maximalist approach." Other legal scholars tend to side with Boyle and Samuelson; Barry (1997) writes that after "lengthy consideration" of the 250-page White Paper, he concluded that "its proposals are clearly interrelated and the result of one overriding principle consistently applied: maximization of the rights of intellectual property owners." The Fair Use issue is troubling to him.

Fair use, and other issues, were also troubling to Congress. So, after the strange spectacle of Democratic politicians trying to cut fair use rights and further enrich America's wealthy intellectual property-related companies (as Goldstein [1994] noted about U.S. positions on intellectual property during the GATT negotiations: "the United States negotiators...were at this point taking their cue from the American entertainment industry [p. 227]), while Republicans stuck up for scholars, librarians and the public, both the Clinton copyright and Clinton database bills died in committee. (Again, among Shenk's [1997] "Laws of Data Smog" is "Cyberspace is Republican"; he later explains that it is more libertarian, a philosophy that of course cuts across parts of both traditional Republican and traditional Democratic politics.) Usually, death by committee is the end of an initiative until the next Congress, but as Barry terms it, Clinton and Lehman tried an "end run" at the WIPO treaty negotiations: the U.S. went to Geneva submitting a Draft Copyright Treaty that would implement through international law what Clinton couldn't get through Congress.

The U.S. proposal to WIPO prevented any "direct or indirect reproduction...whether permanent or temporary, in any manner or form" and to be sure that it was understood that this included simply viewing a Web page--received through RAM--on a screen, the proposal explained that "A work that is stored for a very short time may be reproduced or communicated further, or it may be made perceptible by an appropriate device." (One can only wonder what happened to the philosophy described by Goldstein [1994] in discussing the history of U.S. copyright law: "One precept of lawmaking in Washington is that it is bad policy to pass an unenforceable law, for such laws impair fidelity to enforceable laws" [p. 131], or his comment that American lawmakers are "chronic copyright pessimists, who...do not extend rights against new uses of copyrighted works unless copyright owners can show they need them as an incentive to continue producing literary and artistic works" [p. 169].) But of course Clinton is not a typical lawmaker.

The U.S. delegation took a very active role in the negotiations as they went along. It proposed a "right of importation" (Reinbothe et al., p. 172), and just before the conference it "came up with a proposal which provided for some protection for audiovisual performers, combined with clauses on the assignability of rights, on a presumption of transfer of rights, on the recognition of contractual arrangements and of the law of the 'country of origin' (of the contract), on the flexible implementation of the treaty obligations to Contracting Parties' own nationals, as well as on wide Berne-type national treatment" (Reinbothe et al., p. 175). As negotiations dragged on, "the United States, the European Commission and some E.C. Member States, were unwilling to accept any of the amendments proposed" to what was essentially the U.S. copyright proposal, although a "substantial majority of delegations [were] opposed" to it (Vinje, p. 232); American copyright scholar David Nimmer called it "novel and unprecedented" and the European Commission's Legal Advisory Board agreed (Vinje p. 231). The United States also was rather obtuse on the issue of technical protection systems for copyright holders, and this time significantly more so than the European Community. Vinje reported (p. 234),

> "Along with the infrastructure provider liability issue, the proposed legislation failed in the U.S. Congress in large measure because of a broad spectrum of opposition....Despite this domestic defeat, the United States continued to press forward on the international front, demanding adoption of a provision in the Copyright Treaty nearly identical to the one that proved too controversial for resolution at home."

Vinje, though generally not opining on the WIPO treaties, explained that the "U.S. proposal inappropriately condemned circumvention alone, rather than circumvention for infringing purposes. Moreover, the U.S. Proposal lacked a knowledge requirement on the part of the manufacturer." A technical protection systems article was adopted (Art. 13), but worded so that a manufacturer must know or have reason to know that a protection-defeating device will be used for infringement. In short, all of the U.S. proposals failed, with Reinbothe pointing out, for instance, that the audiovisual performers proposal was not "compatible with other systems [other] than the one applied in the United States" (Reinbothe et al. p. 175). Barry is the most candid, and also the most flippant:

> "To make a huge understatement, there was a lot of opposition. One has only to visit the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) site or the essential.org threads on these topics to sense the degree of outrage. People flew to Geneva, they camped out, they posted to the Web. The going was tough. One correspondent wrote that 'you could not imagine a more closed proceeding.' At the end of the day--December 20, 1996, to be exact--both of these provisions [U.S. copyright and database proposals] failed to be adopted. The database provision was an early casualty. According to the WIPO press release, the Conference did not discuss it, but rather adopted a recommendation to convene an extraordinary session of the WIPO governing bodies to decide on the further preparatory work required for database protection. The 'ephemeral copying' provision was dropped at the last minute. The official WIPO press release stated that the Conference considered the transitory copies issue, 'but did not adopt any such provisions since it considered that these issues may be appropriately handled on the basis of existing international norms on the right of reproduction" (Barry, pp. 631-632)

But the Clinton administration doesn't suffer only from questionable interpretations of U.S. copyright law or its usual US hubris resulting in negotiating positions that it should know don't stand a chance of being successful. The mere nature (logistics?) of information is that it does not have an "embodiment," as Barry puts it, adding, "Some say 'information wants to be free,' or information is 'inherently leaky.' The point is that many people can share information at the same time without diminishing its value" (p. 621). And as a matter of American cultural/economic history, he wrote:

> "[A]lthough information content is becoming an increasing percentage of the value added in many products in our society, and our copyright-based industries are constantly launching attacks on the 'pirates' that reduce their ability to exploit that content, our society is very unused to treating information as property and subject to the exclusionary implications of a property regime. The traditions of our country are free and unfettered access to information is the best means of increasing wealth and stimulating invention."

Although one can object to Barry's characterization of information as having strictly economic benefits--and even wonder how "free and unfettered" the American public's "access to information" has been and for how long--it is reasonable to agree with his overall point that the U.S. always has been an information-rich country, much of it free or low cost, and that this seems to have been beneficial. The U.S. was and in many cases still is the world leader in free public education, free public libraries, free public museums, free public lectures, taxpayer-subsidized public universities, Freedom of Information laws, Sunshine laws, etc.

It is difficult to assess what long-term domestic and international effects will result from the United States' obtuse negotiating positions. One of the most striking realizations one makes in researching U.S. Internet law or culture is the lack of discussion of international law at all. See, for example, Cavazos (1994); Stoll (1995), although he included this: "Without a massive change in copyright law--unlikely, since it lives in international treaties--libraries can't put their collections online"; Boyle (1996); Perritt (1996), who devotes one paragraph to WTO's GATT/TRIPs; Sussman (1997); Seabrook (1997); Shenk (1997); or Lamberton (1997). Thus, little discussion is given to how the U.S. positions will affect the country economically or politically in tangible ways. But the question cannot be avoided: as even an American law student wrote, "what message is the United States sending the world when it proposes that its domestic copyright law, as well as international law, should be weighed so favorably towards copyright holders on the GII to the detriment of First Amendment freedoms?" (Fraser, p. 801). One wonders what average Americans would think if they knew how many anti-First Amendment positions the Clinton administration takes on both at home (see Abrams, 1997) and abroad?

Reading articles about WIPO in the European Intellectual Property Review suggests that other countries are not particularly concerned about U.S. positions; EIPR articles about WIPO state or imply that the United States is out-of-step with much of the rest of the world, but U.S. positions on many specific issues are not mentioned; one wonders if the train is leaving the station again without the U.S. on board. (Even Fraser's article in the American Journal of Computer & Information Law scoffs at the United States' hypocrisy and arrogance; on the current U.S. position on audiovisual performance rights, for instance, he noted, "Taking the high moral ground that the United States now claims can appear hollow when considering that historically, U.S. protection of foreign works, at least prior to its joining the Berne Union in 1989, was pitiful at best" [p. 791]).

And certainly there is no indication that the United States alone--or even together with a group of European Community nations--will prevail or even always be able to slow down diplomatic progress when in the minority.

Critique of WIPO Treaties

The new Copyright and Performances/Phonograms treaties, in addition to the proposed databases treaty, largely are justified by their supporters and defenders on the basis of history and legal precedent alone. Mossinghoff and Oman wax nostalgic, equating history and technology with progress: "the history of the United States is no more accurately reflected than in the vast collection of United States patents," and then listing several of them. Previously existing and new tough intellectual property laws are further justified with such statements as, "A World Bank study found that 65 percent of modern pharmaceutical products would not have been developed or introduced in the absence of adequate intellectual property protection" (Mossinghoff and Oman, p. 683).

Vinje, and Reinbothe et al. are glowing about progress that the WIPO treaties represent. Vinje (pp. 235-236) summarized the assumptions of international Internet law as:

> "Those who provide, deliver and consume content in the Information Society are each economically dependent on one another. Content providers must have adequate and effective protection of they will not produce works and place them into a digital environment. Infrastructure providers must have predictability about, and appropriate limitations on, their liability for copyright infringement or they will not open new avenues for the distribution of copyright works by building and providing the Information Infrastructure. Consumers must have adequate access to copyright works at reasonable cost or there will be no market for Information Society products."

He concluded that the Treaty

> "actually achieved this balance. By providing new and valuable rights to copyright holders, avoiding the adoption of provisions that risked stifling innovation and investment in new delivery technology, and taking account of the needs of the consuming public, the Copyright Treaty should help fulfill the promise of the Information Society to make more information available to more people than ever imagined, furthering the advance of culture, learning and democratic participation."

Reinbothe et al. concluded that "The two new treaties represent a major historical step forward in international copyright and neighbouring rights protection. They may be considered a significant improvement on the Berne and Rome Conventions, which have not been revised since 1971 and 1961 respectively. At the same time, they update the WTO/TRIPs Agreement."

Ultimately, Reinbothe et al. claimed, "Regarding [new technologies] the new WIPO treaties are probably more advanced and adapted to the current technologies than any national law." This would appear to be true vis-a-vis U.S. laws, and how WIPO treaties mesh with other countries domestic laws is outside the scope of this paper.

The WIPO conference was well aware of certain legal issues that it was unable to resolve, either because such issues were not brought up, or because they were brought up but not resolved. The two major topics still to be addressed by WIPO are databases, about which the 1996 conference issued a brief "Recommendation" statement, and audiovisual performances, about which the Conference issued a short "Resolution." Reinbothe concluded that databases were not addressed in greater detail because many countries considering a separate databases treaty to be "premature" (p. 175), and hinted that the United States was the major stumbling block on an audiovisual performances treaty: "While this approach [recognizing the "artificial(ity)" of distinguishing between sound performances and audiovisual] has been shared by a large number of countries, the United States, against the background of the particular features of its film industry, has been in the forefront of opposition against the protection of audiovisual artists."

The WIPO Treaties & Today's Legal Regime

Let us assume, however, at least for the sake of argument, that the WIPO treaties--particularly the Copyright Treaty--of Dec. 20, 1996, are realistic, useful, enforceable additions to the international law of intellectual property. Commentators still agree that they left several questions unanswered, many of which were of course brought up and then not resolved. They are:

Do WIPO Countries Understand the Impact of Browsing as Infringement?

Although the Clinton administration was not able to make browsing on the Internet (i.e. simply looking at a copyrighted website) against international law in the WIPO Copyright Treaty's main text, it did get an Agreed Statement (a sort of Appendix) to that regard. Fraser (1997) wrote,

> "[U]nless an exception is included for browsing in a states' national legislation for 'a normal exploitation of the [copyrighted] work' that does 'not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author,' browsing constitutes an infringing reproduction of that work. Assuming the requisite thirty nations ratify the WIPO Copyright Treaty for it to enter into force, and further assuming the treaty proves popular, browsing on the GII, unless otherwise excepted, could become illegal even though there is no other way to view the materials or to know before hand if a work is copyrighted or in the public domain. In fact, under Mr. [Mihaly] Fiscor's [Assistant Director General of WIPO] interpretation of the Berne Convention, browsing may already be forbidden" (p. 778)

Fraser comfortingly pointed out that "it is arguable that private uses of copyrighted materials are not infringements in the United States" (p. 778) and speculated that "If practically every instance of browsing risks constituting an infringement, the likelihood of being pursued for the infraction is currently small" (p. 778). But this brings to mind archaic U.S. laws against jaywalking (which are seldom enforced, and when they are, apparently usually in cycles tied to political concerns) or consensual sodomy, and makes ironic new technology laws that will be enforced seldom and/or inconsistently. Fraser claims another irony: "What the new WIPO Treaties ignore is that in many cases, the largest users of copyrighted materials tend to be authors and copyright holders themselves, thereby placing an impediment on their expression that could be tragic" (p. 781).

How Can the Creator's "Moral Rights" Concept be Applied to the Internet?

When the United States finally adopted the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, the U.S. bound itself to recognize a creator's "moral rights," which, as Delta and Matsuura (1998) explain:

> "has been a popular legal concept in many countries other than the United States. This concept essentially grants the creator of a work the right to be identified as its creator and the right to object to uses of the work which would discredit the reputation of the creator. Moral rights are structured around the premise that a creative artist has a right to protect the creative integrity of his or her work and to protect his or her integrity as an artist. Those rights are deemed to be personal to the artist, and as such, they cannot be transferred or waived....
>
> "Although this is an internationally recognized legal concept, there is a great deal of disparity in the way the principle is enforced by different countries. As noted previously, the concept has never been popular in the United States....Moral rights are a bit of an intellectual property wild card thanks to the uncertainty of their scope...." (p. 5-75).

More to the point for this paper, Delta and Matsuura (1998) explain/speculate that moral rights could "complicate" the Internet, primarily if some governments decided that moral rights "cannot be transferred and cannot be waived" (p. 5-76). In particular, they fear that moral rights claims could "impede development of the information infrastructure" generally, in part because "many of the vast opportunities offered by networked communications databases depend on the ready transferability of intellectual property." Delta and Matsuura also are concerned that "artists and photographers" may use moral rights arguments as a "means of exerting additional control over the material distributed on-line," particularly because the "Internet environment makes it very easy to manipulate and alter content" (p. 5-76). Their recommendations are as follows:

> "From the perspective of legal and operational practitioners, the prudent course would involve awareness of the potential that moral rights possess to complicate intellectual property transactions and an attempt to deal with that potential complication through creative use of releases and acknowledgments by artists. From the perspective of policymakers, prudence would suggest directly discussing possible methods to make moral rights more uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and to permitting waiver or limitation of such rights" (p. 5-76).

One is prompted to wonder what planet Delta and Matsuura live on. U.S. artists --particularly work-for-hire writers and photographers--routinely sign away most or all of their rights, and, if "moral rights" picks up steam as a widely-recognized right domestically, surely "moral rights" will be no different. The authors also seem to assume that "artists and photographers" now and perhaps always have various means of "exerting additional control." Yet it is highly probably that such U.S. creators are almost completely unorganized into economic units, relatively few sue except in the most egregious cases, probably many creators are ignorant of even current domestic and international copyright law, and artists most likely are not going to spend time tracking down who has copied one of their, say, photos or paintings onto a website or other location and altered it. How would they ever find these pirated versions of their work in cyberspace, especially since neither the works' original name nor their names as artists would likely still be attached? How can the creator of a work have his/her reputation damaged if people use the unauthorized use of the work but have no idea whose work it was--which would be the case much of the time?

Moreover, who is to say which "uses of the work...discredit the reputation of the creator"? Some uses of a work, even if the artist knows about them and thinks such usage discredits him/her, may actually improve the artist's reputation. Other usages--for example, an alteration obvious to anyone who sees the work--would have no effect on the reputation because the average user would know that the work was altered, likely without the creator's knowledge or consent.

U.S. publishing houses, recording companies and other corporate entities are unlikely to support expansion of "moral rights." Since "moral rights" extend to creators only, they would seem to increase the legal power of individual creators and relatively decrease the power of their publishers, broadcasters, curators, exhibitors, recording studios, distributors, etc. Finally, it is unlikely that the United States government will support expansion of moral rights domestically or internationally (especially not "mak[ing] moral rights more uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction," if these means from one country to the next); "moral rights" are new to U.S. law, would suggest significant changes in U.S. law, and would be contrary to the pro-big business postures of the Clinton administration and, to a lesser extent, the Republican-controlled Congress.

It is unlikely that the "moral rights" idea will gain much ground in the U.S. despite its Berne treaty signing. But as Fraser concludes, "The issue cannot...be wished away or diminished." If other countries try to enforce moral rights even more than ever on the Internet while the U.S. continues to give the issue only lip service, it is anyone's guess how this will be resolved. It highlights the problems caused when the United States acts as if it can force and persuade other countries to adopt laws similar to U.S. laws, while the reverse is seldom or never acceptable.

Is Trade Overpromoted, but not International Relations & Education?

Although "the business of America is business," as President Calvin Coolidge once said, early and many not-so-early proponents of the Internet thought and hoped that the business of the Internet would be primarily political, cultural, personal, educational, and recreational--maybe with a little ordering out of the on-line catalog on the side. Several books such as the one by Stoll (1995) recount--with varying levels of surprise, sorrow or outrage--the Internet's history and the now common realization that the Internet may or may not (probably the latter) fulfill its early promise. This is true in part, though not wholly, because both corporations and government want to either make money or cut expenses or prevent losses with the Internet. Not only do the WIPO treaties, then, primarily deal with economic issues, but the world's nations discovered that only one way existed to regulate even free cultural exchanges on the Internet--and that is through the World Trade Organization, GATT and TRIPs. Now that both the treaties and the enforcement of treaties are grounded in nothing but economic mechanisms and economic goals, where does this leave the early promise of the Internet vis-a-vis international law (or even international incentives)? Nothing but money seems to be of much concern, and there is no indication of this changing.

Will "National Treatment" Work, and if So, How?

National treatment requires a court to treat a foreign individual or corporation as if it were a citizen of the country in which the court is located, and will usually result in the application of that country's laws. Fraser (1997) wrote, "The advantage of national treatment is that courts do not need to learn another country's law whenever a foreign copyright owner is before its courts. The disadvantage is that copyright protection in a given work will vary from country to country" (p.

764; citation omitted). The result of this, Fraser asserted, is that, "Surfing the Internet, the process of searching, perusing and collecting materials on the GII, might result in the unknowing infringement of the copyright laws of numerous nations" (p. 765). Can we assume that, if this is implemented, that only flagrant copyright infringers will be prosecuted? And if not every copyright infringer is prosecuted, how will countries make determinations of who to prosecute?

The TRIPs agreement, which under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, allows for trade retaliation against countries not enforcing intellectual property law, quite likely will cure some enforcement problems of the old Berne Convention. But pirated copies of entire books, movies, record albums, etc., were tangible products of infringements upon which to base claims and could more easily be shown to cause economic damage to producers and creators. Will Country A be willing and able to seek trade sanctions against Country B simply because it has many Web surfers violating the copyrights--simply by looking at them--of websites based in Country A?

Delta and Matsuura (1998) explained that the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement are an "essential first step toward constructively relieving some of that strain [between countries]. The international framework established by those efforts is not yet sufficient [to] accomplish what it needs to do" (p. 5-81). They added, however, that "such a legal and regulatory framework must be characterized by consistency among all nations" and that "Current efforts...attempting to develop a basic level of consistency...are proving to be quite complicated to complete successfully." In other words, the overall, long-term outlook is not encouraging.

And if this problem weren't large enough, Fraser (1997) also pointed out that even "determining the country from which an infringing work is first sent over the GII may prove a cumbersome problem in itself," adding, "Use of anonymous remailers, where indicators of the source of a work are removed, are an obvious example."

How Will We Avoid Damaging "Fair Use" or Undo Damage Done?

Fraser (1997) implies that the concept of "Fair Use" as an exception to copyright is primarily an American right. As international copyright law is written and implemented, he wrote, the

United States may only be able to shoehorn it into international law through catch-all articles that allow for countries to continue with domestic laws that are not significantly different from international law. But even then Fraser is afraid that the U.S. fair use doctrine is a "general provision... which possibly would not be specific enough" (p. 776) to be considered as an exception to international law, since exceptions are supposed to be limited in number and narrow in scope. This is another major problem with domestic versus international law.

The New WIPO Treaties & What Some Believe is Today's Real World

In the area of copyright, it is asserted that copyrighted products account for 6% of the United States' Gross Domestic Product (GDP), some part of which also composes $40 billion worth of exports; interestingly, Mossinghoff and Oman do not claim--as other commentators do (as noted above) that, say, 65 percent of copyrighted products would not have been produced without copyright protection. Such an argument is common among copyright defenders and promoters; yet it conveniently overlooks the fact that it doesn't seem uncommon to see material that surely is copyrighted having been copied on the Internet anyway (i.e. lots of infringing is going on that copyright holders aren't doing much about) and, I think more importantly, almost all of the content currently on the Internet was created and placed there without being copyrighted. Fraser (1997) put it,

> "If the examination were to end there [with the idea that creators wouldn't contribute to the Internet with copyright protection], authors and copyright holders would be understandably reticent to placing their works on the GII for fear of forever losing control over their creations. A giant vacuum would arise, of insufficient content, and as a result, lack of interest and use. The reality, of course, is quite the opposite....In fact, the Internet has been referred to as one of the greatest public forums for free speech ever created" (p. 788).

Perhaps claimed needs for strict copyright laws--to be honest about the Internet--would have to rewritten something like, "It has been claimed by creators and producers of copyrighted material that 65% of such material would not have been produced without copyright protection, and elites believe this will continue to be true about the appearance on the Internet of content they value and prefer; they are ignoring both the technological and cultural realities of the Internet."

Nicholas Negroponte (1995) takes this assault on the assumptions and preferences of elites to its most extreme, simply stating, "Copyright law is totally out of date. It is a Gutenberg artifact. Since it is a reactive process, it will probably have to break down completely before it is corrected"

(p. 58). Negroponte perhaps thinks copyright already has broken down, but for whatever reason is unwilling to say so; for instance, he emphasizes that, "In some countries, as many as 95 percent of al videocassettes sold are pirated" (p. 59). One doesn't have to be an international law expert to reasonably guess that neither WIPO nor international laws/treaties is going to solve this problem.

The WIPO Treaties & Tomorrow's World

If it is difficult to square the WIPO treaties with the realities of today's Internet, it is even more difficult to square the WIPO treaties with what today's trends, technological developments, human nature, the imperatives of capitalism, and other indicators tell us about the Internet in the not-so-distant future. Negroponte (1995) predicted copright's new inabilities to solve what creators and producers probably will find a threat to their livelihoods is:

> "[C]omputer programs, not just people, will be reading material such as this book and making for example, automatic summaries. Copyright law says that if you summarize material, that summary is your intellectual property. I doubt that lawmakers ever considered the idea of abstracting being done by an inanimate entity or robo-pirates" (p. 60).

Negroponte concludes (in a hat tip to McLuhan) that "The medium is no longer the message." He adds that national laws regarding the Internet are highly unlikely to ever be consistent in all 200 countries in the world, and even if they are, some countries will be safe havens for copyright infringers or child pornographers who can't function in major countries: "National law has no place in cyberlaw. Where is cyberspace? If you don't like the banking laws in the United States, set up your machine on the Grand Cayman Islands. Don't like the copyright laws in the United States? Set up your machine in China. Cyberlaw is global law, which is not going to be easy to handle, since we seemingly cannot even agree on world trade of automobile body parts" (pp. 237-238).

An often-quoted Internet theorist, Esther Dyson, suggests persuasively that much national and international law being written (such as the WIPO treaties) or considered, will be impossible to enforce, have little to no effect for that reason or others, or would throw out the baby with the bath water (by limiting demand for it by limiting content or charging relatively high fees for it). Her now-classic article in the December 1994 Release 1.0 advanced a comprehensive theory about Internet developmenet and equillibrium. An attempt to summarize Dyson is made here:

1) High quality content will continue to be important on the Internet, but the best creators must figure out how to get paid well and quickly, since cheaper imitations will emerge. High-quality content must break through the clutter of all of the bad content, and even then understand that not all consumers both recognize and want high-quality content when they see it. Even when they do recognize and want high-quality content, they still will not be willing to pay much for it.

2) Creators should treat content as if it is free, whether it is or not, because intellectual property that can easily be copied or imitated will be. Wise corporate strategy would use free content as a loss leader for services and relationships that can be charged for. Another strategy is for free generic information to serve as a loss leader for customized information that can be charged for. As Dyson wrote, "This 'generosity' isn't a moral decision: it's a business strategy."

3) The Internet will carry ads, but only high quality ads aimed at high-quality consumers.

4) On-line newspapers will survive, but only if ads pay for most or all news costs.

5) High-quality content has a Catch-22. It will only be recognized and properly rewarded if it is widely distributed, but "people want to pay only for what is perceived as scarce." Thus, high-quality content should be used--when sold or given away--to sell subscriptions/memberships for a "continuing supply of reliable, timely content."

6) With more and more high- and low-quality content on the Web, perhaps creators should concentrate on niche or local markets.

7) Advertisers, for their messages to be effective, must try to ensure that they are "inextricable from the content."

8) Consumers will be willing to pay extra for "certification of authenticity and reliability...Brand name, identity, and other marks of value will be important," but fees for such services will go "middlemen and trusted intermediaries," not to creators.

9) Ultimately, the amount of free content will discourage redundant efforts and perhaps even "crummy content," although another possibility is that only high-quality content with premium prices, and low quality content that is free or cheap will survive. "The middle disappears," and intellectual property-related companies have not prepared for this possibility at all.

10) High-quality content will be legally well-protected content, and legally well-protected content will be high-quality content.

How well would the new WIPO treaties help authors, performers and other creators cope with--let alone benefit from--the brave new world as predicted by Dyson?

1) The WIPO treaties obviously could and did nothing to prevent widespread imitation of high quality content. Various aspects of websites can be copyrighted or trademarked, and creators can sue for copyright infringement or trademark dilution (see for example, Outing, 1998), respectively, when they have a case. But we all know that ideas can't be copyrighted and imitations usually borrow only ideas. On Dyson's second point, infringing the copyright of content that people aren't paying much for to begin with would limit damages in lawsuits, perhaps curtail infringement suits, and possibly even force copyright holders to reevaluate the cost-benefit analysis of charging for content and/or the quality of what they placed, or was placed from them, on the Web.

2) If content on the Web is free, and various individuals and corporations are making their money from custom information that is not of interest to anyone else, or custom services not accessible to anyone else, then copyright holders will be primarily interested in preventing use of their content by disreputable individuals/corporations or in unauthorized altered forms. Copyright holders otherwise should be happy to receive free publicity from unauthorized copies of their content, because even unauthorized copies may result in customers paying for customized content or customized services. Again, the copyright infringement of free content limits lawsuits and damages.

3) The WIPO treaties did not address advertising on the Internet, except of course to the extent that advertisements are copyrighted. Advertisers should be happy about free copies, as long as copies are not altered and are not associated with disreputable individuals/corporations. Second, why would WIPO or any other government or international organization want to regulate high quality advertising directed at high quality consumers? In the U.S., for example, that wouldn't seem to be a concern of the Federal Trade Commission or Federal Communications Commission.

4) WIPO treaties make no effort, nor should they, to ensure that high quality news content is available on the Internet, let alone profitable for its producers.

5-7) The WIPO treaties do not attempt to regulate, or protect, subscriptions, memberships, or advertising available over the Internet. They seem to encourage such subscriptions and memberships, however, through the granting of expansive rights to authors, performers, producers, etc. If Dyson is correct that creators will eventually concentrate on local or niche markets, much of the resulting legal issues would be strictly domestic, and the WIPO treaties of little or no relevance.

8) WIPO treaties specifically address property rights management, which is an issue that would be closely tied to "certification of authenticity and reliability...Brand name, identity, and other marks of value." Dyson's prediction that related fees would go to middlemen would not sit well with countries interested in maximum remuneration for creators, but perhaps they would accept such a system as a reasonable cost of helping creators maintain and enjoy their "moral rights."

9) The WIPO treaties would surely be significantly less useful and less necessary if eventually all Internet content is very high or very low in quality. There surely would be less content on the Internet overall than if all types of content survived, consumers would be more used to the "real McCoy" of high quality content, infringers (particularly those associated with low quality content sites) of high quality content would most likely be easier to spot and thus easier to prosecute, and high quality content sites would be extremely unlikely to infringe upon the copyrights of low quality content or other high quality content.

10) Although no WIPO treaty would admit this, and WIPO treaties are written so as to protect content regardless of quality, one could reasonably guess that WIPO negotiators are more interested in protecting high-quality and/or high profitability content than other types of content on the basis that the best content is more important to a country's economic and/or cultural well-being.

In sum, if Dyson and other so-called cyberspace "purists" are correct about what really is happening and will happen between creators, intellectual property corporations, and the public, then it will not matter in the long run whether the U.S., the European Community, and/or individual countries have up until now taken the most realistic positions on the international law of the

Internet (the WIPO treaties, etc.). If Dyson is correct, it will soon become apparent that the U.S. and other countries negotiating on the basis of previous domestic and international intellectual property law were squabbling not over details, but squabbling over irrelevant details. And should the futility and irrelevance of documents such as the WIPO treaties become widely apparent--especially if this happens sooner rather than later after their ratifications--the net result could be significant damage to international law's credibility, in the intellectual property area if not generally.

Conclusions

Many, if not most, of the questions posed by this paper still are unaswered. How will, say writers, get compensated by or for people who read their writing off a computer screen, perhaps saving part or all of it in computer file or printing part or all of it on paper? Why would newspaper companies publish a "scoop" on its website if their news can simply be taken and rewritten by someone else, without giving credit for the original source, and perhaps even make more money on a rewritten, repackaged version of the information than the newspaper did in the first place? How will a photographer protect himself from altered versions of his photographs, still attributed to him or not, showing up on websites other than his own? The questions are many, and the answers are few when confronted with a medium that can send more information, more quickly.

Generally, it seems that much of the discussion by politicians, diplomats, legal scholars, policy wonks, and journalists is too abstract and is rooted both too much in the past (domestic and international intellectual property law as it has developed over the past 100+ years), too much in a future that may never arrive (large amounts of, say, copyrighted materials being distributed--without proper remuneration to copyright holders--to large numbers of people who supposedly otherwise would pay for it), and not rooted enough in the present (a time when relatively few people seem willing to pay for anything on the Internet except pornography, and full text versions of anything copyrighted are rare, even for those willing to pay).

So far, the rhetoric domestically and internationally has indicated that copyright holders seem to have an extremely high opinion of the content they can provide, a very high opinion about the public's interest in receiving copyrighted material over the Internet, and a very low opinion of the public's ethics and morals. (This has come out slightly different for computers in schools: the quality of Internet content is high; teachers' interest in and need for such content to be delivered over the Internet is high; and we don't need to worry about whether teachers and students will respect the law--except in the case of children who want to see pornography.) It is likely that only the third assumption is correct. Internet content quality generally is low; as Vinje (1997) asked (p. 233), "Will every, or even most, of those ephemeral copies have economic significance justifying their characterisation as an infringing act?" In other words, how can an author claim financial damage if no would have paid anything for the content he provided for free and which people saved on a disk or printed on paper, almost for free? Intellectual property companies act as if their products are services always unique and always significantly better than those available to consumers from any individual entrepreneur or artist (professional or amateur); but as Shenk's first "Law of Data Smog" puts it, "Information, once rare and cherished like caviar, is now plentiful and taken for granted like potatoes" (p. 11).

Moreover, people seem generally interested in information from the Internet that they would simply obtain in no-cost or low-cost alternative ways: travel planning, arts/entertainment information, sports news, pornography, shopping for goods and services (including college educations), and various other information they previously would have obtained in person, by mail or by phone from commercial companies (and not necessarily holders and enforcers of said information), public libraries, government agencies, non-profit organizations, bookstores, etc. Second, it is arguable that the copyrighted material that media conglomerates most want to protect will not be made available by those media conglomerates or anyone else, or read or downloaded off the Internet. Is anyone going to read an entire Stephen King novel on their computer screen? No. Is anyone going to watch Titanic on their computer screen? Maybe. How many people have expressed interest in reading a newspaper on a computer screen? Several newspaper websites already have been shut down. Most Internet copyright infringements will be like most copyright infringements always have been--minor infractions for personal use.

And if a company is so afraid that that, say, a magazine issue's entire contents available on a subscription-based website will be pirated and sold in violation of copyright, there are two reactions seldom voiced. The first is, "How does the publisher know that the loss of sales outweighs the marketing/promotions/public relations value of non-subscribers seeing the magazine's contents?" The second is, "If you don't want your copyrighted material pirated, don't put it on the Internet in the first place." Copyright holders' position on Internet-based copyright questions seem similar to a publisher of a slim book with a title like, How to Get Away with Cheating the IRS--priced at $50--selling a copy to the New York City Public Library and then wondering why everyone goes to the library and photocopies it instead of paying $50 for their own copy. Sure an entire novel can be scanned into a computer and then posted on a website, but wonder how often this will happen in the real world; who would read a novel that way?

The U.S. government and many corporations that sell intellectual property also seem to imply that intellectual property would not be created in the United States unless its creators were not only get paid for it, but getting paid handsomely by recording companies, book publishers, movie studios, magazine publishing groups, etc. I think this view reflects what intellectual property corporations think they need to claim to protect their high profits, and has very little to do with the creators themselves (although apparently also held by such cynics as Stoll [p. 179]). Anybody who has ever read a book about, or heard an interview with, creators--whether successful or not--knows that most authors, singers, songwriters, actors, poets, composers, and even journalists would do what they do whether they were getting paid well or not. Many U.S. creators, in fact, do create for very little or no money at all, and often little difference exists between the works of high-quality "amateurs" and low-quality "professionals" (in fact, amateurs are sometimes better, but simply haven't been "discovered" or otherwise been at the right place at the right time). In fact, the Internet could add to the U.S.'s creative output, for example, as the thousands of books written in the U.S. each year but rejected by publishers could be placed on the World Wide Web.

And, again, most highly successful creators claim that they would continue to do what they do even if they were making much less money. If such statements have any credibility whatsoever, copyright infringements over the long run may mean simply the end of extravagant incomes for top creators and high profits for intellectual property companies, and not a decrease in the quantity or quality of U.S. intellectual property output. As Goldstein wrote,

> "The copyright pessimist would write a law based on the answer to just one question: How much money would it have taken to get Margaret Mitchell to sit down at her desk to write Gone with the Wind and to get her publisher to publish it? In a commentary on the 2 Live Crew case, the New York Times critic Jon Pareles wrote, 'Any song that is well enough known to make a takeoff worthwhile has probably already raked in plenty of profits from sales, licensing agreements, sheet music, etc. Sometimes I'm tempted to suggest that any song that has sold more than a million (or maybe two million or five million) copies ought to go directly into the public domain, as if its fans have ransomed it from the copyright holders.' Edward Murphy, president of the National Music Publishers' Association, did not take this tongue-in-cheek suggestion lightly. 'This outrageously regressive attitude,' he wrote to the editor of the Times, 'has been rejected by nearly every government in the world.'...(pp. 15-16)
>
> "Is copyright protection needed as an incentive to creative production? One reason the copyright optimists resist the pessimists' claim so strongly is that they know that, if put to rigorous empirical proofs, they would often have a hard time answering this question affirmatively." (p. 17)

Overall, it seems that legal issues surrounding the Internet domestically are relatively straightforward under current U.S. copyright law, but the legal issues internationally are extremely complicated. In addition to all of the various problems already discussed, one source pointed out, for instance, that some countries don't even have a domestic copyright law. It appears, then, that to the extent that the Internet both can be and should or must be regulated, that a combination of legal and market mechanisms have the best chance of working well. Delta and Matsuura (1998) wrote:

> "When evaluating intellectual property protection mechanisms appropriate for the global information infrastructure, it is unwise to focus solely on the legal framework of intellectual property rights and remedies. Instead, significant attention should be paid to the economic relationships and incentives associated with the various participants in the Internet marketplace. To the extent that business strategies and commercial incentives can be used to foster the development of optimal use patterns for intellectual property, as a resource, such strategies and incentives are preferable to exclusive reliance on legal rights and legal enforcement mechanisms. Although it is impossible and inappropriate to use business strategies and commercial incentives to replace the framework of intellectual property law, it is equally inappropriate to rely solely on intellectual property law principles to manage the availability of intellectual property in an environment as dynamic as that presented by the global information infrastructure. Exclusive reliance on such legal principles will result in inefficient policies governing the development and use of the information infrastructure. Such policies are likely to impede the development of that infrastructure and will not serve the objectives behind the existing intellectual law framework."

Or as Fraser (1997) wrote much more simply and briefly, "if the GII's promise is to be fulfilled, centralized state control cannot easily be asserted, if it should be asserted at all."

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Int'l

Professionalism and African values at The Daily Nation in Kenya

Carol Pauli
Marist College
Poughkeepsie, NY

Abstract

A survey of 15 journalists at Kenya's largest independent newspaper finds that they place high importance on such hallmarks of professionalism as a willingness to go to jail to protect sources and a belief in the value of education (McLeod and Hawley, 1964). It also suggests a journalistic role of "populist/peacemaker," which is consistent with African communitarian values, as suggested by Bourgault (1993), and which is different from American roles found in earlier studies (Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman, 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986). This African role bears some similarity to an emerging American role found by Weaver and Wilhoit (1996), that of the "populist mobilizer."

Professionalism and African values at *The Daily Nation* in Kenya

Africa offers an unusual opportunity to explore the meaning of professionalism in journalism and the range of roles that journalists can play. These are questions not only of academic interest, but also of pressing importance to many African journalists, themselves. The number of independent newspapers has increased in Africa during the past decade of the "Second Liberation." (Eribo and Jong-Ebot, 1997) But, despite constitutional, legal and economic changes favorable to the media, the press is still beset by problems (Ogbonda, 1997) and press freedom is fragile (Eribo and Jong Ebot, 1997) In some cases, critics say, journalists' failure to live up to professional standards may provoke the government to reassert press controls. (Kasoma, 1997; Ogbonda). On the other hand, some journalists complain that they cannot function when the government does not respect them as professionals in their own country. The author has heard journalists in Botswana, among the more open of African nations, complain that they had to wait weeks or months for interviews with government officials, while foreign journalists were eagerly received on short notice (Botswana Journalists Association, personal communication, 1992). Professionalism implies not only a certain kind of behavior from the journalists but also a certain measure of respect from government officials, business leaders and others whom they must engage in their work.

Related to professionalism, but not identical to it, is the role that the journalist plays. A broad, open-ended, inquiry into a variety of possible roles is encouraged by the unusual situation of the African press. Independent journalism is still young in Africa. The mass media were first imported and dominated by colonial powers and then dominated again, in many cases, by one-party African governments (De Beer, Kasoma, Megwa and Steyn, 1995). African media bear the strong imprint of European colonial values but also of African society (DeBeer, et al.) whose deepest cultural values are linked to oral tradition (Bourgault, 1993). African media critics call for an African model of journalism and also for journalism training, rooted in traditional practices. (Okigbo and Pratt, 1997).

This study is a preliminary attempt at two things. First, it inquires into professionalism by replicating, among a group of Kenyan journalists, McLeod's 1964 survey on implementation of professional values. Second, it asks how these journalists see their roles, using questions similar to those asked among American journalists by Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman (1976) and Weaver and Wilhoit (1996). In those surveys, Johnstone found two fundamental roles: neutral and participant, while Weaver and Wilhoit identified four: adversarialist, interpreter, disseminator and populist mobilizer. This study attempts to learn whether journalists in Kenya, where the press has been described as among the most Westernized of Africa , 1983), place a high value on roles that are rooted in African discourse styles and cultural values -- specifically a respect for rulers, group identity and praise singing -- which are among those outlined by Bourgault (1993).

African values would seem to support two complementary roles: disseminator and populist. The disseminator role, which suggests a responsibility to communicate government policies to the public in a top-down flow of information, seems easily consistent with Africa's traditional respect for elders. Such respect, dating back to pre-colonial times, can translate into a requirement that journalists always grant news coverage to government officials (Bourgault, 1993). It can still be seen, in a more extreme form, among African leaders who regard journalists as "naive small boys and girls..." (De Beer, Kasoma, Megwa and Steyn, 1995, p. 234). The disseminator role can become a passive one, in which the reporter serves a merely secretarial function and headlines become exhortations from government officials to the public.

as could readily be seen in Malawi during the regime of former President Banda (Malawian journalists, personal communication, 1992).

However, the traditional African emphasis on community (Bourgault, 1993; Okigbo and Pratt, 1997) would seem to encourage a journalist also to move information in the opposite direction, bottom-up, bringing the grassroots knowledge, experiences and concerns of the public to the attention of government officials. In pre-colonial Ghana, for example, the chief's "speakers" could, at least in limited ways, bring public complaints to the leader, providing a two-way flow of communication. (Murphy and Scotton, 1987) A need for this kind of communication, giving voice to common people in developing nations, has been stressed by Galtung and Vincent (1992) and its relative scarcity in the modern African media has been decried by Ogbonda (1997):

> "... the opinions of and issues relevant to rural populations, peasants, farmers, laborers, shepherds, market traders, fishermen and women are not accommodated in media content..."

Such grassroots communication can be hindered when it overlaps the adversarial role and puts African journalists in a politically and culturally uncomfortable position. Covering everyday people inevitably brings up problems such as hunger, labor disputes and educational gaps. Stories focusing on themes such as these may be viewed as a threat by the government (Ogbonda, 1997).

Traditional African culture also would be expected to discourage journalists from seeing their mission as one of empowering individuals, since a group orientation -- extending to a sense of non-individuality -- is the "the hallmark of African society" (Bourgault, 1993, p. 80). Instead, traditional culture would logically focus on strengthening the peace and unity of communities, a role that can come into conflict with other roles. Okigbo and Pratt (1997), agreeing with Moemeka (1997), write that, to meet the needs of their audiences, the media should promote social order and improve interpersonal relationships. In keeping with this orientation, as Bourgault (1993) observes, "in the context of modern Africa, establishing the truth of substantive issues in the press often takes a back seat to the needs of social harmony." (p. 81). That a goal of social harmony can limit reporting can be illustrated by the discomfort of a Tanzanian journalist at a political reporting workshop sponsored by USIA in Tanzania, a country that has consciously promoted a strong sense of national unity in order to counter tribal fracturing. The author encouraged reporters to become familiar with the concerns of their various constituencies. For example, the author suggested, the concerns of rural people might be different from those of city dwellers: concerns of Muslims, from those of Christians. After a few more examples, a Tanzanian journalist stood to protest: "But you'll tear us apart: We are all Tanzanians!" (USIA workshop, personal communication, 1992).

African tradition, among other forces, would also seem to support journalists in performing the role of praise-singing for their rulers, communities and nations -- and in shying away from self-criticism. As Bourgault (1993) observes, criticism in Africa is often reserved for internal, domestic communication only, not for public display, especially to outsiders. This tradition is heightened by the dependence of African nations on the international community and is reflected, for example, when Kasoma (1997) criticizes African journalists for what he sees as irresponsible attacks on the government: "What if what the newspapers publish, true or false, is taken seriously by the electorate, and more especially, by the international donors?" (p. 299) African journalists have complained in the past that the developed world already focused on their societies' weaknesses (Martin, 1983). They would seem, therefore, to have ample reason -- tradition, nation-building and personal pride -- to try to balance the picture. Some state this role explicitly: "the media have a responsibility toward the continent as a whole to change the image of Africa in foreign media." (De Beer, Kasoma, Megwa and Steyn, 1995).

Method

The survey was conducted in March, 1998, in the Nairobi newsroom of The Daily Nation. The English-language newspaper, established in 1961 as part of the Aga Khan's East

African Newspapers Ltd. enterprise, historically supported African self-government but was not reluctant to criticize African leaders. (Hatchen 1971). It has grown to become the largest independent newspaper in Kenya, with a circulation of 170,000 (Editor and Publisher, 1998) and a broad readership (Okigbo, 1997). It is characterized as "perhaps the boldest" of the Nairobi dailies, having more brushes with authorities than others (Eribo and Jong-Ebot, 1997).

Survey forms were distributed by an American journalist working at the newspaper under Knight fellowship. Of the 60 forms distributed, 15 anonymous responses were returned. All of the respondents, 12 men and 3 women, reported that they had an active role in the news function of the paper. Their median age group was 31-45. Their median experience level was 6-10 years of work in journalism.

Items in the survey included McLeod and Hawley's (1964) 13 "Professional Implementation Items" on job performance, professional training, organization of the newspaper and professional organizations. These items, asking each respondent to check along a seven-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" were repeated in their original form, except for minor rewording which seemed advisable to bridge the cultural gap between American and Kenyan journalists.

Along the same seven-point scale, journalists responded to seven additional statements about the importance of different journalistic roles. Four items fit into Weaver and Wilhoit's (1996) roles of disseminator ("to inform the public of government policies"), adversary ("to examine the workings of government"), interpreter ("to present different points of view in a controversy") and populist mobilizer ("to inform the government of public concerns").

Other survey items suggested a community-oriented, peacemaker role, ("to promote unity and harmony in communities"). Another question looked for the journalists' concern for individual empowerment ("to give individuals the information they need to make decisions.") A final item offered a praise-singing role attuned to the sensitivities of developing nations ("to reflect a positive image of the community").

TABLE 1

Professional Implementation Items
(Kenyan responses compared to McLeod's 1964 survey of American journalists)

	Group means		
	Kenyan Journalists	McLeod Professionals	McLeod Semi-Pros
Performance of job			
Journalists should be willing to go to jail or leave the country if necessary to protect the identity of their news sources.	1.4	2.10	2.40
Emphasis on the five "W's" in the lead is overdone.	3.8	2.79	3.76
It is all right to take promotional or informtional junkets sponsored by business organizations or government agencies if there are no strings attached.	2.5	5.15	4.62
A journalist should not continue to work for a newspaper if he disagrees with its editorial policy.	2.2	4.87	5.05
Professional training			
A college education should be mandatory for beginning journalists.	2.9	1.98	2.78
For the working journalist, there should be required and periodic institutes or refresher courses at a nearby university, e.g., courses in economics or political sciences.	1.2	3.19	3.62
In early journalism training, it is more important to learn how to write than how to get the story.	2.4	5.06	5.03

Organization of the newspaper			
There should be greater intellectual specialization in journalism, e.g., science, local government farm economics.	1.5	3.08	3.18
Journalists as a group have a legitimate claim to help determine news column content and policies.	2.6	3.10	3.24
It is the duty of the newspaper to its stockholders to do more than break even, even at the expense of cutting back the news function.	6.0	5.04	4.68
Professional organizations			
Professions such as law and medicine have developed organizations to uphold professional standards. Journalists themselves should form an organization to deal with problems that come up and to police the profession.	1.1	4.12	4.13
If a member of a professional journalism organization commits an unprofessional action (e.g. takes a bribe), he should be disciplined by the professional organization.	1.2	3.95	3.97
A journalist should be certified by his professional organization as to qualifications, training, and competence.	2.2	5.04	5.09

Means indicated are based on a 7-point scale, where "1" indicates extreme agreement with the statement and "7" denotes extreme disagreement.

TABLE 2
Journalism roles

An important role of the journalist is to:	Group Means	Standard Deviations
Inform the government of public concerns.	2.1	1.5
Present different points of view in a controversy.	2.2	2.1
Promote the strength and unity of communities.	2.5	1.8
Provide information that individuals need to make decisions.	2.7	2.4
Inform the public of government policies.	2.9	2.4
Examine the workings of government.	3.2	2.1
Reflect a positive image of the community.	4.8	2.5

TABLE 3
Professionalism and roles
Pearson's correlation coefficients

	Disseminator	Adversary	Interpreter	Populist	Peace-maker	Individual	Praise-singer
Performance of job							
Journalists should be willing to go to jail leave the country if necessary to protect the identity of their news sources.	-.009	.370	.286	**.589***	.501	.435	.064
Emphasis on the five "W's" in the lead is overdone.	-.259	-.365	-.265	-.278	-.192	-.279	**-.614***
It is all right to take promotional or informational junkets sponsored by business organizations or government agencies if there are no strings attached.	.044	.363	-.241	.025	-.168	-.059	-.117
A journalist should not continue to work for a newspaper if he disagrees with its editorial policy.	.336	.386	.244	-.178	.105	.250	.229
Professional training							
A college education should be mandatory for beginning journalists.	**.717***	**.590**	.447	.470	.073	**.545***	.068
For the working journalist, there should be required and periodic institutes or refresher courses at a nearby university, e.g., courses in economics or political sciences.	.082	.163	.406	-.024	.290	.396	.351
In early journalism training, it is more important to learn how to write than how to get the story.	.302	.082	-.187	.209	-.014	.007	-.107

Organization of the newspaper							
There should be greater intellectual specialization in journalism, e.g., science, local government, farm economics.	.305	.275	.020	.347	.343	.203	-.119
Journalists as a group have a legitimate claim to help determine news column content and policies.	.527	**.583***	**.920****	.486	**.601***	**.581***	.447
It is the duty of the newspaper to its stockholders to do more than break even, even at the expense of cutting back the news function.	-.199	**-.601***	-.144	**-.574***	-.378	-.290	-.047
Professional organizations							
Professions such as law and medicine have developed organizations to uphold professional standards. Journalists themselves should form an organization to deal with problems that come up and to police the profession.	**.627***	**.668**	.384	-.019	-.199	**.545***	.384
If a member of a professional journalism organization commits an unprofessional action (e.g. takes a bribe), he should be disciplined by the professional organization.	-.204	.000	-.273	-.138	-.007	-.333	-.273
A journalist should be certified by his professional organization as to qualifications, training, and competence.	.264	.045	-.148	.031	.046	.054	-.148

* significant at $p < .05$
** significant at $p < .01$

TABLE 4
Pearson's correlation coefficients
Journalistic roles

	Adversary	Interpreter	Populist	Peacemaker	Individualist	Praise-singer
Disseminator	**.659***	**.583***	.454	.227	**.784****	.178
Adversary		**.668****	.653	.437	**.784****	-.013
Interpreter			**.543***	.469	**.659***	.267
Populist				**.812****	.666	.207
Peacemaker					.438	.410
Individualist						.121
Praise-singer						

* significant at $p < .05$
** significant at $p < .01$

Results

Professional implementation

The Kenyan journalists' responses regarding implementing professional values were striking on several counts, especially when compared with the McLeod and Hawley (1964) results, as shown in Table 1. Based on two of the categories that McLeod and Hawley found to separate the professionals from the semi-pros, the Kenyan journalists would seem to be more professional than the Americans. They were nearly universal in their strong agreement with the statement that they should be willing to go to jail or leave the country if necessary to protect the identity of their confidential sources. They also placed a high level of importance on the value of education: Although only moderately supportive of higher education as a requirement for journalists, the Kenyans gave the highest priority, among the items asked, to *continuing* education for those already working in the field. They also strongly desired more specialization in the field.

The Kenyans' enthusiastic willingness to join and be guided by a professional organization contrasted sharply with American journalists' declining membership over the past three decades (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996), evidence of the disinterest that Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) found to be the least professional attitude of the Americans. However, like the Americans, the Kenyans backed away a bit from the idea of allowing a professional organization to grant professional certification.

Interestingly, despite the financial trials of African newspapers, the Kenyans rejected, more strongly than Americans, the notion that profit considerations can properly be allowed to cut back on the news function of a newspaper. However, they were far more willing than Americans to accept promotional trips from business or government, as long as these carried no strings. The Kenyans also indicated far more support than Americans for unity in the newsroom.

clearly agreeing with a statement advising quitting one's position over an editorial policy disagreement.

In contrast to the Americans, they ranked writing skills as more important than reporting skills, and they showed barely any agreement with the idea that getting the five "W's" in the lead of a story is overemphasized.

Role

On the question of the role of the journalist, the Kenyans gave the strongest support to a populist, bottom-up flow of communication. In this, they may be ahead of their American counterparts. In their latest survey of American journalists, Weaver and Wilhoit have only begun seeing and tracking this approach, which they say "may be the harbinger of change in the field (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996)." Weaver and Wilhoit sketch an emerging "populist mobilizer" role, which includes "setting the political agenda and letting ordinary people express views." McComb (1997) outlines, among Americans, the beginnings of a proactive agenda-setting role in which journalists base story selection on either their detailed knowledge of community conditions or on popular polling. As shown in Table 2, on a 1-7 scale, the Kenyans very clearly (M=2.1) agreed with the importance of informing the government of public concerns. They were less clear (M=2.9) about the importance of the top-down information flow which seems implied in Weaver and Wilhoit's (1986) disseminator role.

In rank order, the group means also place the analyst role above the disseminator role, a reversal of American results (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996). It sees strengthening communities as more important than providing individuals with the information they need to make decisions. The adversarial role sinks to near the bottom of the list, with its importance ("to examine the workings of government") getting only slight agreement. Contrary to what might be expected, the notion that it is important to reflect a positive image of the places they cover gets mild disagreement.

The relationship of these different roles to the professionalism implementation items was calculated. in Table 3. using Pearson's correlation coefficient. with some statistically significant results. despite the small sample size.

One strong correlation links support for a college education with support for the disseminator role (r =.717. significant at $p<.01$). suggesting that emphasis on disseminating information in a top-down direction may be predicted by a respondent's agreement that a college education should be required for entry into the field.

The adversarial role was also correlated. although less strongly (r = 5.90. significant at $p<.05$) with support for a mandatory college education. Stronger correlations were found in three other survey items. all of them suggesting a sense of journalistic pride and autonomy: a desire for a professional organization (r =6.27). a clear disagreement with the idea that news content should be sacrificed to profits. (r = -.601) and belief that that journalists have a right to help determine that news content (r =.583). This last factor was also linked to the "peacemaker" and "individualist" roles. but in connection with the role of interpreter. it provided the strongest correlation of all (r =.920. significant at $p<.01$). It was the only correlate of the interpreter role.

Support for the "populist" role. conveying information in an upward direction. from the less powerful to the more powerful. was correlated at the p .005 level with a journalist's emphasis on being willing to go to jail to protect confidential sources (r =.589) and also by a fairly clear disagreement with the idea that profits should be allowed to override news content. (r = -.574).

An emphasis on informing audience members as decision-making individuals was linked to support for a mandatory college education and to a desire for a professional organization.

Finally. the journalists who thought it important to reflect a positive image of the places they covered. also put the strongest emphasis on the journalistic formula of getting the "five Ws" in the lead of a story. disagreeing clearly with the statement that they are overdone. (r = -.614).

Table 4 shows correlations among the seven suggested journalism roles. The individualist role has a significant correlation to each of Weaver and Wilhoit's first three roles.

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and those three roles are linked to each other. The strongest correlation. however. is a separate one. between the peacemaker and populist roles (r = .812).

Limitations and suggestions for further research

The small size of the sample in this preliminary study. of course. limits the author's ability to make generalizations. The conclusions here will be most useful in suggesting avenues for further research. In that research. more questions and further refinements to questions are needed. It would also be wise to survey non-journalists. as McLeod and Hawley (1964) did. to get a baseline of cultural values against which newsroom responses can be measured. To repeat the professional implementation items from the McLeod and Hawley survey among the current generation of American journalists would also allow for clearer cross-cultural comparison with their Kenyan counterparts.

Future attempts to find African values at work in African newsrooms should also recognize and try to measure the influence of non-African values. which are already at work there. Some newspapers. including The Daily Nation. were established and initially run by foreigners (Hatchen. 1971) and foreign interests are still important in the commercial press (Eribo and Jong-Ebot. 1997). At the University of Nairobi. the School of Journalism was established with help from UNESCO. Norway. Denmark and Austria (Martin. 1983). Ongoing training programs. sponsored mainly by the United Nations. Christian churches and foreign donors. including the United States Information Agency (De Beer. Kasoma. Megwa and Steyn. 1995). continue to bring Western values and assumptions into African newsrooms. Furthermore. despite demands for Afro-centric journalism training. pragmatic American-style training seems to be the only available model (Okigbo and Pratt. 1997).

Future research should also recognize and take account of the diversity of cultures on the African continent as well as differences in the historical experiences of its nations. As a small example. when the author circulated a survey. similar to the one used in this study. among a group of Rwandan journalism students -- primarily 1994 Tutsi returnees from Uganda -- the students volunteered in discussion that their high support for the peacemaking role came directly from their own consciousness of the tragic ends of tribal conflict (USIA workshop, personal communication, August 1997).

Finally, future research can explore connections between communitarian values in Africa and in the United States. A call for communication to build community was sounded, in this country, in the Hutchins Commission and Kerner Commission reports and is echoed today in "public" journalism's emphasis on the interdependence -- rather than individualism -- of audience members (Christians, Ferre and Fackler, 1993). If American journalists are discovering communitarian values similar to traditional African values, then dialogue and two-way educational exchanges may be fruitful, and may even strengthen community among journalists, across cultures.

Conclusions

This preliminary study suggests that African journalists may be more professional in some of their attitudes than those in the West, particularly in their enthusiasm for what appears to be a near-universal value among journalists (Weaver, 1998): a willingness to accept punishment to protect news sources. They are also far more willing to support and to be disciplined by a professional organization, and they are keenly interested in continuing education and intellectual specialization in their field. On the other hand, they are more accepting of promotional junkets than their American counterparts, who disagree with this practice.

The study suggests that, in Kenya, support for a college education is linked to support for individual empowerment and to Western press roles. It also suggests an African journalistic role -- populist/peacemaker -- which emphasizes communication that originates at the grassroots and works toward community peace and unity.

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REFINING THE PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE PUBLIC RELATIONS EXCELLENCE MODEL

Dan Berkowitz
Associate Professor
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242
(319) 335-5844
dan-berkowitz@uiowa.edu

Nancy Muturi
Graduate Student
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Iowa

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REFINING THE PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE PUBLIC RELATIONS EXCELLENCE MODEL

Abstract

Theoretical models of development communication have made a transition in recent years from a traditional top-down approach towards a participatory approach where beneficiaries of development efforts provide input for communication programs. This paper interfaces concepts from the recent public relations literature on communication excellence with the central ideas of the participatory approach. The conceptual discussion is then applied to a case study of a women's reproductive health program in Kenya.

REFINING THE PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE PUBLIC RELATIONS EXCELLENCE MODEL

In 1994, an edited volume was published entitled *Participatory Communication: Working for Change and Development* (White, Nair & Ascroft, 1994). The writings within represented ideas that grew from a meeting of scholars at a 1989 seminar in Pune, India sponsored by the Development Communication Research Project (DCRP). Twenty chapters by twenty-one scholars highlighted different aspects of what was becoming the new dominant paradigm in development communication.

Many scholars had written about participatory approaches to development even before that book appeared (e.g., Oakley & Marsden, 1984; Mishra, Sharma, & Sharma, 1984; Cohen & Uphoff, 1977). According to Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, (1979) the United Nations Economic and Social Council recommended that governments should adopt the popular participation as a basic policy measure in national development strategy. Popular participation in development is broadly understood as active involvement of people in making decisions about the implementation of processes, programs and projects that affect them (Slocum & Thomas-Slayer, 1995).

Currently, participation has been identified as essential to the "basic needs" approach to development and many participatory methodologies have been applied in development programs. Many scholars have written on the topic (e.g., Agunga, 1997; Okigbo, 1996), where the concept of people's empowerment through participation has been emphasized (Karl, 1993; Nelson & Wright, 1997). The 1993 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, for example, points out ways in which people in developing countries can participate and become closely involved in the economic, social-cultural and political processes in their societies. It is believed that participation as a process of empowerment can help to amplify traditionally unacknowledged voices. The goal is to involve people in the problem definition, data collection, decision making and implementation processes.

Participatory communication strategies pertain to creating conditions for and facilitating dialogue between programs and the stakeholders. The participatory approach has, however, faced a lot of criticisms from among others Robert Chambers, Norman Uphoff, David Korten and by Slocum and colleagues (1995) who have all raised issues on who participates and who benefits from the programs. Despite the strength and good intentions of the participatory approach and its concern for creating culturally resonant solutions for development efforts, most of the literature in this area lacks theoretical and conceptual refinement to put the approach into action. Sparsely defined terms are common, so that many key notions remain murky. This is especially true concerning the nature of local people's participation in development decisions and the related communication (Chambers, 1997). Poor people, those in remote rural areas, and those who live far from population centers especially tend to be missed in the participation process.

Overall, authors tend to portray development communication in black-and-white terms, where the approach is, on the one hand, fully manipulative of the people who programs are designed for, or on the other hand, entirely willing to respond and incorporate whatever suggestions are offered by recipients of a program's concerns. In addition, the role of the communicator in the participatory approach needs to be explicated more clearly, since it typically is portrayed as either a technician or a researcher/technician who tries to understand local people in order to more effectively implement a communication program. The development literature tends to overlook the potential of the communicator as a member of the program planning team who has impact on program decision-making as well as communication decision-making.

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The purpose of this paper is to refine and develop the central ideas of participatory development communication through the application of theory and concepts developed in the field of public relations. It draws on the work of a team of scholars funded by the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC). That work resulted in two books (Grunig, 1992; Dozier, Grunig, & Grunig, 1995) discussing excellence in communication management, much of which parallels the discussion about participatory communication, albeit with a more explicit, more fully delineated conceptual framework. In fact, Agunga (1997, p. 243) begins to draw on the concept of excellence in his recent book, stating that "success comes about by knowing your audience."

This paper begins by examining and critiquing literature about two aspects of development communication. First, we will consider a development program's philosophy concerning the relationship with the local people it intends to serve. Next, we will focus on the nature of the communicator's role in the overall development process. From there, the paper turns to concepts from the IABC research that also explores these two dimensions. Following this theoretical discussion, we will offer an example of how these ideas can be applied to communication with rural Kenyan women about reproductive health and family planning.

Participation In What? From Ideals to Realities

The participatory approach to development communication arose as a reaction to an authoritarian paradigm of one-way communication that relied on persuasive communication to implement predetermined solutions. The Source, Message, Channel, Receiver (SMCR) model, for example, was commonly used in development communication which indicated the power of mass media as multipliers of development benefits. This was later altered by Everett Rogers (1983) in his Diffusion of Innovations theory to SMCRE, with "E" denoting effect. That model in turn became extensively used in development communication where mass media were widely used by development communication professionals to communicate innovations. This model, shown in the Figure 1., indicated the source as active and send messages through the media to passive receivers.

FIGURE 1 HERE

This and other older models left program directors to decide almost autonomously what was best for the people in terms of development programs and they left communicators to decide what would be done to communicate about those programs. When the participatory model was introduced, it highlighted why many development programs had failed: they had not understood the people who were being served so that solutions and innovations were implemented that tended to be discordant with local cultures and lifestyles. The participatory approach offered a model of ideals that grew out of a late 1970s conception of development communication as a two-way dialogue rather than as a monologue from the program to the people (Piotrow, Kincaid, Rimon, & Rinehart, 1997). However, programs sought to include people in the planning and implementation of development projects which were externally initiated, funded and controlled. This approach became manipulative or even coercive and they satisfied bureaucratic imperatives (Thomas-Slayter, 1995).

Central to the participatory approach is the belief that ordinary people are capable of critical reflection and analysis and their knowledge is relevant and necessary. More recently, Rogers included his concerns for the importance of people's participation through information sharing in a revised edition of his book on the Diffusion of Innovations model (1995). A key idea in the roots of the participatory approach was that "effective communication begins with the audience, the client, or the consumer and continues over time as a process of mutual adjustment" (Piotrow, et al., p. 18). Still, the emphasis was on communication to enable people participate in decision making, implementation, benefits or evaluation of programs.

Despite the straightforward nature of this idea, some authors cast communication as an either/or choice, where the development program either imposed changes on its recipients (traditional approach) or it had the will of the recipients imposed on the organization (participatory approach) (White, 1994). In general, though, there has been little rigorous analysis of these oversimplifications, other than the realization that "participatory" may take on more than one meaning (White, 1994). Additional evidence of the vagueness of the participatory concept come from characterizing it as "participatory euphoria" (White, 1994) based on inclusion of indigenous knowledge. This depiction led another author to conclude that "hardly a research proposal is written or a development plan prepared without ... [the] terms being liberally sprinkled throughout the text" (Awa, 1996, p. 137).

Some of the literature about the participatory approach offers conceptual models that tend to be refinements or variations on the sender-receiver ideas offered by Berlo, Rogers and Shoemaker, or Westley and MacLean (Agunga, 1997). These show how the sender (development program) and receiver (local people) fit in, as well as how the communicator fits into the process, but they usually do not model an ongoing relationship between sender and receiver. Figure 2 presents a model that Agunga argues is a good fit to the participatory approach (p. 240). He explains how a "DSC professional" can help beneficiaries understand the value of the change agency's innovations. He does not, however, suggest that the DSC professional can actually have impact on a change agency's choice of innovations. Agunga (p. 241) describes the communicator's role as "an active gatekeeper, not only capable of modifying messages...but also of adding information about other relevant *innovations...*" to the local people.

FIGURE 2 HERE

Agunga takes this model to the next stage by placing the development communicator as a "facilitator" between an agency and its beneficiaries. This appears in Figure 3. The strength of this new model is how it portrays the development communicator's role as a distinct entity that can shape communication between the agency and the beneficiaries, what has been called a "boundary spanner."

FIGURE 3 HERE

Mody (1991) places the communicator in a similar position, where beneficiaries participate in crafting messages through their input and feedback. This effort provides messages with a better fit to those who are receiving them, but the innovations being communicated about are still decided upon by the program team leaders. Thus, the communicator as facilitator is left in a potentially awkward situation of creating resonant messages about non-resonant solutions.

Some scholars address this communication role with a model that portrays development communication more explicitly as a process. For example, Piotrow et al. (1997, p. 27) offer the "P Process", which they portray as systematic, strategic, and long-term. This model appears in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4 HERE

The P Process model was developed by the Johns Hopkins University Population Communication Services (JHU/PCS) and has been used in the population communication programs to guide their work, especially in the newly conceived reproductive health approach to family planning. The model starts with audience analysis to identify what they know, believe, hope for and practice. It also includes analysis of relevant policies, after which programs set their objectives and develop and pretest communication materials based on the information gathered. Programs are then implemented and monitored with the input of the program management. Constant evaluation is applied to measure impact and changes are made to make way for continuity based on the programs performance (Piotrow, et al, 1997).

The disadvantage of the model is that it may be equated to social marketing, where audience analysis is used to more effectively accomplish behavior change related to an agency's preferred program. Social marketing is not essentially different from commercial marketing as it relies on the same analytical techniques: market research, product development, pricing accessibility, advertising and promotion. The approach, which incorporates both formative and summative evaluation in order to design effective messages, has been applied to HIV/AIDS prevention and family planning campaigns in developing countries.

Like social marketing, in the P process model, the program does not necessarily have to take people's views about solutions to be effective and people may not agree with the program's solutions. However, in terms of strategic communication and using appropriate communication strategies, this model has been the best so far for reproductive health and family planning programs.

Similar to the P Process is Mohamed's (1993) Extension Planning Conceptual Framework. Again, it presents communication as a strategic process that draws on research to understand the people who are being communicated with. Although communication efforts are designed to support predetermined goals of the development agency, this strategic process considers KAP (knowledge, attitude, practice) of the people before developing solutions. This model appears in Figure 5.

FIGURE 5 HERE

Summary

This overview has highlighted literature addressing the transition in thinking from a traditional persuasion model of development communication toward a participatory model. Although there is not room here to cover the rich depth of this discussion, the key ideas and related critiques have suggested three overarching themes. First, development communication based on an understanding of program recipients will develop more resonant, grounded communication solutions. A second theme is that participatory programs can benefit from audience research in creating strategic approaches designed to reach objectives. A third theme suggests that an ideal role for a communicator in the participatory approach is as a facilitator (Agunga, 1997) or teacher (Mody, 1991).

Despite addressing these three important themes, a clear, conceptual discussion is still lacking about the relationship between agencies and local people. Also, communicators still appear to be in the awkward position of developing communication solutions for program decisions that have been made without the full benefit of their participatory knowledge. The following section presents a discussion of excellence in communication to build these dimensions.

Drawing on Ideas From the Excellence Research

At first thought, drawing a connection between public relations and development communication appears to be a conceptual stretch, especially with the societal stereotype of public relations as the practice of deception. However, leaders in public relations scholarship and practice have recast thinking in the field through an exploration of the long-term effectiveness of organizations (Dozier, L. Grunig, J. Grunig, 1995; J. Grunig, 1992). Much of this research does indeed parallel the participatory discussion in development, as ideas turn to discussions of understanding the people who are being communicated with and adapting the organization based on this information. For example, Cutlip, Center, and Broom

(1994) discuss a historical transition from a persuasive model of public relations to a model that seeks to build understanding between organizations and their publics. This is exemplified in their use of the coorientational model of organization-public relationships that appears in Figure 6.

FIGURE 6 HERE

The key point demonstrated by Figure 6 is that organizations and publics need to build common understanding about an issue before each group can reach its goals. This is facilitated by public opinion research tools similar to those used by development communicators: surveys, observation, focus groups and depth interviews, among others. In many cases, though, organizations base their actions not on an informed understanding (modeled by agreement in the top two boxes), but on estimates of public views that represent little more than hunches (the bottom two boxes).

From this perspective, the communication process in public relations represents an effort to align the views of the organization with that of its constituents, or "publics." This alignment can be accomplished in three ways. First, alignment can be accomplished by leading a public to believe in and accept an organization's position. This approach has been characterized as an asymmetric relationship, which can be achieved by conducting public opinion research that leads toward the crafting of persuasive communication (Grunig, 1992; Dozier, 1995). This model is called asymmetric because the relationship is imbalanced in favor of the organization's preferred outcomes.

Another alternative to this asymmetric model of relationships is the "two-way symmetric" approach that uses informed understanding to bring an organization in line with a public's expectations. This approach can be characterized as either moving an organization toward a position of cooperation with a public, or as helping both an organization and a public to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995, p. 48) present these ideas through a game theory perspective that considers which side will "win" on an issue. These different outcomes are included in their model, which appears in Figure 7.

FIGURE 7 HERE

To interpret this model, the arrow pointing toward the number one in the circle shows movement of the public's position toward the organization's (or dominant coalition's) position, and represents a pure asymmetric model. The arrow by the number two shows the opposite, where communication is used to move an organization to a public's position, and could be called "pure cooperation." The two circles and arrows for the number three represent communication applied to move both parties to a win-win zone, where they both feel they have reached an acceptable outcome. This zone can be called a "mixed motive" outcome, because an organization considers the gains and compromises it makes along with those to be made by its publics.

The parallel of public relations theory to development communication situations now becomes clearer. The traditional approach to development communication has used communication to draw local people toward an agency's position on an issue or innovation. In other words, it has applied an asymmetric model. The participatory model, as expressed by many authors (White, 1994), instead appears as pure cooperation. Neither of the usual development approaches are usually depicted as working toward the win-win zone, though, where development solutions and the related communications are adjusted by an agency to reach a compromise with local people. One version of the participatory approach suggests that local people will become part of the decision-making team that chooses appropriate innovations. Another version simply develops more resonant messages for more-or-less preordained development solutions (Mody, 1991). Despite the apparent lack of this win-win zone thinking in development communication, the success of many programs could hinge on a program reaching such a position.

The problem with reaching the win-win zone, in part, stems from the role of the development communicator. In some programs, the communicator is a technician who can turn out communication tools as requested by a program manager (Agunga, 1997). This technician has little input into what the agency is actually trying to accomplish. Mody (1991) portrays a participatory communicator as an enlightened technician who draws local people into the communication process to enhance communication effectiveness, but not to shape a program's preferred innovations and solutions. In other programs that bring local involvement further, the participatory communicator takes on the role of the facilitator to help an agency better understand the people it works with (Agunga, 1997). However, even in this role, the facilitator does not work as part of the agency team in planning which innovations will provide a good solution for a development situation. Instead, the facilitator can only communicate about solutions that have been largely decided in advance. The relationship, in this case, would be essentially two-way, but also asymmetric, since input is used to enhance program effectiveness through communication.

Again, a parallel appears with public relations. The excellence research defines four broad roles for communicators, three of which deal with impacting an organization's practice and communication approaches through some degree of a managerial role (Grunig, 1992). At one end is the role of expert prescriber that autonomously manages communication for an organization. Although this role takes a strategic view of communication, a serious drawback is that it separates communication decision-making from program decision-making. A role at the opposite end of the spectrum that also separates communication from program decisions is the communication technician. This role parallels the traditional communication approach in development communication, where production skills are the key strength of the communicator, and minimal effort is made to interface with either program decisions or an understanding of local people.

The two other roles of public relations communicators lie in-between. One is the communication facilitator, similar to that suggested by Agunga. In development, this role performs a valuable function by serving as a go-between for the program and the local people. Although it might use the information it gains to adjust communication efforts, the communication facilitator generally does not have significant involvement in program decision-making. A somewhat similar role, but one with more overall impact, is the problem-solving facilitator. This role includes attributes from each of the other three, because it is strategic, it draws on information from local people (in a development context) and, ideally, it includes strong technical skills. Its real strength is that it involves the program in the communication process and it works proactively to consider the implications of program decisions on the program's relationship with local people. The problem-solving facilitator represents an ideal, where the communicator is recognized as part of the overall program team. In practice, this role could be considered a "relationship facilitator."

The role of a relationship facilitator has important advantages not only for development communication, but for development programs overall. A key benefit is that the communicator not only helps develop resonant communication solutions, but also resonant program solutions that fit the cultural and social dimensions of local people. This role takes development programs out of the business of providing short term "fixes" to promote innovations for solving Third World problems. Thus, the communicator as relationship facilitator works for resolving development problems rather than only for helping implement development solutions. The relationship facilitator keeps organizational outcome goals in mind while also considering the communication and relationship goals that will ultimately support successful accomplishment of desired organizational outcomes.

The next section of this paper draws on a case study of family planning and reproductive health in Kenya that contrasts traditional development communication approaches with development incorporates a communicator with a relationship facilitator role.

Kenyan Family Planning and Reproductive Health:
A Case Example and Application of Concepts

This section begins by describing the context of family planning programs in Kenya detailing different approaches to population control over time. The section then turns to an application of the concepts introduced by this paper, in an effort to recast thinking about the role of communication and communicators in the development process.

Context of the Case Example

Kenya was the first country south of the Sahara to accept and support family planning in the 1950s with financial aid from various western funding agencies, including United Nations, USAID, UNFPA, World Bank and Britain's Overseas Development Agency (ODA). In I967 it became the first African nation to launch an official population control program. However, after 1967 and into the 1970s, Kenya's population increased rapidly with a population growth rate of four percent, the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Until the 1980s, only negligible impact on contraceptive use and fertility control was made.

This population increase has been attributed to the way the program was implemented (Hartmann, 1995). Before the program was introduced, a team of four consultants from the US Population Council spent three weeks in the country to gather the basic information needed for the formation of the first population policy in Kenya. The program was out to achieve its set goals of reducing the population growth rate from four percent to three percent by the year 2000. However, the program neither took into account the related social-cultural factors nor the health of women and children, but focused instead on the distribution of contraceptives to women with the aim of averting births.

The process for designing and implementing family planning programs also inhibits people from active involvement in them, especially among poor women. A lack of knowledge and access to family planning and services, as well as cultural factors and practices are part of a context that encourage high fertility and threatens women's reproductive health. Consequently, despite the efforts of the population programs to limit the number of children women can have, the problem persists and more women suffer from preventable reproductive health problems.

At the 1994 Cairo international conference on population and development (ICPD) it was recognized that family planning/reproductive health information, communication and education are part of basic human rights and that people should have access to this information regardless of class, gender and race to participate in reproduction decision-making. However, the concept of participation in family planning is fairly recent and has not clearly defined how people should participate given the private nature of the issue. Socio-cultural factors, play a major role in determining to what extent people get publicly involved in family planning activities. For example, the Catholic religion is prevalent in much of Kenya, and it does not advocate family planning approaches. The patriarchal nature of traditional Kenyan culture also inhibits married women from transforming their understanding of family planning into appropriate behaviors (Ndeti &Ndeti, 1980).

At the same time, widespread acceptance of extramarital relations places additional reproductive health risks for women.

Traditionally, family planning and other health and human reproduction aspects were dealt with through public health approach of maternal and child health (MCH). In 1984, a government department, the National Council for Population and Development (NCPD), was established to execute Kenya's population projects. Within NCPD there is a communication division which is responsible for promoting family planning to the target audiences and coordinating communication activities of other population projects. The mass promotion of contraceptives is done through the mass media and interpersonal communication approaches to support the goal of recruiting 640,000 new family planning acceptors and averting about 150,000 births by the year 2000 (Hartmann, 1995). Promotion of family planning is done through radio and television, and in the form of soap operas, spots and advertisements of methods and clinics. This communication approach is perceived as the most cost-effective since the program can reach a large audience simultaneously.

Other approaches include social marketing and community-based distribution (CBD) of contraceptives. Both methods promote and enable access of contraceptives to women even in the most remote rural areas by delivering them to their door steps. This communication approach, as indicated in the Kenya demographic and health survey, has yielded an awareness of contraceptive methods of 97% among women of reproductive age but only a third of those aware are using them (NCPD, 1993).

Family planning communicators most often aim at disseminating information to the audiences for awareness of the population problem and promoting contraceptives. The 1994 ICPD recommended a reproductive health approach that will include all other aspects related to human reproduction into family planning information, education and communication (IEC). For this to be successful, however, a more appropriate communication approach is needed to understand and involve more women in family planning and reproductive health programs.

Application of Concepts to the Case Study

This section applies concepts from this paper's theoretical discussion to the Kenyan case study. Discussion of three approaches to the practice of development communication — traditional SMCRE, participatory, and symmetrical — considers the nature of relationships between the program and the beneficiaries, the purpose of communication, and the role of the communicator. To summarize the situation in Kenya, development agencies are working to reduce population growth and promote overall reproductive health among young rural women. Challenges include conflict with prevailing religious beliefs, low acceptance of family planning in the traditional culture, and low women's empowerment in relation to family planning and reproductive health. Both the traditional SMCRE and participatory approaches to development communication have been applied in the past with minimal success in changing family planning practices or increasing local people's concerns about reproductive health. Discussion of each development approach here has been reduced to its basic conceptual dimensions to clarify distinctions in both process and outcome.

Working from the traditional SMCRE approach, the process begins when the agency planners choose a method or methods of contraception as a solution to achieve family planning goals. Because condoms and oral contraceptives are readily available, these methods would be chosen. Next, communicators — mainly of a communication technician orientation — are asked to design a program to communicate to rural women about how these techniques should be used. Using their skills in media production, communicators design radio messages and posters that attract attention to the program and explain the use of these contraceptives. Communicators also plan events to distribute condoms, which are not accepted by large proportion of women. The communicator does not usually reach communication solutions by gathering information about these women, their sexual practices or their attitudes toward contraception and family planning. The communicator also does not consult extensively with program managers about the chosen communication solution or the attitudes of these rural women toward these solutions. In the end, the communicator mainly relies on instinct, experiences and creativity. This approach suggests a lack of coorientation in the relationship between the development agency and its beneficiaries: the relationship could be considered not only asymmetric, but unstrategic and one-way.

To discuss the participatory approach, we draw on Agunga's (1997) depiction of the communicator who serves as a boundary spanner that facilitates communication between an agency and its beneficiaries. Work would proceed with research as part of an overall strategic communication planning process, such as the P Process model or Mohamed's planning model. Thus, some information is gathered about rural women in relation to family planning, and this information is then communicated to agency planners. The impact of this information is unclear, though, because the communicator minimally contributes to the program's decision-making team. The communicator's chief role instead involves mainly creating, pretesting and revising messages and communication products to better align them with the preferences of rural women. As a result, the communication solution is somewhat more resonant with the situation than the SMCRE approach, yet the solutions chosen by the program might not always be feasible, and the related messages might not truly be targeted toward the actual reason why family planning methods are not being adopted. More specifically, information gathered by the communicator is centered on usage and benefits for use, rather than on women's attitudes related to the lack of use. Similarly, communication solutions might not be those preferred by these women. As with the traditional approach, there is a lack of coorientation between the organization and the beneficiaries that creates an asymmetric relationship. The goal is adoption of the agency's solution, with participation focused mainly on developing communication strategies. These communication efforts would be characterized in Figure7 as pure cooperation, since messages are tailored to match beneficiaries' preferences, rather than for their strategic appropriateness.

Finally, the symmetric approach geared toward a win-win outcome begins with the communicator's position on the development agency's management team. This communicator starts at the program's inception and is involved in choosing solutions for attaining the program's goal of reduced population growth. Again, work proceeds systematically, such as with the P Process model. Research, however, would not be focused just on communication effectiveness, but on enhancing overall program effectiveness through the ongoing relationship between the agency and its beneficiaries. Here, the communicator plays a key role in helping understand why women are not adopting family planning measures despite their high level of knowledge. This information is discussed with program planners to devise a strategic approach that considers changes in the agency's thinking and programming, as well as changing the attitudes and behaviors of its intended beneficiaries. The communicator is involved in developing both program solutions in addition to communication solutions. As a result, the agency might discover alternative strategies, such as communicating key information to men, who are constraining women's reproductive health choices. Thus, in the symmetric approach, the program goes beyond simply distributing contraceptives and heads toward developing ideas that enhance the success of contraceptives being used to reduce population growth. The outcome is a win-win situation for both the agency and for rural women.

Conclusions

This paper has discussed three main theoretical perspectives for development communication that consider the nature of the relationship between an agency and its recipients, as well as the role of the communicator within the development process. It began with the two positions most commonly addressed within the development communication arena — traditional top-down and participatory communication — and brought in ideas from the Excellence studies of Grunig (1992), and Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995) to offer another viewpoint that empowers the communicator to not only create effective communication solutions, but to help guide the development agency in choosing better program solutions. Two key benefits emerge. First, using this approach allows a communicator to create a more harmonic relationship between program goals and beneficiaries' attitudes toward those solutions. Success of overall program objectives will likely be enhanced through this approach. As a second benefit, this approach allows communication to move out of the arena of persuasion and into the realm of facilitating better understanding between the development agency and the local people intended as beneficiaries. We offered here a model of the development communicator as a relationship facilitator who negotiates between the solutions of an agency and the social/cultural context of the beneficiaries. In doing so, both the agency and the local people adapt and adjust somewhat, so that a compromise solution is reached that leaves both parties relatively satisfied with the outcome. At the same time, program goals are likely to be achieved more effectively.

The critique of the traditional approach offered here is not necessarily new, although this paper has tried to cast it in a clearer conceptual framework that specifically addresses what has often been either assumed or overlooked. This discussion also adds conceptual refinement to the often amorphous notion of participatory approaches to development. By taking the communicator out of the position of helping to achieve predetermined program goals and into a role of participation in the agency's planning team, the participatory approach takes on new meaning. Although local people sometimes are able to advise communicators on which kinds of messages and communication channels they prefer, their input as gathered by the communicator and fed back to program managers means that they indirectly help design both solutions and communication strategies that resonate with the social and cultural context of the local development situation.

This conceptual framework for development communication can lead to future research on not only the implementation of the development program, but also on the role of the communicator and that person's integration into the agency's overall process. As with the empirical testing employed by Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995), future studies can consider differences in the functioning of communicators within a development agency in relation to an organization's culture, its preferred approach to development (and development communication) and ultimately, its success in reaching development objectives.

# # #

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Int'l

National Interest and Coverage of U.S.-China Relations: A Content Analysis of *The New York Times & People's Daily* 1987-1996

By

Xigen Li
917 A Cherry Lane
East Lansing, MI 48823
Phone: 517-355-7980
Email: lixigen@pilot.msu.edu

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in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention
New Orleans, August 1999

Xigen Li is a Graduate
of the Mass Media Ph.D. Program
in the College of Communication Arts and Sciences
at Michigan State University

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ABSTRACT

This study tested the effect of national interest on the coverage of U.S.-China relations by *The New York Times* and *People's Daily*. It examined the relationship between extramedia variables and the news coverage, and the relationship between national interest emphasis in the news coverage and the references to trade and non-trade political issues. The findings support the proposition that national interest affects the coverage of U.S.-China relations both in *The New York Times* and *People's Daily*. However, neither extramedia variables nor intramedia variables were found to be strong predictors of the news content for both newspapers. In *The New York Times*, emphasis on national interest was associated only with reference to trade, while in *People's Daily*, emphasis on national interest was associated only with reference to non-trade political issues. There was not much difference between *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* that their coverage of U.S.-China relations was affected by national interest.

Research on international news examines who controls the news,[1] what factors influence news selection,[2] and the attributes which affect news content.[3] In the coverage of international news, although study shows that media speak for the nation,[4] it is not so clear to what degree that national interest affects news content. Few studies have investigated the influence of national interest on news content, whether demonstrated through political and economic environment and events as extramedia variables, or through reference to national interest in the news content as intramedia variables.

This study examines national media coverage of U.S.-China relations in their respective elite newspapers of record, *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* for the 1987-1996 period. It explores the relationship between national interest demonstrated through political and economic events and emphasis on national interest in the news coverage, and the relationship between emphasis on national interest and references to trade and non-trade political issues in the news content.

Literature Review

The general theoretical framework for this study draws from the work of Shoemaker and Reese (1996). They observed that news content is influenced by several hierarchical factors. These factors range from the micro level (e.g. the individual media worker, media routine, and media organization) to the macro level (e.g. extramedia and ideology), graphically illustrated through concentric circles of influences. The hierarchical circles illustrate that news content is produced by individual media workers but it is influenced by the nature of the particular news organization and the national economic and ideological environment.[5]

Factors that influence news content

Shoemaker and Reese note that because media have relative autonomy, the ruling powers cannot directly supervise this important cultural apparatus. Thus, ideology serves as a unifying force situated in the outermost circle in their model.[6]

Gitlin (1980) defines hegemony as the "systematic engineering of mass consent to the established order." The media "certify the limits within which all competing definitions of reality will contend". They do this largely by accepting the frames imposed on events by officials and by marginalizing and delegitimating voices that fall outside the dominant elite circles.[7]

In Raymond Williams'(1977) words, hegemony does not passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified.[8] Existing cultural values are structured and interpreted to best serve the interests of the dominant groups.

Galtung and Ruge (1970) suggest news is an ideological product in both Communist and free market countries.[9]

The ideological perspective specifies the frame that the news media define themselves. The media serve as means of the ruling power to produce and maintain the dominant ideology by accepting the frames imposed by the powerful groups. News as an ideological product, reflects the interest of the powerful in both Western capitalist and Communist societies.

Extramedia perspective suggests that factors external to the communicator and the media organization -- economic and cultural forces, social institutions and audience -- determine content.[10]

Analyzing data from the American component of the UNESCO study, Ahern (1984) found that, among extrinsic variables, GNP, trade, and political relations exerted the most powerful influence on coverage. Trade was second in importance after GNP, followed closely by political relations.[11]

Rosengren and Rikardsson (1984) found a relationship between trade and foreign news coverage in their study of Mideast news in Swedish press.[12] Wu (1997) discovered that trade played a key role in shaping foreign coverage in some countries, but was not a significant determinant in the U.S.[13]

However, Lacy, Chang and Lau 's (1989) study of American newspaper content found no relationship between economic factors and the news content, and they argued that economic factors may not be strong predictors of coverage patterns.[14]

Chang and Lee's (1990) survey suggested that economic factors—operationalized as U.S. trade relations and a country's level of economic development—were of little importance in the editors' news selection decisions.[15]

Cassara's (1992) study found that economic connections such as export relationships did not influence the character of international news content in the newspaper which serves that area.[16]

The influence of trade on news content is found at odds in the above studies. The difference could be caused largely by the operational definition of dependent variables. One aspect that most studies missed is the time associated with the independent variable trade. Trade relations are changing with the bilateral and multilateral relations. A study will shed more light on the relationship between trade and international news coverage if it integrates the change of trade relationship across a period of time into the inquiry of the impact of trade.

Government views are considered a strong extramedia factor influencing media content. Zeidenstein (1984) described the government's influence on the media succinctly: "The White House can influence - if not completely control - the content, timing, and methods of publicizing the news".[17]

Graber (1993) found foreign news tends to emanate primarily from various beats in the executive branch, especially the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. The president's views tend to dominate whenever situations are controversial.[18]

According to Parenti (1986), the government influences the media substantially by providing information and misinformation designed deliberately to present a specific point of view.[19]

In her study of media coverage of Indochina from 1950 to 1956, Welch (1977) found that the press response mirrored administration perceptions of the struggle. She found the American media were incapable of perceiving the Indochina case any differently than did the administration because the media did not have an independent frame of reference.[20]

While government was unanimously considered to be a strong factor influencing news coverage, to what degree that the major decision makers of a government such as the president of the United States can affect news coverage on specific issues in foreign relations remains a question largely unsolved.

Altschull (1984) has proposed a framework for studying variations within owner control of the media. He starts with the assumption that media reflect the ideology of those that finance them. i.e., whoever pay the piper calls the tune.[21]

Herman and Chomsky (1988) assume that media serve the dominant elite. They argue that this is just as true when the media are privately owned without formal censorship, as when they are directly controlled by the state.[22]

In recommending media routine approach, Paul Hirsh (1977) says that the mass media may serve different functions, but they share many organizational similarities that outweigh many of the differences.[23]

It is easy to perceive that the media speak for the group who finances them. Here the organizational perspective reveals some hidden fact: even though the media are not financed by the government, they are in many ways controlled by the state. On the national level, the private newspaper such as *The New York Times* serves the dominant elite and preserves the best long-term interest of the capitalist system.

National Interest and Coverage of U.S.-China Relations

Allison (1971) proposed rational actor model for explaining and predicting a nation's foreign policy. This model essentially assumes that a nation is a rational, goal-seeking, and unitary decisionmaker. It assumes there is some shared goal or national interest for the decisionmaker to obtain. The rational actor will develop alternatives from which the most effective means will be selected to maximize the goal.[24]

The rational actor can be defined here as those key politicians and bureaucrats in the executive branch, including the president, who, on the whole, are more likely to make a national view as they respond to the parochial concerns of either social groups or particular governmental institutions. Krasner (1978) maintained that because high-level decisionmakers perceive their roles as protecting and promoting national security interest, they act upon their autonomous set of preferences. [25]

Tan observed that the United States would define U.S. China policies primarily according to shifting strategic balance of power while maximizing other foreign policy interests. Policymakers have certain parameters identifying policy objectives. In the conduct of national foreign policy, national survival and strategic interests, either military or economic, preempt other policy objectives. [26]

Gregor observed, national interests of China are not often comparable with the national and foreign policy interests of the United States, and many of the interests China shares with the big powers are transient..[27]

Zweig (1991) observed that for many years, the strategic imperative has protected Sino-American relations. The positive images of China after 1978 pushed human rights far down the list of issues in Sino-American relations.[28] Mower, Jr. (1987) also noted that Both Carter and Reagan subordinated human rights to national security and national interest.[29]

The literature on national interest and U.S.-China relations asserts that both United States and China pursuit their respective national interest in the bilateral relationship, and national interest shifts as their strategic partnership changes. U.S.-China trade and human rights in China remain to be the major source of conflict in U.S.-China relations. While advocating human rights is the ultimate goal of the United States, American policy on human rights in China has been inconsistent, and has been altered either by the strategic imperative and the pulse of economic gain in trade with China.

While there is an argument about whether media play an active role in foreign policy process, researchers tend to agree that in international news coverage, media focus more on the events and issues that represent the national interest,[30] especially the elite newspapers that are read by policy makers.

Chang's survey of American newspaper editors suggested that their primary concerns centered on coverage of U.S. interests and involvements abroad and threats to world peace.[31]

According to Herbert Gans (1979), foreign news in the U.S. media covers stories relevant to Americans and American interests. Gans found that international news concentrates on American activities in a foreign country, and foreign activities affecting Americans and American policy.[32]

Paletz and Entman (1981) argued that international reporting tends to be monolithic and consistent with US foreign policy because they rely almost exclusively on sources sympathetic to representing the American interest. America's diplomatic aims are honorable: American corporate profits and investments must be protected when threatened.[33]

Kern et al. (1983)[34] and Goodman (1996)[35] found that *The New York Times* is among the media that are most independent of government. When the government gave limited to great attention to specific China policy issues, the press did not follow suit.

Lee and Yang (1995) used national interest as a predictor of coverage of the Chinese student movement by the U.S. and Japanese press from April to June in 1989.

They argued that the vital interest of the United States was winning ideological victories in the Cold war, whereas Japan's paramount concern was economic gain. These distinctive national interests led to different treatments of the Chinese student movement in the Japanese and U.S. press coverage.[36]

De Sola Pool (1952) points out that the elite press speaks for the interests of its own country, regardless of the nature of the political system. The "prestige paper" is always in some way tied to the government, the degree of intimacy being a function of the politization of the particular elite.[37]

Although few studies looked at the effect of national interest on the coverage of international news, the scholars agreed upon that national interest is one of the factors that guides media in their news coverage, and the vital national interest may distinguish the media in their coverage of international events, which explains the phenomenon in international reporting: elite press speaks for the nation.

Hypotheses

The literature review on factors that influence news content suggests that factors outside and inside media influence news content in a hierarchical order. The literature on national interest and U.S.-China relations reveals that the decision-makers act upon situations in international relations according to their perceived national interest. Despite that many studies found that government is one of the most powerful factors in influencing the coverage of international news, few studies have looked at how national interest perceived by the key players in international relations and represented through political and economic events affects news coverage.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of factors associated with national interest on the news content. We propose use real-time indictors of the national interest in U.S.-China relations, namely, U.S. investment in China, U.S.-China trade status, and related concerns raised by the U.S. president and China's government on U.S.-China economic trade and non-trade political issues, to test the notion that news content has been driven by national interest.

National Interest is defined as the basis upon which a country makes its decision in international relations to minimize the cost and maximize the benefit. National Interest in the context of news coverage of U.S.-China relations refers to the verbal denotations of a concern or a stand regarding a nation's benefit or loss in its relationship with the other country. Reference to National Interest is categorized into Trade interest and Non-Trade interest.

The selection of national interest as an indicator of news coverage of U.S.-China relations serves a second purpose: to test whether the priority national interest in trade related issues will transcend the interest contained in the dominant ideology as indicated in the literature of political science and Lee and Young's study. The underlying assumption would be: the national interest embedded in U.S.-China trade could surpass the dominant ideology in directing the news coverage of U.S.-China relations by *The New York Times* at the time when trade interest was dominant. In the case of *People's Daily*, it could also be true as what has already been observed in the process of China's economic development in recent years.[38]

Based on the theoretical framework, two groups of hypotheses were derived. Each group containing several hypotheses which apply to both newspapers. The following hypotheses groups corresponding respectively to *The New York Times and People's Daily* were tested.

HG1. Relationship between Extramedia Variables and News Content

The New York Times		*People's Daily*	
Independent var	*Dependent var*	*Independent var*	*Dependent var*
1) U.S. investment in China increases	Emphasis on national trade interest increases	1) U.S. investment in China increases	Emphasis on national trade interest increases
2) U.S. trade deficit with China increases	Negative reference to trade increases	2) China trade surplus with U.S. increases	Positive reference to trade increases
3) U.S.- China trade increases	Reference to trade increases	3) U.S.-China trade increases	Reference to trade increases
4) More U.S.-China trade issues in Presidential Papers	More emphasis on national trade interest in coverage	4) More U.S.-China trade issues in Chinese government papers	More emphasis on national trade interest in coverage
5) More non-trade political issue in Presidential Papers	More reference to non-trade political issue	5) More non-trade political issue in government papers	More reference to non-trade political issue

Hypothesis group 1 tests the relationship between the real life indicators of U.S. and China's national interests and the emphasis on national interest in the news coverage. They explore to what degree respective government concerns on U.S.-China relations were reflected in the coverage by the two newspapers. The hypotheses are based on the assumptions 1) that the elite press speaks for the interests of its own country, regardless of the nature of the political system: 2) U.S.-China trade is considered an important issue in U.S.-China relations, involving national interest of both countries. The common interest involved in U.S.-China trade is likely to generate similar patterns in dealing with the issues relating to trade in the coverage of U.S.-China relations by the two newspapers.

HG2. Relationship between Intramedia Variables

The New York Times		*People's Daily*	
Independent var	*Dependent var*	*Independent var*	*Dependent var*
6) More emphasis on national interest	More reference to trade	6) More emphasis on national interest	More reference to trade
7) More reference to trade	Fewer reference to non-trade political issue	7) More reference to trade	Fewer reference to non-trade political issue
8) More U.S. trade interest emphasis	Fewer reference to non-trade political issues	8) More China Trade Interest Emphasis	More reference to non-trade political issues

Hypothesis group 2 examines the relationship between the issues involving national interest in the coverage of U.S.-China relations, including emphasis on national interest, reference to trade and non-trade political issues, and portrayal of U.S.-China relations. It is expected that emphasis on national interest is associated with references to trade and non-trade political issues. The issues relating to trade are entwined with non-trade political issues, and the degree to which that trade issues are involved in the news coverage is likely to affect the portrayal of U.S.-China relations.

Method

This study was conducted through a content analysis. A ten-year period (1987-1996) U.S.-China relations coverage by *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* was selected for analysis. The coverage of U.S.-China relations is defined as hard news and feature stories reporting the current events, institutional and personal experience relating to U.S.-China relations, such as government actions, business activities, and personal adventures.

The study period was selected for the following reasons: U.S. and China went through both a relatively stable relationship and turbulent relationship in this period. On the U.S. side, 1) It covers three U.S. presidencies, and their concerns relating to U.S.-China relations varied; 2) Some major issues concerning U.S.-China relations arose during the period, such as Human Rights in China and annual renewal of Most Favorite Nation status. On the Chinese side, 1) Transition of government leaders led to the changes in China's U.S. policy; 2) The major events such as Tiananmen Incident and Taiwanese President's visit to U.S. drastically affected U.S.-China relations. The ten-year period also saw a steady increase in U.S. investment in China, U.S.-China trade and the trade deficit on the U.S. side. These are major influencing factors on U.S.-China relations.

The New York Times was chosen because of its extensive coverage of foreign policy news, and its prominence and influence on decision making.[39] It is widely read by policy makers, journalists, and diplomatic community in and out of Washington.[40]

People's Daily was chosen for its eminent status in China and its role as a spokesperson for China's foreign policies.[41]

Edelstein (1982) noted that there is a world system of elite communication as expressed by an "elite" or "prestige" press that speaks for these nations and to elites in other nations.[42] *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* are outstanding members of the world system of elite communication.

Presidential documents on U.S.-China relations during the ten-year period were used to measure U.S. government concerns on U.S.-China relations. The presidential documents included all the nonduplicate items listed in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* and the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. These two sources cover all contemporary documents released by the White House, including announcements, public speeches, agreements, news conferences, messages to the Congress, and other materials.

For Chinese government concerns on U.S.-China relations, Chinese government documents on U.S.-China relations during the ten-year period were used. The Chinese government documents selected include all the nonduplicate items listed in the *Gazette of The State Council of The People's Republic of China*. This source covers all contemporary documents on domestic and international issues released by the State Council of China, including issues regarding U.S.-China relations.

The data regarding U.S. investment in China and U.S.-China trade during 1987-1996 ten-year period were obtained from *Survey of Current Business* published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The periodical carries the data on U.S. direct investment positions abroad and U.S. export, import and merchandise trade balance by country.

To get a complete list of news stories on U.S.-China relations by *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* during 1987 to 1996, the following sources were consulted: Lexis-Nexis database, *The New York Times* Index, *People's Daily* Index and *People's Daily* on microfilm.

All news items classified under the category "United States International Relations – China" In *The New York Times* Index, beginning January 1, 1987, ending December 31, 1996 are included. 427 stories were identified with a clear theme of U.S.-China relations. Using "U.S. within 5 words China" and "U.S.-China" as the key words, a total of 302 stories was identified through Lexis-Nexis search. Combining the two lists of stories, and eliminate those that appeared on both lists, we were left with 512 stories.

All news items classified under the category "China – United States" In *The People's Daily* Index, beginning January 1, 1987, ending December 31, 1996 are included. About 900 items were identified from *People's Daily* under the category "China-United States" during the ten-year period. The search result from *People's Daily* was double checked against *People's Daily* on the microfilm to determine whether the news items matched the study purpose. A complete list of the coverage of U.S.-China relations by *People's Daily* consists of 528 news stories.

Forty percent of articles were selected for analysis annually from the sampling frame, using systematic stratified sampling procedures. With the adjustment to include at least ten stories for each year, 225 stories were picked *from The New York Times*, and 230 stories were chosen from *People's Daily* for content analysis.

The coding of news content was conducted according to the prescribed procedures by Daniel Riffe et al (1998).[43] Three bilingual Chinese coders participated in the coding. Scott's Pi was used to test the intercoder reliability for nominal variables; Pearson's correlation coefficient was selected for ratio variables. An intercoder reliability test result greater than .75 was deemed satisfactory. For a 95 percent level of probability and an assumed 90 percent agreement between the coders, 90 stories were selected for intercoder reliability testing.[44] Each coder in the two groups was assigned respectively a portion of *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* items of the remaining news stories after satisfactory intercoder reliability was established.[45]

Findings

HG1. Relationship with Extramedia Variables

The New York Times

H1. The hypothesis that as U.S. investment in China increases, emphasis on national trade interest increases is not supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable U.S. investment growth in China and the emphasis on national interest (trade) in *The New York Times* is .12. After controlling for the variable U.S. trade with China, the partial correlation is reduced to .11.

Insert Table 1

H2. The hypothesis that as U.S. trade deficit with China increases, negative reference to trade increases is not supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable U.S. deficit in trade with China and negative reference to trade in *The New York Times* is .17, which is statistically significant. However, when controlling for U.S. investment growth in China, the partial correlation is reduced to .12, which is statistically insignificant.

H3. The hypothesis that as U.S.-China trade increase, reference to trade increases is partly supported. The correlation coefficient between U.S. trade with China and references to trade is .22. When controlling for the variable U.S. investment in China, the partial correlation is .14, which is statistically significant.

H4. The hypothesis that more U.S.-China trade issues in presidential papers, more emphasis on national trade interest in the coverage of U.S.-China relations *in The New York Times* is not supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable U.S. presidential concern on U.S.-China trade and emphasis on national trade interest is .05, which is statistically insignificant.

H5. The hypothesis that more non-trade political issues in presidential papers, more reference to non-trade political issues in the coverage of U.S.-China relations *in The New York Times* is not,supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable U.S. presidential concern on non-trade political issues and references to non-trade political issues is -.13, which is statistically insignificant.

People's Daily

H1. The hypothesis that as U.S. investment in China increases, emphasis on national trade interest increases is not supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable U.S. investment growth in China and the emphasis on national trade interest in *People's Daily* is .09, which is statistically insignificant.

Insert Table 2

H2. The hypothesis that as China surplus in trade with U.S. increases, positive reference to trade increases is not supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable China surplus in trade with U.S. and positive reference to trade in *People's Daily* is .03, which is statistically significant.

H3. The hypothesis that as U.S.-China trade increases, reference to trade increases is not supported. The correlation between U.S.-China trade and reference to trade in *People's Daily* is .02, which is statistically insignificant.

H4. The hypothesis that more U.S.-China trade issues in China's government document, more emphasis on national trade interest in the coverage of U.S.-China relations in *People's Daily* is partly supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable China's government concern on U.S.-China trade and emphasis on national trade interest is .22. Controlling for the variable China's government non-trade concern, the partial correlation is .22, which is statistically significant.

H5. The hypothesis that more non-trade political issues in China's government document, more reference to non-trade political issues in the coverage of U.S.-China relations in *People's Daily* is partly supported. The correlation coefficient between the extramedia variable China's government concern on non-trade political issues and references to non-trade political issues is.19. Controlling for the variable China's government concern on trade, the partial correlation is .23, which is statistically significant.

HG2. Relationship between Intramedia Variables

The New York Times

H6. The hypothesis that the more emphasis on national interest in the news coverage, the more reference to trade is supported. The correlation between emphasis on national interest and reference to trade is .40.

H7. The hypothesis that the more reference to trade, fewer references to non-trade political issues is not supported. The correlation between reference to trade and reference to non-trade political issues is .13, which statistically insignificant.

H8. The hypothesis that the more emphasis on U.S. trade interest, the fewer references to non-trade political issues is not supported. The correlation between emphasis on U.S. trade interest and reference to non-trade political issues is -.03, which is statistically insignificant.

Insert Table 3

People's Daily

H6. The hypothesis that the more emphasis on national interest in the news coverage, the more reference to trade is not supported. The correlation between emphasis on national interest and reference to trade is .02, which is statistically insignificant. However, relationship is found between emphasis on national interest and reference to non-trade political issues. The correlation between China national interest and reference to non-trade political issues is .25 with negative reference to non-trade political issues contributing more to the relationship.

H7. The hypothesis that the more reference to trade, fewer references to non-trade political issues is weakly supported. The correlation between reference to trade and reference to non-trade political issues is -.15, which is statistically significant.

H8. The hypothesis that the more emphasis on China trade interest, the fewer references to non-trade political issues is not supported. The correlation between emphasis on China trade interest and reference to non-trade political issues is .01.

Insert Table 4

The data analysis also reveals some important distinguished characteristics of the two newspapers in their coverage of U.S.-China relations being affected by national interest.

The New York Times emphasize U.S. trade interest more than China trade interest. The mean of emphasis on U.S. trade interest is 6.0, while the mean of emphasis on China trade interest is 1.10. The t value of the comparison of the means is −2.58, which is statistically significant at the 99% level.

People's Daily emphasizes China non-trade interest more than U.S. non-trade interest. The mean of reference to U.S. non-trade interest is 4.10,.while the mean of reference to China non-trade interest is 16.10. The t value of the comparison of the means is 5.56, which is statistically significant at the 99% level.

No difference is found in the emphasis on U.S. national interest and China national interest as a whole in *The New York Times*, while *People's Daily* emphasizes more China national interest than U.S. national interest as a whole. The mean of reference to U.S. national interest is 10.10, while the mean of reference to China national interest is 22.20. The t value of the comparison of the means is 4.55, which is statistically significant at the 99% level.

Discussion

Overall, the three major extramedia variables, U.S. investment growth in China, U.S.-China trade, and U.S. and China's government concerns on trade and non-trade issues are weak predictors of news content, but each variable has its specific influence under certain circumstances.

HG1. Relationship with Extramedia Variables

The New York Times.

The rejection of H1 indicates that U.S. investment growth is not a good predictor of emphasis on national interest in the news coverage. U.S. investment in China continued to grow during 1987 to 1996 at a relatively stable rate, around 35% average a year. The emphasis on national interest varied according to the news events covered. Except in those years with big issues regarding U.S.-China relations going on, verbal emphasis on national interest is not a regular occurrence in the news coverage.

The rejection of H2 is consistent with the result of H1. As U.S.-China trade continued to growth, U.S. deficit continued to increase too. U.S. trade deficit might have an overall negative impact on U.S.-China relations when it was an issue on the table, but it may not have a clear negative impact on reference to trade in the coverage of U.S.-China relations.

The weak support of H3 indicates that U.S.-China trade has some impact on the news coverage and the finding supports the notion that real life indicator of national interest such as U.S.-China trade could affect the news content. The weak relationship is also close to the findings in the previous studies: *The New York Time* set its own agenda in reporting U.S.-China relations, and it did not follow what the government considered important in its coverage of U.S.-China relations, such as issues regarding human rights in China.[46]

The rejection of H4 and H5 cast some doubt on the impact of presidential concerns on the emphasis on national interest in the news coverage. It also partly confirms the findings of Goodman[47] and Li and St. Cyr on presidential agenda vs. *The New York Times*' agenda.[48] The presidential concerns of national interest may not be the focus of *The New York Time* in reporting events involving national interest.

People's Daily

The rejection of H1 indicates that U.S. investment growth in China is not a good indicator of emphasis on national interest in *People's Daily*. Although national interest is involved as China attracted more investment from the U.S., when comparing to the investment from other parts of the world, investment from the U.S. weighted less.[49]

The rejection of H2 is consistent with the result of H1. U.S. trade deficit was a problem in U.S.-China relations. Unless *People's Daily* neglects the negative impact that trade surplus issues would bring to China, it is reasonable that *People's Daily* avoid negative effect when covering U.S.-China trade, and choose not to deal with U.S.-China trade issues corresponding to its trade surplus.

People Daily basically chose to cover the topic at its own pace, not corresponding to U.S.-China trade. The finding of H3 suggests that as U.S.-China trade continued to grow during the ten-years, *People's Daily* covered trade issues only when trade became an issue in U.S.-China relations, and only when it needed to advance China's national interest through news content.

The partly support of H4 (.22) and H5 (.19) is consistent with what we know as the organizational goal of *People's Daily*. The results confirm the notion that *People's Daily* performs as the government organ, and it follows what the government identified as important in U.S.-China relations concerning trade and non-trade political issues. It also shows that China's government concerns on trade and non-trade issues are fairly good indicators of news coverage of important issues in U.S.-China relations involving national interest in *People Daily*.

The findings of both The New York Times and People's Daily confirm shoemaker and Reese's model of news content influenced by extramedia factors. The extramedia variables affect news content together with variables on all other levels. The relatively weak influence of extramedia variables on the news content may be explained by the proportional space that extramedia level accounted in the hierarchical circle.

The findings of the impact of three extramedia variables from both *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* support Ahern and Rosengren and Rikardsson's findings that trade exerted influence on coverage of international news, although this study indicates that the impact, whenever found, is less strong as what was indicated in Ahern's study. The difference could be due to the different dependent variables that each study looked at and the way that the independent variables were operationlized.

HG2. Relationship between Intramedia Variables

It is found that for both *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* emphasis on national interest are weak indicators of reference to trade and non-trade political issues in the news coverage. The findings show that the issues relating to trade are to some degree entwined with non-trade political issues.

The New York Times

The support of H6 provides the evidence that emphasis on national interest in the news coverage is connected with trade related issues and confirms the notion that emphasis on national interest is associated with reference to trade (.40). The finding also indicates that the coverage of trade related issue were presented as the area involving more national interest than the coverage of non-trade political issues in *The New York Times*.

The rejection of H7 implies that in the news coverage of *The New York Times*, the increase of reference to trade does not have the effect to suppress reference to non-trade political issues. The finding fails to support the notion that the national interest embedded in trade related issues will override the concern on non-trade political issues in the news coverage. In the news coverage of U.S.-China relations by *The New York Times*, trade related issues were often found linked to non-trade political issues.

The rejection of H8 answers the question related to H7 more clearly. When national trade interest is emphasized in the coverage of U.S.-China relations, it does not lead to fewer references to non-trade political issues. *The New York Times* failed to meet the expectation that it will put less attention to non-trade political issues when it perceived that national interest was involved.

People's Daily

The rejection of H6 fails to support the notion that emphasis on national interest is associated with reference to trade (.02). Whenever *People's Daily* considered that national interest was at stake, it did not refer more to trade issues. Instead, it did refer to non-trade political issues (.25). To *People's Daily*, emphasis on national interest in the news coverage was implemented only when non-trade political issues were referred.

The weak support of H7 provides some directional indication of the relationship between reference to trade and reference to non-trade political issues in the news coverage (-.15). However, with the weak correlation between reference to trade and non-trade political issues in *People's Daily*, the findings provide little confidence to support the notion that the more concerns on trade related issues will restrain the concerns on non-trade political issues in the coverage of U.S.-China relations by *People's Daily*.

The rejection of H8 is a complement to the result of H6. It is found that emphasis on national interest was related to reference to non-trade political issues (.25). Only national interest on non-trade political issues was found associated with reference to non-trade political issues (.27), which indicates that relationship found between emphasis on national interest and reference to non-trade political issues exclude the effect from emphasis on national trade interest.

For *The New York Times*, Emphasis on national interest is associated only with reference to trade, while in *People's Daily*, emphasis on national interest is associated only with reference to non-trade political issues. Although the associations went to the different directions in the two newspapers, it does show that emphasis on national interest is connected with the reference to trade or non-trade political issues in the news coverage. The different focus of national interest in the two newspapers suggests that the effect of emphasis on national interest on news content depends on which area that the newspaper identifies to have the highest national interest at stake. For *The New York Times*, trade related issues implied more national interest, while for *People's Daily*, non-trade political issues involved utmost national interest.

Despite the use of real life indicators of national interest, this study only employ figures on U.S.-China trade compiled by U.S. institution, U.S. presidential document and China's State Council's document. It did not examine the effect of other aspects of the national interest on news content. So the significance of the findings is limited within the range that the selected real life indicators cover.

This study looked at two elite newspapers of the U.S. and China. The findings provide some understanding of how these two newspapers were affected by national interest. The generability of the findings on the effect of national interest on international news is limited without looking at a broader range of media in the U.S. and China and without a more comprehensive comparison on how news media in the two countries are affected by national interest.

To assess the effect of national interest, a broader scope of national interest than what this study looked at might be considered as extramedia variables in the future studies. Other research questions regarding effect of national interest on coverage of international news may include: what are the common issues and aspects of the coverage of international news that are most likely to be identified by the media as the key components of national interest? If the real life indicators of national interest were found to have effect on the news content, does such effect remain active across the time, or is it for a specific time frame? To what extend does shift of national interest influence the emphasis on national interest in the news content?

Conclusion

National interest is tested in this study as a construct to evaluate how newspaper content of international news was affected by extramedia and intramedia variables. Its usefulness in studying the effect of news content is reconfirmed by this study. As extramedia variables, the effect of national interest was found present and its impact is not negligibly trivial. As intramedia variables, the indicators of national interest served both as references that demonstrated the effect of extramedia variables as well as the factors that affected other issues and aspects of the coverage of international news.

The findings of this study provide some support to the Shoemaker and Reese's model of influences on news content. The notion that newspaper speaks for the nation is supported by the findings. Overall, the three major extramedia variables, U.S. investment growth in China, U.S.-China trade, and government concerns on trade and non-trade issues are weak predictors of news content. The distinction is clear in the relationship between emphasis on national interest and reference to trade and non-trade political issues in *The New York Times* and *People's Daily*. For *The New York Times*, Emphasis on national interest is associated only with reference to trade, while in *People's Daily*, emphasis on national interest is associated only with reference to non-trade political issues. There is not much difference between *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* that their coverage of U.S.-China relations being affected by national interest.

Table 1

Relationship between the Extramedia Variables and The New York Times' coverage of U.S.-China Relations (1987-1996)

(N=225)

Variables	*U.S. Investment Growth in China*	*U.S. Trade with China*	*U.S. Trade Deficit*	*U.S. President Trade Concerns*	*U.S. Prest Non-Trade Concerns*
U.S. National Interest	.14*	.08	.08	.12	-.02
U.S. Trade Interest	.12	.05	.05	.05	-.03
U.S. Non-Trade Interest	.07	.06	.06	.12	.01
Reference to Trade	.21**	.22**	.24**	.25**	-.15*
Reference to Trade Negative	.14*	.16*	.17**	.22**	-.11
Reference to Trade Positive	.21**	.20**	.22**	.15*	-.13
Ref to Non-Trade Issues	.21**	.32**	.32**	.09	-.13
Ref to Non-Trade Negative	.12	.27**	.28**	.04	-.10
Ref to Non-Trade positive	.27**	.21**	.22**	.16*	-.10

** $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed).
* $p < 0.05$ (2-tailed).

Table 2

Relationship between the Extramedia Variables and People's Daily's Coverage of U.S.-China Relations (1987-1996)

(N = 230)

Variables	*U.S. Investment Growth in China*	*U.S. Trade with China*	*China Trade Surplus*	*China Govnmt Trade Concerns*	*China Govnmt NonTrade Conc*
China National Interest	-.10	.14*	.13*	.04	.16*
China Trade Interest	-.09	.06	.06	.22**	.02
China Non-Trade Interest	-.16*	.11	.10	-.09	.16*
Reference to Trade	.12	.02	.02	.25**	.07
Reference to Trade Negative	.01	-.01	-.01	.21*	.08
Reference to Trade Positive	.15*	.03	.03	.18**	.04
Ref to Non-Trade Issues	-.05	.02	.01	-.12	.19**
Ref to Non-Trade Negative	-.19**	-.15*	-.15*	-.15	.09
Ref to Non-Trade positive	.14*	.19**	.20**	-.01	.19**

** = $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed).
* = $p < 0.05$ (2-tailed).

Table 3

Relationship between the Intramedia Variables (Issues) in The New York Times' coverage of U.S.-China Relations (1987-1996)

(N=225)

Variables	*Reference to Trade*	*Reference to Non-Trade*	*U.S. National Interest*	*U.S. Interest Trade*	*U.S. Interest Non-Trade*
U.S. National Interest	.40**	.08	1.00	.80**	.60**
U.S. Interest Trade	.43**	-.03	.80**	1.00	.00
U.S. Interest Non-Trade	.08	.17*	.60**	.00	1.00
Reference to Trade	1.00	.13	.40**	.43**	.08
Reference to Trade negative	.89**	.08	.28**	.33**	.03
Reference to Trade positive	.69**	.15	.39**	.38**	.14*
Reference to Non-Trade	.13	1.00	.08	-.03	.17*
Reference to non-trade neg	.12	.92**	.03	-.06	.15*
Reference to non-trade pos	.07	.58**	.12	.06	.11

** = $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed).
* = $p < 0.05$ (2-tailed).

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Table 4

Relationship between the Intramedia Variables (Issues) in People's Daily's Coverage of U.S.-China Relations (1987-1996)

(N=230)

Variables	*Reference to Trade*	*Reference to Non-Trade*	*China, National Interest*	*China, Interest Trade*	*China Interest Non-Trade*
China National Interest	.02	.25**	1.00	.44**	.85**
China Interest Trade	.23**	.00	.44**	1.00	-.09
China Interest Non-Trade	-.12	.27**	.85**	-.09	1.00
Reference to Trade	1.00	-.15*	.02	.23**	-.12
Reference to Trade negative	.61**	-.08	.12	.22**	.01
Reference to Trade positive	.87**	-.14*	-.05	.16*	-.15*
Reference to Non-Trade	-.15*	1.00	.25**	.01	.27**
Reference to non-trade neg	-.19**	.77**	.24**	-.03	.29**
Reference to non-trade pos	-.02	.66**	.11	.05	.09

** = $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed).
* = $p < 0.05$ (2-tailed).

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Worthy Versus Unworthy Victims in Bosnia and Croatia, 1991 to 1995: Propaganda Model Application to War Coverage in Two Elite Newspapers

A.E.J.M.C. Open Competition
International Communication Division

Lawrence A.(Luther) Di Giovanni
M.S.J.
Ohio University Scripps School of Journalism

Address:
97 Mulligan Road
Athens, Ohio 45701
(740) 593-7829

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Worthy Versus Unworthy Victims in Bosnia and Croatia, 1991 to 1995: Propaganda Model Application to War Coverage in Two Elite Newspapers

Abstract

A content analysis of news articles in *The New York Times* and *The London Times* was conducted. The war in Bosnia and Croatia was divided into three periods of study between 1991 and 1995. Examined were articles that mentioned the perpetrators and victims of ethnic cleansing, and refugees.

Results demonstrated that the Serbians were presented as the main group responsible for ethnic cleansing. The Bosnian Muslims were named in almost exclusive terms as the victims.

Background

The war in Bosnia and Croatia ended on November 21, 1995, when the Dayton Accord was signed.[1] *New York Times* writer Elaine Sciolino, who covered the event, said it ended the worst war in Europe since World War II, resulting in more than a quarter of a million deaths and in excess of two million refugees.[2]

In *Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press*, Brock noted overwhelming evidence that the Bosnian Serbs committed grave atrocities during the war, principally in Bosnia.[3] He criticized the western media, however, for dismissing Serbian claims that its citizens had also been victimized by Croatian and Muslim forces. Brock noted that after the war started in June 1991, the Croatian government expelled tens of thousands of Croatian Serbs and changed requirements for citizenship.[4] Public squares in

Croatia were renamed for Croatian Ustashi figures who fought with Hitlers Axis powers, according to Brock.

As the fighting between the three principal ethnic groups raged in Bosnia in the summer of 1992, Brock argued that the western media downplayed the atrocities that the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims committed against the Serbs and each other.[5] Western journalists preferred to focus almost exclusively on Serbian war crimes, he contended.

In August of 1992, United Nations Security Council resolutions were introduced that condemned the genocidal practices of ethnic cleansing and the execution of civilians.[6] That same month, the United States blamed Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for an aggressive campaign to carve out a "Greater Serbia" at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims.[7] Economic sanctions approved by the U.N. were imposed in May 1992 on the remaining rump Yugoslavia[8] – Serbia and Montenegro. This effectively isolated Yugoslavia's economy from the world.

Despite Brock's assertions that Serbian victims were marginalized, a *New York Times* report in March 1995 claimed that "90 percent of the acts of ethnic cleansing (in Bosnia) were carried out by Serbs."[9] The report was based on aerial photography conducted by the Central Intelligency Agency. Ethnic cleansing had been defined as the forcible expulsion of civilians from their homes to attain an ethnically pure state.[10]

The Infusion of Refugees

Pogroms executed by the three warring factions in Bosnia and Croatia produced in excess of two million refugees, with political asylum becoming a major foreign policy topic in Europe.[11] More than one million Bosnian Muslim refugees fled the republic during the war, with Germany alone accepting 350,000 refugees,[12] the most granted asylum by any European nation.

An estimated one million Bosnian Serb refugees, comparable to the number of Muslim refugees, had fled to the republic of Serbia (the rump Yugoslavia) by August of 1994.[13] An estimated 350,000 Croatian Serb refugees lost their homes in late 1995 after Croatia – during an offensive led by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman[14] – recaptured territory lost earlier in the war.

The pre–war population of Bosnia – before the mass exodus of refugees – was 45 percent Muslim, 35 percent Bosnian Serb and 18 percent Bosnian Croat.[15] The percentage of Croatians who were Croatian Serbs was 12 percent before the war, then dropped to three percent after the Croats recaptured territories from the Serbs in the spring and summer of 1995.[16]

Ethnic Grouping

There exists in the former Yugoslavia more than one group of Serbs, such as the Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian Serbs, and Serbs from the remaining rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro). In addition, there are more than one group of Croatians. For the purposes of the study, however, the Serbians were considered one ethnic group, as were the Croatians and the Muslims.

The rationale was offered by Maass in *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War*: the strongest ties among these ethnic groups center on their ethnic heritage[17] – not national boundaries. The strength of ethnic ties was demonstrated by the parties signing the Dayton Accord.[18] Milosevic signed the agreement on behalf of all Serbs, Tudjman on behalf of all Croats, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic on behalf of all Bosnian Muslims.

Prior Research: The Propaganda Model

The Chomsky–Herman Propaganda Model was used to develop the premise of the study; which was, in part, that *The New York Times* and *The London Times* marginalized Serbian victims. Chomsky and Herman posited that an ideological fear of Communism in the West serves the media (and the state) as "a political control mechanism with an instrumental value."[19] The Communist rump state of Yugoslavia qualified as an enemy state of the West, critical to the Propaganda Model framework.

The framework maintains that civilians victimized by Communist nations are considered worthy victims.[20] Civilians in Communist nations aggrieved by nations receiving support from the West are considered to be marginalized by the western media.

In *Manufacturing Consent*, Chomsky and Herman presented an initial study comparing the amount of media coverage given to the murder of a Polish Priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, against the coverage given 100 religious figures killed in Latin America between 1964 and 1985.[21] Included among these religious victims were four U.S. women working in El Salvador, and Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, shot by an assassin in 1980.[22] At the time of Popieluszko's murder in 1984, allegedly at the hands of Polish state police, Poland was a member of the Soviet bloc.

Chomsky and Herman examined the coverage that *The New York Times*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *CBS News* gave to all victims. Coded for *The New York Times*, on a per–victim basis, were the total number of articles, front–page articles, column inches, and editorials. Coded for *Time* and *Newsweek* were the number of articles and column inches, and for *CBS News*, the number of news programs that mentioned victims. The period of coverage was from the time of each killing to 18 months afterward.[23]

Results for *The New York Times* showed that the Popieluszko murder received more media attention than the combined coverage of all 100 religious figures in Latin America. The *Times* gave the Popieluszko case more coverage in every coded category, including total articles, column inches, front–page articles and editorials.[24] The results for *Time* and *Newsweek* were similar:

each allotted more articles and total column inches to Popieluszko. In addition, *CBS News* devoted more newscasts to Popieluszko than his Latin American counterparts. Chomsky and Herman concluded that where the U.S. media were concerned, "a priest murdered in Latin America is worth less than a hundredth of a priest murdered Poland."[25]

Herman has referred to the western media's focus on the denunciation of one group out of favor with the U.S. – while minimizing the crimes committed by groups, or nations, in favor with with the U.S. – as "doublethink."[26] "Doublethink" applied to media reports of the shooting down of civilian airliners, according to Herman. For example, when the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner in 1983,[27] *The New York Times* editorialized that there was no excuse for the criminal act. When the armed forces of Israel, a U.S. client state, shot down a Libyan airliner in 1973,[28] the media offered no comparable denunciations of aggression.

Chomsky has referred to "doublethink" as "selective perception."[29] It applied, for instance, when *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* focused on a self–described political prisoner, Armando Valladares, who unveiled Cuban leader Fidel Castro's imprisonment methods in 1986.[30] Valladares alleged that Castro used torture of prisoners as a means of social control. Ignored by the western media, according to Chomsky, were the surviving members of the Human Rights Group of El Salvador (a U.S. client state), tortured in an El Salvadoran prison, also in 1986.[31]

Research Objective

An examination of two elite western newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The London Times*, was conducted to study each newspapers' coverage of the ethnic participants of the war in Bosnia and Croatia. At issue was determining which ethnic group (or groups) was depicted as committing the atrocity of ethnic cleansing, and which group was depicted as the victims. Of equal importance was determining which groups were mentioned as refugees in each newspaper.

Method

A longitudinal content analysis of civil war coverage in Bosnia and Croatia was conducted, extending from June 27, 1991, the start of the war,[32] to November 21, 1995, the date the Dayton Accord was signed.[33] *The New York Times* and *The London Times* were selected for a cross-national study because of their exemplary reputations for international news coverage.[34]

The bound indices of each newspaper, from 1991 to 1995, were used to construct a sample of articles. Included in the sample were staff-written news articles and analyses under a general heading of Yugoslavia, and under the subheadings of Bosnia and Croatia. Excluded from the sample were columns, editorials, commentaries, op–ed pieces, first–person accounts, and photographs.

The sample size was slightly larger than 10 percent, with every ninth article selected chronologically from the universe of news articles and analyses. A number was selected at random as a starting point for coding articles in each newspaper.

The resulting sample contained 402 *London Times* articles and 336 *New York Times* articles. A 10 percent subset of *London Times* articles (40 stories) was used to determine interreliability scores for the coding procedure. Two coders, both former employees with Ohio University public relations, each received an individual training session. Coded in the subset were the perpetration variable of ethnic cleansing, and the victim variables of ethnic cleansing and refugees. The interreliability score, based on the percentage of agreement in 40 articles with three variables each, was 90 percent. A 15–article subset of *New York Times* articles was also used to test interreliability. The rate of agreement was 91 percent.

Periods of Study

Three periods of study were developed to use as the independent variable. The *early–war period* extended from June 1991 to August 1992. This period began with ethnic fighting in

Croatia and then Bosnia, before ending with U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning the genocidal practices of ethnic cleansing and executions of civilians.[35] The U.N. pledged its initial peacekeeping force to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid.[36]

The *mid-war period* extended from September 1992 to February 1994. It included the initial deployment of British peacekeeping forces. Considered a period of policy execution, N.A.T.O. was given the authority, under U.N. approval, to launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery targets.[37]

The *late-war period*, from March 1994 through the Dayton Accord of November 1995, was considered a period of policy outcome. Following the marketplace shelling of February 1994, blamed on the Bosnian Serbs,[38] it was characterized by an all-out N.A.T.O. assault[39] on Bosnian Serb targets.

Perpetration: Ethnic Cleansing

For coding purposes, the following answer choices for perpetrator(s) were given regarding ethnic cleansing:

1. Serbs
2. Muslims
3. Croats
4. Combination of two or three of the above groups
5. No mention (The article did not mention the topic.)

Coded were any statements, whether paraphrased or in direct quotations, which mentioned ethnic cleansing. Also included were statements made by sources (officials or civilians) as well as interpretive statements made by each article's author.

A *New York Times* article during the summer of 1992 provided a detailed description of ethnic cleansing:

> "Scenes of sealed trains, emaciated inmates of prison camps and women and children fleeing *"ethnic cleansing"* have begun to stir European consciences with ugly reminders of the Nazi brutality of half a century ago . . . there have been calls in France and Britain for European leaders to show more determination to stand up against Serbian aggression."[40]

The description was an interpretive statement that came from the reporter's lead and second paragraph. Although not attributed to a direct source, it qualified for mention as an interpretive statement, with the Serbs held accountable.

Victims: Ethnic Cleansing and Refugees

These variables were coded with the same answer choices as the perpetration variables: Serbs, Muslims, Croats, combination of two or three groups, or no mention.

Statistical Test

Preliminary results indicated that *The New York Times* and *The London Times* depicted the ethnic groups the same way. Within each period of study, however, each newspaper *did* treat the groups differently – as the Chi–Square Goodness–of–Fit test demonstrated. The Goodness–of–Fit test was considered appropriate[41] given the domination of one group in a category – such as the Serbs and perpetrations of ethnic cleansing – which was consistent over time. Chi Squares were computed when the expected frequencies were greater than 5. The level of significance was set at .05.

Results

The sample of articles, for each newspaper, was shown in Table 1 (p.12). A plurality of *New York Times* articles (44.4%) fell into the *late–war period*. This period was characterized by U.S.–led N.A.T.O. operations to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. A plurality of *London Times* articles (43.3%) fell into the *mid–war period*, during which the initial British peacekeeping force was deployed ($X^2 = 10.27$; df = 2; $p < .01$).

Perpetrations of ethnic cleansing were examined in Table 2 (p.12). Results demonstrated that the Serbs were held accountable in the majority of articles in which the topic was mentioned. This finding was consistent in both *The New York Times* and *The London Times* over each period of study. The *early–war period* (Period 1) between June 1991 and September 1992 established that the Serbs were the ethnic group most associated with inflicting ethnic cleansing. This period was marked by the initial fighting in Croatia during the summer of 1991, with a

Worthy Versus Unworthy Victims in Bosnia and Croatia, 1991 to 1995:
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TABLE 1. ARTICLES IN SAMPLE BY PERIODS

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	
	Early War 6/91–8/92	Mid War 9/92–2/94	Late War 3/94–11/95	Cumulative
N.Y. Times	77 (22.9%)	110 (32.7%)	149 (44.4%)	336 (100%)
Lond. Times	91 (22.6%)	174 (43.3%)	137 (34.1%)	402 (100%)

Chi–Square 3 x 2 table, $X^2 = 10.27$; df = 2; $p < .01$.

TABLE 2. GROUP THAT COMMITS ETHNIC CLEANSING

The following totals were the number of articles per period, for *The New York Times* and *The London Times*, that mentioned ethnic cleansing and the groups responsible.

	Period 1		Period 2		Period 3		Cumulative	
	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT
	(N = 12)	(N =6)	(N = 38)	(N = 26)	(N = 21)	(N = 10)	(N = 71)	(N = 42)
Serb	91.7%	83.3%	71.1%	69.2%	76.2%	80.0%	54 (76.1%)	31 (73.8%)
Muslim	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10.0%	0 (0%)	1 (2.4%)
Croat	0%	0%	10.5%	19.2%	14.3%	10.0%	7 (9.9%)	6 (14.3%)
Combin. **(2 -3 groups)**	8.3%	16.7%	18.4%	11.5%	9.5%	0%	10 (14.1%)	4 (9.5%)

Test:
Chi–Square Goodness–of–Fit. Groups collapsed into: 1) Serb 2) Muslim 3) Croat

Period 1.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 11; Serb = 11 (100%); Muslim = 0; Croat = 0. The expected frequency was less than 5; significance was undeterminable.
London Times. Collapsed N = 5; Serb = 5 (100%); Muslim = 0 ; Croat = 0. Significance was undeterminable.

Period 2.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 31; Serb = 27 (87.0%); Muslim = 0; Croat = 4 (13.0%). $X^2 = 41.1$; df = 2; $p < .001$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 23; Serb = 18 (78.3%); Muslim = 0; Croat = 5 (21.7%). $X^2 = 22.5$; df = 2; $p < .001$.

Period 3.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 19; Serb = 16 (84.2%); Muslim = 0 ; Croat = 3 (15.8%). $X^2 = 22.9$; df = 2; $p < .001$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 10; Serb = 8 (80.0%); Muslim = 1 (10.0%); Croat = 1 (10.0%). Significance was undeterminable.

shift of the war into Bosnia by the spring of 1992.

For the purpose of computing the Chi–Square Goodness–of–Fit test, the combination category was excluded. The combination category contained articles in which two or three ethnic groups were mentioned to have committed ethnic cleansing. This was done to collapse categories into three ethnic groups: Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. It allowed each group to be compared to the others on an individual basis.

With categories collapsed, the frequency of articles holding the Serbs accountable for ethnic cleansing increased. For example, in *The New York Times* during the *mid–war period* (Period 2), 27 of 38 articles (71.1%) named the Serbs as the responsible group, when the combination category was included. When collapsed, 27 of 31 articles (87.0%) named the Serbs as the responsible group ($X^2 = 41.1$; df = 2; $p < .001$). The Bosnian Muslims, by contrast, were mentioned in just one article in either paper (*The London Times,* Period 3) as having committed ethnic cleansing.

Articles that mentioned ethnic cleansing were most prominent during the *mid–war period*, during which each ethnic group waged war against the others.[42] The greatest numbers of war refugees were produced during this period[43] (September 1992 to February 1994). Cumulative totals demonstrated that ethnic cleansing mentions were much more common in *The New York Times*

(71 of 336 articles, 21.1%) than in *The London Times* (42 of 402 articles, 10.4%). This suggested that the U.S. paper paid more attention to the issue and reported with a greater depth of coverage. The cumulative percentage of articles in each newspaper holding the Serbs accountable was nearly the same.

TABLE 3. ETHNIC CLEANSING VICTIMS

	Period 1		Period 2		Period 3		Cumulative	
	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT
	(N = 12)	(N =6)	(N = 33)	(N = 28)	(N = 25)	(N = 9)	(N = 70)	(N = 43)
Serb	0%	0%	0%	3.6%	8.0%	11.1%	2 (2.9%)	2 (4.7%)
Muslim	66.7%	100%	72.7%	85.7%	72.0%	55.6%	50 (71.4%)	35 (81.4%)
Croat	8.3%	0%	3.0%	3.6%	0%	0%	2 (2.9%)	1 (2.3%)
Combin. **(2 -3 groups)**	25.0%	0%	24.2%	7.1%	20.0%	33.3%	16 (22.9%)	5 (11.6%)

Test:
Chi–Square Goodness–of–Fit. Groups collapsed into: 1) Serb 2) Muslim 3) Croat.
Period 1.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 9; Serb = 0; Muslim = 8 (88.9%);
Croat = 1 (11.1%).
The expected frequency was less than 5; significance was undeterminable.
London Times. Collapsed N = 6; Serb = 0; Muslim = 6 (100%); Croat = 0.
Significance was undeterminable.
Period 2.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 25; Serb = 0; Muslim = 24 (96.0%);
Croat = 1 (4.0%). $X^2 = 44.25$; df = 2; $p < .001$
London Times. Collapsed N = 26; Serb = 1 (3.8%); Muslim = 24 (92.3%);
Croat = 1 (3.8%). $X^2 = 40.7$; df = 2; $p < .001$.
Period 3.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 20; Serb = 2 (10.0%); Muslim = 18 (90.0%);
Croat = 0. $X^2 = 28.4$; df = 2; $p < .001$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 6; Serb = 1 (16.7%); Muslim = 5 (83.3%);
Croat = 0. Significance was undeterminable.

Articles that mentioned victims of ethnic cleansing were examined in Table 3 (p.14). When results were collapsed into three ethnic groups, each newspaper mentioned that the Bosnian Muslims were victimized in almost exclusive terms. For example, in the *mid–war period* (Period 2), 24 of 26 *London Times* articles (92.3%) mentioned Bosnian Muslims as the single group victimized by ethnic cleansing ($X^2 = 40.7$; df = 2; $p < .001$). The greatest percentage of articles mentioning victims of ethnic cleansing fell into the *mid–war period.*

By contrast, cumulative percentages demonstrated that *The New York Times* and *The London Times* rarely contained articles in which either the Serbians or the Croatians were mentioned as the single group victimized.

Mentions overall were much more prominent in *The New York Times* than in *The London Times*. This again demonstrated that the U.S. paper paid more attention to the issue. *The New York Times* contained more articles that mentioned a combination of groups victimized (22.9% cumulative) than *The London Times* (11.6%). (The number of articles in each newspaper that mentioned perpetrations of ethnic cleansing was not identical to the number of articles mentioning victims. Each article could mention the perpetrator of ethnic cleansing without mentioning the victimized group.)

Articles that mentioned refugees were examined in Table 4 (p.16). A cumulative plurality of refugees who were Bosnian

TABLE 4. VICTIMS AS REFUGEES

	Period 1		Period 2		Period 3		Cumulative	
	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT	NYT	LT
	(N = 25)	(N =24)	(N = 32)	(N = 39)	(N = 31)	(N = 29)	(N = 88)	(N = 92)
Serb	20.0%	4.2%	3.1%	5.1%	32.3%	44.8%	16 (18.2%)	16 (17.4%)
Muslim	48.0%	45.8%	81.3%	71.8%	48.4%	44.8%	53 (60.2%)	52 (56.5%)
Croat	8.0%	33.3%	9.4%	12.8%	6.5%	3.4%	7 (8.0%)	14 (15.2%)
Combin. **(2 -3 groups)**	24.0%	16.7%	6.3%	10.3%	12.9%	6.9%	12 (13.6%)	10 (10.9%)

Test:
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit. Groups collapsed into: 1) Serb 2) Muslim 3) Croat.

Period 1.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 19; Serb = 5 (26.3%); Muslim = 12 (63.2); Croat = 2 (10.5%). $X^2 = 8.45$; df = 2; $p < .02$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 20; Serb = 1 (5.0%); Muslim = 11 (55.0%); Croat = 8 (40.0%). $X^2 = 7.87$; df = 2; $p < .02$.

Period 2.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 30; Serb = 1 (3.3%); Muslim = 26 (86.7%); Croat = 3 (10.0%). $X^2 = 38.6$; df = 2; $p < .001$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 35; Serb = 2 (5.7%); Muslim = 28 (80.0%); Croat = 5 (14.3%). $X^2 = 34.7$; df = 2; $p < .001$.

Period 3.
New York Times. Collapsed N = 27; Serb = 10 (37.0%); Muslim = 15 (55.6%); Croat = 2 (7.4%). $X^2 = 9.55$; df = 2; $p < .01$.
London Times. Collapsed N = 27; Serb = 13 (48.1%); Muslim = 13 (48.1%); Croat = 1 (3.7%). $X^2 = 10.65$; df = 2; $p < .01$.

Muslims indicated that they were the most—aggrieved ethnic group. Each newspaper, however, mentioned Serbian refugees during the *late—war period* (Period 3) in comparable terms to the percentage of Muslim refugees. With categories collapsed, for example, 13 of 27 refugee mentions in *The London Times* during this period (48.1%) involved Serbs as the single group, with an equal percentage (48.1%) of Muslim refugees ($X^2 = 10.65$; df = 2; $p < .01$). The *late-war period*, from March 1994 to November 1995, involved a mass exodus of Croatian Serb refugees from Croatia.

Articles that mentioned Serb refugees during the *early-war period* (June 1991 to September 1992), were infrequent in each newspaper. This period, as Brock contended,[44] was marked by the expulsion of tens of thousands of Croatian Serb refugees after the Croatians reorganized requirements for citizenship. Articles that mentioned Serbian refugees were also infrequent during the mid-war period.

The inattention given to Croatian refugees by *The New York Times* and *The London Times* can perhaps be explained, in part, by demographics – they were the least populous of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia,[45] with 18 percent of its population Bosnian Croat. In addition, the attention of the West shifted away from Croatia and toward Bosnia and its Muslim majority starting in the spring of 1992 – where it remained until the Croatian offensive was launched in mid 1995.[46]

Conclusion

If the previously mentioned C.I.A. report[47] was correct – claiming that 90 percent of the ethnic cleansing during the war was committed by the Serbs – then the focus on Serbian atrocities was justified. A Propaganda Model argument suggests, however, that Serbian victims were marginalized.

This was particularly true during the *early–war* and *mid–war* periods, when the percentages of articles that mentioned Serbian refugees were marginal in each newspaper. Ethnic cleansing produced refugees, yet the Serbs were rarely mentioned in either *The New York Times* or *The London Times* as victims of this atrocity. The focus of each newspaper, in almost exclusive terms, was on Bosnian Muslim victims.

The study was limited by its focus on two elite western newspapers. Future research conducted concerning the war in Bosnia and Croatia – as pertains to perpetrators and victims – would be invaluable. Comparing coverage of the ethnic groups in a western newspaper against newspaper coverage in a Serb–allied nation such as Russia would likely yield different results.

The Chomsky–Herman Propaganda Model is limited by its focus on an institutional level of analysis[48] – arguing that the western media serves the dominant elite class of society. It does not account for ideological variations among those who control and finance the media, with the view that anti–Communist ideology is static.[49]

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'INTERACTIVE' ONLINE JOURNALISM
AT ENGLISH-LANGUAGE WEB NEWSPAPERS IN ASIA:
A DEPENDENCY-THEORY ANALYSIS

By

BRIAN L. MASSEY

Assistant Professor, School of Communication Studies
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

and

MARK R. LEVY

Professor and chairperson, Department of Telecommunications
Michigan State University, Michigan, USA

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Correspondence should addressed to:

Dr. Brian L. Massey
School of Communication Studies
Nanyang Technological University,
31 Nanyang Link, SCS Building
Singapore 6397718

(65) 790-5772 > office; (65) 792-7526 > fax
tblmassey@ntu.edu.sg > e-mail

Abstract

Three different measures of socio-economic development were used in an attempt to account for differences in the degree of interactivity associated with English-language Web newspapers in Asia. A five-dimension conceptualization of interactivity was used, and two hypotheses based on the Dependency Theory of national economic development were tested. A content analysis of 44 Asian Web newspapers showed that interactivity neither decreased regionally, from Asia's developed center through to its economically peripheral nations, nor sub-regionally.

Internet use appears set to grow rapidly in Asia and that could bode well for the region's online newspapers. For example, one estimate has about 30.0% of all households in the developed economies of Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Singapore being wired to the Net by 2002 (Asia/Pacific Internet services, 4 February 1997). In that same year, the number of regular Net users from Asia and the Pacific islands is predicted to reach 44.7 million (Net users forecast at 45m in Asia-Pac, Nov.-Dec. 1998). And most of those new additions to the region's online community are expected to be from Mainland China and South Korea (China to take Internet lead in Asia, 26 October 1998), or Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (Malaysia to lead Internet growth in Asia, 29 October 1997).

There now are 25.6 million people using the Net from the Asia-Pacific region, according to the latest estimate by NUA Internet Surveys (How many online? December 1998a). By that count, the region's Netizen population grew by 48.0% over

NUA's estimate for May 1998, and accounts for 17.0% of the world's estimated 151 million Net users.

This perhaps is what Singapore journalist Paul Jansen meant when he wrote that the Net 'has become a tsunami' for Asia (New look for *Straits Times* Interactive, 12 May 1998). Demand, he reported without giving specifics, has grown dramatically for the online editions of many Asian newspapers. A recent survey of AltaVista Asiawide search-engine users may bear him out: nearly three in four respondents said they get their news from the World Wide Web, although their exact online destinations were not reported (*1st International AltaVista Asiawide User Survey*, 1997).

The vagaries of these two reports aside, it seems probable that there is a large and growing audience in Asia for online journalism. Yet online journalism, particularly its practice in Asia, generally has yet to fully attract the attention of researchers. Most of the work on the phenomenon to date has explored its development at U.S. Web newspapers.

The current work, therefore, focuses on Web news-making as it is practiced in Asia. Specifically, it seeks to explore the phenomenon of "interactive" online journalism through the lens of Dependency Theory, which essentially argues that a nation's socio-economic development depends on its position within a global capitalist system. This effort was guided by the following question: "Can Dependency Theory help explain variations in the level of interactivity observed for online newspapers between and within sub-regions of Asia?"

Economic Development and Interactive Online Journalism

Interactivity "is supposed to be the most distinctive contribution of online journalism" (Tucher, 1997 [On-line]) to news consumers and the business of disseminating the daily news. Yet it likely requires a fairly sizeable staff to build a discernibly high degree of interactivity into a Web newspaper. Even the seemingly simple task of preparing traditional news-media content for uploading to a Web newspaper can be "tedious and time consuming, taking up many hours of employees' days" (Martin, 1998, p. 72). "Interactive" online journalism, therefore, is a labor-intensive endeavor. Add the cost of the required technical resources and it becomes a capital-intensive affair as well.

In general, capital flows into a commercial newspaper in large part through the sale of advertising space on the printed or virtual page. This revenue stream, in turn, is influenced by the size of the newspaper's audience. "The larger the audience," as McManus suggests, "the greater its wealth, the greater the proportion of audience members in the highest consuming age bracket ... the more valuable the [newspapers'] advertising space is to retailers and the higher the fees ... newspapers may charge" for it (1995, p. 314). Hence, a Web newspaper may be only as interactive as the level of its funding will allow. Support for this notion is found in the work of McMillan (1998), who observed an interactivity-funding link at health-related Web sites.

Advertising revenue arguably is linked to the viability of a society's economy, or to its state of economic development. There must be a sufficient number of sufficiently wealthy consumers to make it worthwhile for retailers to purchase advertising space to promote their products to them. If some threshold of consumerism does not exist, then it seems unlikely that retailers would purchase any great quantity of advertising space; moreover, absent this threshold, sufficient numbers of retailers may not exist to enrich a newspaper with revenue from the sale of advertising space. It is at this juncture that "interactive" online journalism and Dependency Theory may intersect.

Raul Prebisch, chair of the post-World War II United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America, is generally credited with giving Dependency Theory its start (Chilcote, 1984; Larrain, 1989; Wallace, 1990). The crux of his argument is that unequal exchanges between "center" and "periphery" nations serve to keep peripheral states under-developed. Bauzon and Abel (1986) give the example of the industrialized center extracting profit, or "surplus," from the un-industrialized periphery by taking out raw materials and sending back finished consumer products.

Notable refinements to the center-periphery concept have come from Frank (1966, 1967), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), and Galtung (1971). Wallerstein contributed the notion of "semi-periphery" nations in his conceptualization of a world capitalist system (1976). The semi-periphery is the buffer between the top and bottom of the global economic ladder and a country could rise or fall to semi-periphery status (Barnett, Jacobson, Choi & Sun-Miller, 1996). Semi-peripheral nations also potentially can wrest from the center additional levels of influence over markets at the periphery (Wallerstein, 1979).

One method of arraying countries from center to periphery is by Gross Domestic Product. For Asia, Gunaratne (in press) uses global economic competitiveness to suggest regional and sub-regional Dependency Theory divisions. And communication – specifically, the number of outbound international telephone calls – has been found to be predictive of a nation's level of economic development, quality of life and political participation (Barnett et. al, 1996).

The theory admittedly has engendered many criticisms (see Weiner & Huntington, 1987), although a thorough discussion of them is beyond the scope of the current work. Whatever the theory's shortcomings, however, its conception of global economic centres and peripheries "can, in certain instances, be helpful analytical constructs" (Dietz & James, 1990, p. 45). It is in that vein that Dependency Theory could be applied to interactive online journalism.

Bringing Interactivity to Online Journalism

Online journalism, albeit in the most basic sense, means taking a news article prepared for a traditional, paper-and-ink news product and "re-purposing" it to a companion Web site (Pavlik, 1997). Yet the Net – the system through which consumers access news articles published to the Web – brings to the table the potential for more technologically sophisticated forms of journalism. Inherent in the technical architecture of the Net is the capacity for interactivity (Newhagen & Levy, 1998).

News-industry commentators and researchers tend to generally disagree on the ideal look of interactive online journalism, however. The common practice of outfitting a Web-published news article with hypertext links is criticized as a rather pedestrian form of online journalism (Noth, 1996; Pogash, 1996; Lasica, 1997) – and defended as valid but unfairly maligned device of interactivity (Lux, 1996). Ideal online journalism also has been described as the act of accompanying Web news texts with digital audio or video (Lasica, 1996a & 1996b; Woefel, in Dent, 1998), and offering readers searchable news-story archives, direct access to news wires and news customization features (Lasica, 1996b; Lieb, 1998).

What these disparate views do share is the notion that online journalism has the potential to empower its audiences. In other words, content producers can harness the technological capabilities of the Net to give content consumers hitherto unavailable means for controlling their interactions with the day's news (Dennis, 1996; Khoo & Gopal, 1996).

Morris and Ogan's work (1996), on the other hand, suggests that online journalism can be called "interactive" when it is put to work facilitating asynchronous and synchronous interpersonal communication between content consumers and producers, and among consumers. E-mail links to online journalists, electronic bulletin boards and chat rooms could be examples of interpersonally interactive Web news-making.

Recent studies arguably do little to unify these competing conceptualizations of interactive online journalism. The tendency has been to broadly categorize as "interactive" any number of content-control and interpersonal-interaction features (see Gubman & Greer, 1997; Tremayne, 1997; Tankard & Ban, 1998; Riley, Keough, Christiansen, Meilich & Pierson, 1998). However, a more uniform – and perhaps more usefully analytical – approach may be found in Heeter's effort (1989) to coalesce the varied definitions of interactivity that have been applied to new communication technologies in general.

Interactivity, Heeter argues, can occur along six dimensions and among them, four appear to closely fit the literature on online journalism. A new dimension is suggested for immediacy of information, a journalistic concept not accommodated by Heeter's broad package of measures. Those five dimensions of interactivity are explicated for online journalism as follows:

Complexity of Choice Available. Choice-complexity is defined as the range of content topics that Web journalists make available to readers. In other words, an online newspaper's level of interactivity can be measured by the diversity of content published to it. Replicating the full range of content topics found in a traditional, printed-page news product, plus converging that with the multimedia features of traditional broadcast media, could be examples of a highly interactive Web news site. This, therefore, would empower the site's users with many choices for exercising control over information.

Responsiveness to the User. To paraphrase Heeter, this refers to "the degree to which [online journalists] can react responsively" (1989, p. 223) to messages from readers. The dimension can be further defined as "potential for responsiveness," as in the provision of e-mail links to the newsroom, and "actual responsiveness," or whether journalists actually respond to reader e-mail.

Ease of Adding Information to the System. Interactive online journalism, under this dimension, is defined as the technological empowerment of Web newspaper readers for asynchronous, one-to-many communication.

Facilitation of Interpersonal Communication. This refers to a Web newspaper's potential for offering itself as a digital conduit through which a reader can carry on a synchronous, one-to-one interaction with another reader.

Immediacy of Content. This may be the one characteristic of online journalism that most clearly distinguishes it from traditional journalism. However, the Net's potential for immediacy possibly was not fully recognized until February 1997, when a U.S. daily newspaper, the *Dallas* (Texas) *Morning News*, turned to its Web site to break a major story about Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, federal-building bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh (Reider, 1997; Hanson, 1997). Immediacy thus is another dimension of online journalism's potential interactivity, and it can be defined as the extent to which a Web newspaper offers its readers the most immediately available information.

However, there is a drawback to measuring the interactivity of an online journalism endeavor through the five dimensions. Although it can produce data on the scope of interactivity at a Web news site, it offers little in the way of an explanation for observed differences between sites. One possible way of overcoming this may be to analyze dimensional scores through a proxy for the resources required for making online journalism interactive. Dependency Theory may offer that substitute variable.

Research Hypotheses

At this point two hypotheses about the interactivity of Asia's Web newspapers can be suggested. First, the extent to which online journalism is interactive will decrease from Asia's economic center to its semi-periphery, and from the semi-periphery to the regional periphery. Second, the sub-regional center-periphery divisions also will exhibit this descending-order pattern.

The hypotheses were framed by the assumption that Dependency Theory, through its center-periphery classification scheme, approximates the extent to which a country's economy is capable of sustaining a level of consumption that makes it profitable for retailers to buy newspaper advertising space. Revenue from advertising-space sales, in turn, makes available the funding that is needed to make a Web newspaper interactive. The higher a country's Dependency Theory ranking, the more interactivity that Web newspapers published from there can afford. Conversely, the smaller and less developed the national economy – the lower its position in the world capitalist system – the less interactive its Web newspapers will be.

Methodology

Daily, general circulation English-language Asian newspapers that publish companion Web editions were identified from the major Net search engines and data bases of online newspapers, such the listing at *American Journalism Review* (http://ajr.newslink.org/nonusa.html). Keywords used in the search-engine sessions included "Asia and news," "Asia and newspaper," and the country names from *Asian Communication Handbook* (1998) profiles. This produced 50 Net "addresses," although six were later found to reach either non-working sites or ones that publish only news summaries in English. The final data set included 44 Web newspapers from 14 Asian countries plus Hong Kong.

English-language newspapers were selected for two reasons. First, English is a commonly found lingua franca in Asia, and is typically used among a nation's educated class and expatriate community. Additionally, Asian newspapers that publish in this shared language often are among a nation's most influential (Merrill, 1991).

The unit of analysis was the entire newspaper Web site, beginning at the "front page." At about half of the 44 sites, the "front page" was accessible only through a "home page," and Li's operationalisations (1998) were used to distinguish the two. The "home page" is a newspaper's initial, or opening, screen on the Web. It generally contains only hypertext links for accessing information published within a newspaper's site or on an external, or off-site, locale on the Web. The "front page," on the other hand, can be accessed through the home page or itself can serve as the newspaper's initial Web screen, and it can be recognized by its similarity in appearance to a print newspaper front page.

Each site was coded for the presence or absence of various types of content and features that tap into the technology of the Net. "Complexity of Choice Available" was conceptualized as news, entertainment, multimedia, commercial, and background/news customization features.[1] "Responsiveness to the User" was operationalised as the provision of e-mail links to journalists[2] and "actual responsiveness." To gauge the latter, a standardized e-mail message was sent to the newspapers by the study's coders, requesting minimal data about how their sites functioned. The message was sent through a general-delivery "feedback" link or, if listed, to the newspaper's webmaster or chief online editor. If the newspaper responded, a score of 1 was awarded.

Online letters to the editor, electronic bulletin boards and reader polls on news topics of the day were coded as examples of the "Ease of Adding Information" dimension. "Facilitation of Interpersonal Communication" was conceptualized as moderated and un-moderated chat rooms. By "Immediacy of Content," we meant the presence on a Web site of a publication date or an "update ticker."

Scores were calculated by dividing the number of items present on a newspaper Web site for a particular dimension by the total number of items comprising that dimension. A perfect score was 1.0. By way of illustration, an online newspaper received a rounded score of 0.70 for "Ease of Adding Information" if two of that dimension's three variables were observed at its Web site.

Individual newspaper scores on the five interactivity dimensions were collapsed to create center, semi-periphery and periphery indices. The indices mirror the regional and sub-regional Dependency Theory categorization scheme that Gunaratne (in press) suggests for Asia, based on national indicators of global competitiveness. Figure 1 reports the Web newspapers that make up the Dependency Theory divisions.

Gunaratne determined global competitiveness on the basis of each Asian nation's percentage share of the region's slice of total world goods-and-services exports for 1996. His center-periphery classification scheme holds up when compared to 1997 world export data – the most recent available from the World Trade Organization (www.wto.org/wto/statis/).

The non-parametric Spearman's rank-order correlation (rho, or r_s) was selected as the test statistic, as the Dependency Theory categories were given ordinal-scale values that descended in whole numbers, beginning at "3" for the center. Furthermore, the prediction is for monotonic relationships – specifically, interactivity always decreases from center through periphery – that the correlation is well-suited to detecting (Vogt, 1993, p. 215-16). Spearman's also is robust against normality-assumption violations, and a pre-analysis check on the interactivity data suggested often widely non-normal distributions, particularly for the sub-regional center-periphery divisions. This may be due to the small sample sizes.

A faculty member and 11 master's degree students at a major Asian university coded the Web sites, which were accessed twice – an initial visit and then a second time 24 hours later – between 23 March and 10 April 1998. Again, we turned to Li's work for support. Li found that Web sites of three U.S. national newspapers tended to be stable in appearance over time, and from that makes the argument that small sample sizes, or numbers of visits, can yield reliable data (1998, p. 357).

Some 11% of the 44 Asian newspaper Web sites were visited independently by two coders during one coding session to gauge reliability. For each of the 37 variables requiring coder judgement, intercoder agreement ranged from .80, a widely accepted threshold (Krippendorff, 1980; Lacy & Riffe, 1996), to perfect agreement, using Holsti's formula (1969).

Results

The first hypothesis predicted a descending order of interactivity for Asia's English-language online newspapers, from the region's center through to its periphery. However, this expectation is not supported by the data.

The predicted pattern appeared to hold up for the "Immediacy of Content" and "Responsiveness to the User" dimensions of interactivity, as Table 1 reports, but neither relationship was statistically noteworthy. The only significant order of interactivity occurred for the "Ease of Adding Information" dimension ($r_s = -.377$; $p<$ .006, 1-tail), yet it was an ascending relationship, contrary to expectations. Interactivity for the remaining two dimensions ran in both directions, converging on the region's economic semi-periphery.

Similarly discouraging were the findings for the sub-region Dependency Theory divisions. The data overall leave the second hypothesis – that interactivity in online journalism will decline from center to periphery within Asia's three sub-regions – without convincing support.

Online journalism's level of interactivity among the 10 Web newspapers of the sub-region East Asia moved against the hypothesized direction on all five dimensions, as Table 2 shows. But it was statistically insignificant that interactivity appeared to be greater at East Asia's semi-periphery rather than at its center. For the 19 Web newspapers from the Southeast Asia sub-region, interactive online journalism diminished, as expected, only along the "Complexity" and "Responsiveness" dimensions. Web newspapers from the sub-region's economic center and semi-periphery matched mean "Immediacy" scores, while the lone "Interpersonal" score came from the semi-periphery. The only predicted pattern of significance was observed for South Asia's 15 Web newspapers on the dimension "Complexity" (r_s = .466; p< .04, 1-tail). Interactivity ascended from the sub-region's periphery to center for the dimensions "Responsiveness," "Ease of Adding Information" and "Interpersonal," and the two South Asia zones were essentially equal on the "Immediacy" dimension.

A second test of the data for interactive online journalism was made to check the fruitfulness of using global competitiveness as a proxy for a country's position in the world capitalist system. Although Gunaratne prefers using competitiveness indicators, he also suggests that a less satisfactory set of Dependency Theory divisions can be fashioned on the basis of the World Bank's rankings of Asia's national economies. In this scheme, "high-income" economies serve as Asia's center; for the current work, these are Brunei, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. The semi-periphery would comprise Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. All other Asian nations, ranked as "low-income" economies, become the region's periphery (e.g., Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).

The findings, however, were no more encouraging. "Responsiveness," as Table 3 reports, was the lone dimension to display the predicted pattern of descending-order interactivity. Each of the World Bank rank-interactivity relationships lacked statistical importance.

A further attempt to distinguish center from periphery in Asia is reported in Table 4. For this effort, Dependency Theory categories were assigned on the basis of the percentage of a country's population that makes frequent use of the Net. The percentages were calculated from country-specific, Net-user estimates reported by NUA Internet Surveys for December 1998 (How many online? Asia, 1998b) and 1998 population figures found at the Web site of the United Nations Population Information Network.

Nolan (online) suggests that when a country has 10.0% of its population regularly using the Net, it is "approaching critical mass, especially if there is a large enough population base or other reasons, for a product or service to prosper." Asia's Net-user center, according to Nolan's benchmark, comprises Singapore (14.7%) and Hong Kong (13.4%). The semi-periphery was defined as nations where Net users accounted for less than 10.0% but more than 1.0% of the general population, and this captured Japan at 6.4%, South Korea (3.9%) and Malaysia (3.0%). A nation was peripheral if its population counted less than 1.0% as users of the Net, and Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand fell into this category. Brunei, Nepal and Pakistan were excluded because no Net-user figures were located for them.

The findings suggest that the interactivity of online journalism and a country's percentage of Net users are unrelated. "Responsiveness" dimensional scores descended as expected, but all of the remaining dimensions displayed mixed interactivity-order patterns. Statistical significance was absent from each relationship.

Discussion and Conclusions

Dependency Theory classifications, at least those cut from global competitiveness indicators and World Bank rankings, offer little help in explaining variations in the interactivity of English-language Web newspapers between and within sub-regions of Asia. With the classifications as a proxy for economic development – hence advertising-sales revenue – the funding-interactivity link that McMillan discovered for health-related Web sites did not materialize in any convincing form for the online Asian newspapers.

One possible reason is that a global competitiveness indicator based on percentage share of regional goods-and-services exports may not precisely approximate a country's position in the world capitalist system. Future applications of Dependency Theory to online journalism should consider other economic center-periphery approximations, such as GDP, level of consumer spending or per capita income. It could be that an Asian Web newspaper's level of interactivity is apparently unrelated to its home country's level of capitalist development. More fruitful predictors of 'interactive' online journalism in the region may be found in such cultural-political measures as freedom of the press, speech, or assembly. At the organizational level, the size and technical skill level of a Web newspaper's staff, or a measure of the willingness of the newspaper's corporate owner to develop the online news site, also might make better predictors.

The percentage of Net users in a country's population also fared poorly as a predictor of interactive online journalism. One explanation may be that this scheme's center-periphery country assignments largely mirrored those made by competitiveness indicators, which lacked predictive value themselves. Indeed, a strong and significant relationship (r_s = .632; $p < .0001$, 1-tail) was observed between the two Dependency Theory ranking schemes.

Finally, it is clear from our analysis that – for the moment at least – the practice of online journalism among Asia's English-language Web newspapers exhibits wide variations in interactivity between those within each of the Dependency Theory categories. This pattern, observed over the three center-periphery classification schemes investigated, suggests a less than straightforward portrait of the Web newspapers' interactivity. Perhaps online journalism's level of interactivity represents a process unique to individual Web newspapers, rather than a phenomenon of uniform scope at a macro-level of analysis. Mody (1987) suggests as much, arguing that factors such as economics, culture, politics and history, and actors such as nation-states, corporations and social movements, can have an impact on the emergence of a new technology. And the impact likely varies by time and place. Thus, the level of interactivity of a Web newspaper could depend more on the specific circumstances of the innovation's emergence than on how its home country is ranked on a Dependency Theory classification scheme.

It will, of course, require future monitoring to determine whether the pattern of interactive online journalism detected by this benchmark study will persist, or whether economic factors ultimately will emerge as the principal explanatory variable. This, in turn, allows for additional study of and refinement to Dependency Theory.

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Notes

[1] "News" was conceptualized as international, regional, national and local news articles, business and sports news, and weather forecasts. "Regional" was defined as news about neighboring nations; "local" as articles about a newspaper's home-base city. Included as "entertainment": movie, book and restaurant/food reviews; crossword puzzles; comic strips; contests; and an events calendar, or a compendium of upcoming activities in the community. "Multimedia" was defined as digitized audio and video of news or entertainment events. By "background/news customization" we meant in-story hypertext links to topically related same-day stories, related archived stories and external Web sites; and searchable archives and news customization features. "Commercial" was coded as the presence or absence of revenue-generating product/service advertisements, and classified and "help wanted" ads.

[2] These included a "feedback" link, or the newsroom's "general delivery" e-mail address, and e-mail links to specific journalists by job title. The job titles were "chief newspaper editor," or the executive in charge of the entire newsroom; "chief online editor," or the Web edition's journalist-manager; and "online section editors," "online reporters," and "webmaster."

Figure 1: *Dependency Theory Divisions*

East Asia Region Centre	**Sub-Region Centre** ▪ Japan: *Asahi Shimbun, Japan Times, Yomiuri Shimbun*
	Sub-Region Semi-Periphery ▪ China: *China Daily* ▪ Hong Kong: *Hong Kong Standard, South China Morning Post* ▪ South Korea: *Chosun Ilbo, Joong Ang Daily News, Korean Herald, Korea Times*
Southeast Asia Region Semi-Periphery	**Sub-Region Centre** ▪ Singapore: *New Paper, New Straits Times*
	Sub-Region Semi-Periphery ▪ Indonesia: *Indonesian Observer* ▪ Malaysia: *Borneo Mail, New Straits Times, Sabah Daily Express, Sarawak Tribune, Star, Sun* ▪ Philippines: *Freeman, Independent Post, Manila Bulletin, Manila Times, Philippines Daily Inquirer, Philippines Star, Visayan Daily Star* ▪ Thailand: *Bangkok Post, Nation*
	Sub-Region Periphery ▪ Brunei: *Borneo Bulletin*
South Asia Region Periphery	**Sub-Region Centre** ▪ India: *Deccan Chronicle, Deccan Herald, Hindu, Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Pioneer, Times of India*
	Sub-Region Periphery ▪ Bangladesh: *Daily Star, Independent* ▪ Nepal: *Kathmandu Post* ▪ Pakistan: *Dawn, Frontier Post, Nation, News International* ▪ Sri Lanka: *Daily News*

Table 1. *Interactive Online Journalism in Asia*

	Mean Scores on Interactivity Dimensions				
	Complexity of Content	Immediacy of Content	Response to User	Ease of Adding Information	Facilitate Interpersonal Comm.
Centre: East Asia	0.33 sd 0.15	0.25 sd 0.35	0.34 sd 0.29	0.17 sd 0.24	0.10 sd 0.32
Semi-Periphery: SE Asia	0.30 sd 0.11	0.24 sd 0.26	0.30 sd 0.18	0.21 sd 0.23	0.08 sd 0.19
Periphery: South Asia	0.34 sd 0.09	0.13 sd 0.23	0.29 sd 0.13	0.36 sd 0.15	0.10 sd 0.21
r_s	*-.167*	*.150*	*.033*	*-.377* *	*-.083*

* p< .006, 1-tail

Table 2. *Sub-regional Asia and Interactive Online Journalism*

		Interactivity Dimension Means				
		Complexity of Content	Immediacy of Content	Response to User	Ease of Adding Info	Facilitate Interpersonal Comm.
East Asia	Center	0.30	0.17	0.29	0.00	0.00
	Semi-Periphery	0.34	0.29	0.37	0.24	0.14
	r_s	*-.343*	*-.130*	*-.039*	*-.522*	*-.218*
Southeast Asia	Center	0.38	0.25	0.36	0.50	0.00
	Semi-Periphery	0.29	0.25	0.30	0.17	0.09
	Periphery	0.24	0.00	0.14	0.33	0.00
	r_s	*.232*	*.136*	*.336*	*.239*	*-.062*
South Asia	Center	0.39	0.14	0.24	0.33	0.07
	Periphery	0.30	0.13	0.32	0.38	0.13
	r_s	*.466 **	*.040*	*-.278*	*-.133*	*-.134*

* $p < .04$, 1-tail

Table 3. *Asian Dependency Theory Divisions Using World Bank Economy Rankings*

	Mean Scores on Interactivity Dimensions				
	Complexity of Content	Immediacy of Content	Response to User	Ease of Adding Info	Facilitate Interpersonal Comm.
Center: East Asia	0.34 sd 0.15	0.21 sd 0.33	0.32 sd 0.27	0.25 sd 0.25	0.08 sd 0.29
Semi-Periphery: SE Asia	0.29 sd 0.10	0.22 sd 0.25	0.30 sd 0.18	0.17 sd 0.20	0.09 sd 0.20
Periphery: South Asia	0.34 sd 0.09	0.16 sd 0.24	0.29 sd 0.13	0.33 sd 0.17	0.09 sd 0.20
r:	*.150*	*-.059*	*-.033*	*-.051*	*-.098*

Table 4. *Percentage of Internet Users in Population as Dependency Theory Proxy*

	Mean Scores on Interactivity Dimensions				
	Complexity of Content	Immediacy of Content	Response to User	Ease of Adding Info	Facilitate Interpersonal Comm.
Center: East Asia	.42 sd .19	.38 sd .48	.46 sd .38	.33 sd .27	.25 sd .50
Semi-Periphery: SE Asia	.31 sd .12	.23 sd .26	.27 sd .16	.18 sd .26	----
Periphery: South Asia	.32 sd .10	.18 sd .24	.30 sd .17	.23 sd .19	.10 sd .21
r.	*.018*	*.173*	*.075*	*-.042*	*-.114*

PRAISING, BASHING, PASSING:

NEWSMAGAZINE COVERAGE OF JAPAN, 1965-1994

Abstract

This longitudinal study of Japan, the world's #2 economic power, analyzed all 290 pieces that Newsweek published during 30 years. Japan was portrayed positively (*praised*)1965-74, but more negatively (*bashed*) as Japan grew in power and then in a balanced way after 1985. The study found a decade of inattention 1975-84, followed by a surge of coverage 1988-93, and then a drop (*passed*) in 1994. In those high-attention years, longer stories and an accentuated linking of the United States to stories about Japan occurred. Of seven Japan covers in 30 years, four have military/ Japan-as-threat themes.

Anne Cooper-Chen
E.W. Scripps School of Journalism
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701

740/ 593-2611
acooper1@ohiou.edu

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PRAISING, BASHING, PASSING: U.S. NEWSMAGAZINE COVERAGE OF JAPAN, 1965-1994

It's easier to emphasize, or put out of perspective, aspects of Japan that sell. Yes, there's pressure from back home to fit the cliche.
--journalist Jocelyn Ford (Otake 1998, p.68)

I. INTRODUCTION

According to former U.S. ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield, the relationship between Japan and the United States is the single most important bilateral relation in the world. The U.S. $7.66 trillion economy and the Japanese $2.92 trillion economy together dominate the world's GNP. As the world's #1 and #2 economic powers, the partners' interactions and mutual perceptions take on importance for the whole world.

For their part, the "Japanese are afraid of the American media because they know that their coverage is influential enough to mobilize the American government" (Otake 1998, p.63). In the case of U.S. citizens,many with no direct knowledge about Japan, mass media portrayals can have great influence. An effects study by Perry (1990, p.357) showed that "negative attitudes about foreign countries result partly from a lack of information." Furthermore, "the quantity of news available about foreign countries often may be at least as important as its content" (Perry 1990, p.358).

According to Japan's most repected journalist, Tetsuya Chikushi (1998 p.61), "Americans and Japanese especially need to be careful in order not to fall back onto cliches." But often cliches do arise in concert with the temper of the times.

Media Portrayals/ Audience Perceptions of Japan

From 1885 to 1924, as Japanese laborers flooded into Hawaii and the West Coast, U.S. doubts about immigrants' loyalty were directed especially toward Asian ethnic groups. The many "yellow peril" cartoons and articles appearing in the mainstream U.S. press gave evidence of racism (Brislin

1995), which reached a peak in 1924 when Congress excluded all further Asian immigration.

In 1942, 10 weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered the internment of 80,000 U.S. citizens of Japanese descent and 30,000 Japan-born residents in California, Washington and Oregon. During 1941-42, not one West Coast newspaper opposed the internment in editorials (Chiasson 1991, 104).

But after the war, the role of Japan as an ally prevailed. Media in the 1960s and 1970s, during the Cold War, conveyed "a particular image of Japan--the Japanese miracle; hard working; no conflicts. . . a model society" (Harootunian 1998, p.85). During the 1980s, as Japan gained wealth and power, "media coverage reflected this rivalry. . .but the American media was still reporting some positive impressions of Japan" (Tsurumi 1998, p. 115).

Then in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, marking the "great divide about the Americans' perception of Japan," according to Tsurumi ("Images of Japan" 1996). Earlier in 1989, Mitsubishi had bought shares of Rockefeller Center, and Sony had bought Columbia Pictures. Japan replaced the Soviet Union as America's chief antagonist. A 1989 poll revealed that 68 percent of Americans feared Japan's economic threat more than Russia's military threat. In 1994, businessman Yasuo Kato was killed in Los Angeles by a man who blamed Japan for losing his job. Observed Lionel Tiger, "Every culture has its monsters. . .and the Japanese have served as a kind of demonic threat, for economic purposes" ("Images of Japan," 1996).

Erroneously, 78.1 percent of respondents thought in 1991 that the United States imported more from Japan than from Canada, when in fact in 1990 the value of imports from both countries was about the same. When the question turned to free trade, cultural biases were evident. Free trade with Canada was favored by 81.0 percent; with Mexico, by 69.7 percent; but with Japan, by only 58.5 percent (Flournoy et al 1992).

By 1996, attitudes had mellowed toward Japan, which experienced a recession in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, trade disputes with a new adversary, China, reached epic proportions. In a series of ABC-TV polls ("Images of Japan" 1996), answers to these questions shifted dramatically:

Are U.S.-Japanese relations good or poor?
Poor: 1994-58%; 1996- 42% Good: 1994-38%; 1996-53%
Are anti-Japanese feelings on the rise?
1992: yes, rising- 65% 1996: yes, rising- 23%
Does Japan practice fair trade with the United States?
1994: yes- 16% 1996: yes- 24%

East Asia experts agree with these poll results. George Packard of Johns Hopkins University believes that the "idea of Japan as a threat is gone," while Prof. Ezra Vogel of Harvard places the turning point at about 1994 ("Images of Japan" 1996). Tsurumi (1998, p. 117) cautions that suspension of "the hostility toward Japan in the media. . . doesn't mean opinions of Japan have become friendly. . .[America] doesn't pay as much attention to Japan as it did." In other words, Japan-passing replaced Japan-bashing in the national media in the mid-1990s.

The Three News Weeklies

Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) play a crucial role as widely read sources of international news. Newsweek has 13 overseas bureaus, one "international correspondent" and nine international editions; Time, 21 bureaus and three international edition; and USNWR, seven bureaus. With its domestic emphasis and smaller circulation, USNWR does not qualify as a major force in international journalism. But Time and Newsweek, covering both the nation and the globe, report to a worldwide audience.

By contrast, the New York Times, with 32 foreign correspondents (26 bureaus), the Los Angeles Times with 25 correspondents and the Washington Post with 22 correspondents (Emery 1989, p. 158) all have local constituencies. As daily publications "of record" that can run to hundreds of pages, they do not serve the same highlighting function as do the news weeklies. Nor do they reach as many people. The New York Times has a circulation of about 1 million, compared to these 1997 SRDS paid circulation figures for the newsmagazines:

Time	4,150,223
Newsweek	3,276,457
USNWR	2,220,236

Readership is about seven times greater than circulation. According to Newsweek, its editions had a worldwide readership of more than 24 million in 1996.

This study of Japan will focus on Newsweek for three reasons. First, research shows "underwhelming"evidence of "between- news magazine differences" (Yu and Riffe 1989, p. 914), obviating the need to study both publications. Second, Time magazine has had a somewhat skewed view of Asian affairs, to the point that "so distorted were [Theodore H.] White's filings from China that he became the object of ridicule" (Fountain 1995, B1). Third, the author was able to interview Newsweek's former (1986-1991) Tokyo bureau chief several times.

While still at his Newsweek Tokyo post, Bradley Martin, who has covered a half dozen Asian nations, stated, "This country is the most difficult and challenging place to find out what's happening. . . . Not in terms of what so-and-so said, but what is really happening" (Shifrel 1988, 28).

Compounding the frustration in reporting on Japan was the domestic edition's reluctance to carry Japan stories; about four times as many Japan stories appeared in the "poor stepchild" international as in the U.S.

edition. (Advisories about all stories went to both domestic and "overseas." But little communication existed between the staffs of the two editions; even the elevators did not connect them directly.) The nine overseas editions' editorial contents "are almost identical, an occasionally different backpage interview and/or cover image being the main difference among them" (Bradley Martin, personal communication, March 29, 1998). Both Martin and his predecessor decided not

> to worry unduly about domestic but just feed international, the reliable customer. . . .a typical situation was that international would schedule a piece, domestic would schedule a shorter version of the same piece, then the domestic story would be bumped by something that seemed more exciting to the editors there (almost anything was more exciting to the foreign desk than Japan) toward the end of the week (Bradley Martin, personal communication, March 29, 1998).

In the 1970s and 1980s, Tokyo had one correspondent and three locally hired staffers. The push to cover Japan more fully came from domestic's business, not foreign, desk--after the agenda-setting function of the New York Times affected the New York editors' perception of Japan as a "hot" story. Thus, starting about 1988, senior business writer Bill Powell, formerly of Business Week, started covering the Japan story from New York. Then in 1989 New York bolstered Tokyo by sending over Bill Powell, who

> spent enormous amounts of time on the phone schmoozing with the folks in New York and pitching stories that they virtually always bought. Framing a compelling story idea is a large part of what Newsweek is about. Reporting is what then fills it in. . . . Powell, who was adept at writing cover stories quickly as a result of his New York training, would usually be assigned by New York as the final writer (Bradley Martin, personal communication, March 29, 1998).

Martin left in 1991. Then New York's perception about Japan changed again. After Powell left for Moscow in 1995, Tokyo "had no bureau chief and no expat at all for many months" (Bradley Martin, personal communication, March 29, 1998).

Purpose of Study

News magazines, the U.S. national print media, are worth studying because of their large readership and potential influence in attitude formation. Furthermore, removed from the cacophony of daily events, news weeklies can "summarize the dominant American reading of a news event" (Wall 1997, 413); thus the domestic edition of Newsweek can serve as a window onto changing and constant perceptions of the world's #2 economy.

To explore long-term cycles, this study will take a qualitative and quantitive look at Newsweek's coverage of Japan over 30 years. It will attempt to discern whether criticisms of coverage have merit.

II. RELATED STUDIES

The large question of determinants of international news has long intrigued content researchers (e.g. Galtung and Ruge 1963). Adams (1986) found that extrinsic factors (e.g. distance from New York) rather than an event's intrinsic newsworthiness explained foreign coverage. Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger (1987) found that three variables influence whether the U.S. media consider an overseas event newsworthy --potential for social change, the normative deviance of the event and relevance to the United States. Others (Riffe 1996; Sparkes and Winter 1980) have likewise confirmed the appeal of linkage to U.S. interests.

As a non-Western country, Japan presents special challenges in reporting to a U.S. audience. Why do foreign correspondents in Japan, working with (and sometimes against) their editors, produce the stories they do? What does coverage entail? Some research has addressed the special case of Japan.

Correspondents in Japan

U.S.-based media make use of 185 persons stationed in Japan (Kliesch

1991). Using a narrower definition of "correspondent," another survey found that the media employ about 70 fulltimers and 25 part-timers, who cite language as their biggest problem (East-West Center 1992). Journalists' other problems include access to public figures; a lack of "bang-bang" (spot news); Japanese sources' reluctance to do interviews by phone; the need to build rapport over many meetings; and the lack of substance in interviews because Japanese "shy away from accepting responsibility or going out on a limb" (Shifrel 1988, 28).

Researchers (Chang and Lee 1992) and reporters alike wonder about editors who don't "get it" (Shifrel 1988, 26). Correspondents in Japan find it "hard to satisfy editors who want clear-cut, black-and-white stories" and who need to know exactly "when to do a particular story" (East-West 1992, 7).

Coverage of Japan: Thematic Studies

A reporter for the Wall Street Journal, with his tongue in his cheek, once said that only three types of stories emerge from Japan: 1) the Japanese are getting more like us; 2) the Japanese are strange and exotic; and 3) "those Japanese are screwing us again" (Kristof 1998, p. 34).

In a more serious vein, another reporter, Charles Burress (1998, p. 41) of the San Francisco Chronicle, saw in U.S. media coverage of Japan a "crescendo of anti-Japanese antagonism" from about 1988 to 1993. He found four types of subtle bias in U.S. coverage: 1) war metaphors; 2) making Japan a monolith (the over use of "they" and the substitution of "Japan" for specific companies); 3)cultural condescension (Japanese portrayed as sexist, intransigent nationalists or workaholic automatons); and 4) failure to tell the other side (e.g., omitting the fact that the Rockefellers themselves solicited the 1989 Mitsubishi purchase of Rockefeller Center).

A Japanese professor identifies a particular form of cultural condension: smug superiority when writing about Japanese women. She adds that "the universality of the United States" is deemed posiive, in contrast to a negative view of "the uniqueness of Japan" (Ueno 1998, p. 73).

Coverage of Japan: Empirical Studies

During 1972-81, Japan ranked 10th in number of video reports originating from overseas--just behind Poland and just ahead of Italy (Larson 1984). More recently, in the 1990s, Cooper-Chen and Kanayama (1998) found for sampled newscasts that CBS covered only three Japan stories in six months in 1993 and four stories in 1996. Without sampling, Flournoy et al (1992) recorded 173 stories on all networks January 1990-September 1991: 52 on ABC, 54 on CBS and 67 on NBC.

What U.S. newspapers cover Japan most? With business/ economics as the big story, not surprisingly, Flournoy et al (1992) found that the Wall Street Journal carried more than twice as many items (news stories, editorials and columns) about Japan, 2,284, as did the next most attentive newspaper, the New York Times (1,225 items). The Los Angeles Times had 843, the Washington Post had 660, and all other papers in the study had fewer than 500 during January 1990-September 1991.

An earlier report covering 1979-84 found that the Asahi Shimbun had 671 international articles, of which 42.6 percent dealt with the United States. By contrast, of the New York Times' 382 international articles, only 10.2 percent dealt with Japan (Takeichi 1991, 73). The "coverage imbalance" mirrors other imbalances; Japan also sends more goods, tourists and international students to the United States than vice versa.

In studying another kind of imbalance, researcher Izumi Kobayashi found that during 1990-1995, both the New York Times and Washington Post had a large number of articles on Japanese women. In 1995 alone, the two papers combined ran 23 such articles, in contrast to one each on German and

British women. Perhaps these articles "served to assuage U.S. egos," making the Japanese seem backward (Burress 1998, p. 49).

News weeklies' international coverage

Gerlach (1987) found that only 6% of Journalism Quarterly's articles 1964-83 dealt with all types of magazines. Only a few studies dealt with news weeklies' international coverage and role. Yu and Riffe (1989) found that Time and Newsweek reflected U.S. foreign policy regarding China. Villabos, Hertog and Rush (1994) found that both had similar coverage and positions regarding Panama.

One monograph (Flournoy et al 1992) compared Japan with the U.S. NAFTA trading partners. The three weekly newsmagazines carried (1990-91) 117 articles on Japan , far outdistancing the volume of stories devoted to Canada and Mexico. Newsweek carried 49; Time, 23; and USNWR, 45. But rather than extrapolating from a 21-month snapshot, we can learn more from a longitudinal overview.

Hypotheses

Based on "Images of Japan" 1996, Tsurumi 1998, Harootunian 1998 and Bradley Martin, personal communications 1998, four hypotheses about coverage of Japan in the domestic edition of Newsweek 1965-1994 can be formulated:

H1: The volume of coverage will change over time as follows:
1960s & 1970s: lower / 1988-1993: higher / 1994- lower

H2: The emphasis of coverage will change over time as follows:
1960s & 1970s: domestic / 1970s & 1980s: international

H3: The depth of coverage will change over time, with greatest attention devoted to the years 1988-1993.

H4: The direction of coverage will change over time as follows: 1960s-1970s: positive/ 1980-87: mixed/ 1988-1993: negative/ 1994- positive

H5: Linkage to U.S. interests will prevail through all time periods (based on Riffe 1996, Chang et al. 1987 and Sparkes and Winter 1980)

H6: Stories about women will be fairly prominent (based on Kobayashi as cited in Burress 1998 and Ueno 1998).

H7: Covers will feature Japan rarely and only at crucial junctures in U.S.-Japan relations (based on Wall 1997).

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III. METHOD

The years 1965-1994 represent the sweep of post-Occupation Japanese history. After Japan hosted the 1964 Olympics, it was acknowledged as a player on the world stage. Through the next decades it rose steadily to economic prominence, until finally experiencing a recession in the 1990s. The year 1994 can be called the end of an era, as in 1995 Newsweek severely downgraded the Tokyo bureau from its heyday as a two-correspondent, three-staffer operation.

The researcher used the Readers Guide (on line for years after 1989, hard copy for earlier years) to locate stories in Newsweek. All published pieces were included in the study--commentaries, short items and cartoons as well as articles (but not letters). No sampling was done; all 290 published items for the 30 years were coded. Two stories that the Readers Guide included had no relation to Japan and were dropped.

Coding took place during 1997 and 1998. Coders followed the guidelines of the Global News Flow Project, a 40-nation group of content researchers with an administrative base at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. The guidelines had been modified from an earlier 29-nation study (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1984). For each item, coders recorded the main topic, second topic, story length (short, medium or long), second country mentioned (in addition to Japan), role of main actor and gender of main actor. Table 1 lists all 22 topics.

An intercoder reliability test between the two main coders was done with seven randomly chosen stories: one from the 1960s, two from the 1970s, two from the 1980s and two from the 1990s. Results, using Holsti's (1969, p.140) formula, were: for story length, 86% agreement; second nation mentioned, 72%; main topic, 72%; gender of main actor, 100%. Secondary topic was tested at only 29% agreement, but 63% of stories had no secondary topic at all. Thus "secondary topic" was dropped from the final results. "Role of main actor" was not used in this analysis.

In addition to the variables above, coders wrote down the headline, subheading, caption and brief synopsis of the story. Using these four pieces of information, a third person coded each story as positive, negative or neutral. In judging negatives, the coder did not include reports of political scandals, accidents or unpleasant but newsworthy events (e.g. caption- "MITI tried to respond to public clamour over Lockheed" 5/13/76). A negative trend, discretionary or enterprise story was coded as negative (e.g. caption- "Japanese troops with Chinese captive, 1931: prodding some painful memories"- 7/19/82).

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To avoid a snapshot approach to coverage of Japan, the world's #2 economic power and a key U.S. partner, this study analyzed all 290 pieces that Newsweek published during 30 years. Table 1 gives an overview of coverage in five-year increments by topic.

H1. Volume. Figure 1 shows the dramatic ebb and flow of attention to Japan, with an especially deep chasm occurring 1976-85 and an impressive Everest occurring 1988-93. The decade of inattention was so severe that in 1978 and 1985, only one story about Japan appeared each year. The fact that the correspondents worked hard at turning out material does not "account for" the surge; New York's decision to better cover the Japan economic angle made the difference. The drop from 1993 (20 stories) to 1994 (10 stories) was precipitous, as predicted. **H1 is supported.**

H2. Topics. As Table 2 shows, the Japan story was domestically oriented through 1974. During the decade of inattention, 1975-84, international and domestic items were nearly balanced, with the first five years slightly more domestic and the second five years, 1980-84, slightly more international (see Table 1). **H2 is supported.**

H3. **Depth.** Figure 2 shows a striking ebb and flow of long stories; again, the last decade under study stands apart from previous years. Length does not necessarily constitute sophisticated, nuanced, complete coverage, but a preponderance of shorter stories surely gives the reader less information and more simplification. The editors in New York, instead of cutting to the chase, willingly devoted precious space to Japan. **H3 is supported.**

H4. **Direction.** Figure 3 shows that neutral stories dominated coverage. In the 1960s, the six stories that showed the Japanese as successful, innovative or hardworking outshone the two stories that pointed to a weakness: racial intolerance. In the 1970s, 11 positive stories appeared (all before 1974), balanced by 11 negative stories. In the 1980s, 14 negatives and only nine positives appeared. In the 1990s, 11 negatives vs. 10 positives brought back a measure of balance. The pendulum did appear to swing toward the negative as Japan grew in power. **H4 is partially supported.**

H5. **U.S. linkage.** Figure 4 shows a clear shift in the most recent decade--an accentuated linking of the United States as the second country mentioned. In 61 stories, the focus remained on Japan (no second country). Newsweek barely covers Japan-China stories; China, mentioned most after the United States, was the "second country" in only six stories during 30 years. Germany was mentioned in five stories--those connected with World War II anniversaries. The 1990s' emphasis on strong U.S. connections shows clearly in the cover story "What Japan thinks of us," which shows a baby holding an American flag (see Appendix). **H5 is supported.**

H6. Gender. As Figure 5 shows, the greatest presence for female actors occured in 1990-94; of the five "female" stories in that period, three featured future empress Masako Owada, who married the crown prince in June 1994. The major focus on male actors in the last decade of the study shows the same pattern seen above of a shift to a different mode of coverage after 1988. **H5 is not supported.**

H7. Covers. The Appendix reproduces all seven Japan-related Newsweek covers of the past 30 years: one in the 1960s, one in the 1970s, two in the 1980s and three in the first half of the 1990s. As Japan became more powerful, the pace of cover stories increased. **H7 is supported.**

Covers rely heavily on symbols. Three feature traditional dress--two women in kimono and a male samurai--instantly identifiable as Japanese symbols. The covers' symbolism present an opportunity to explore the Burress (1998) ideas about war references. One peaceful cover featuring a temple appeared in connection with Expo '70. But four others have military/ Japan-as-threat themes: two on Pearl Harbor anniversaries, one with a sword-brandishing samurai under the word "challenge" and one using the phrase "Japan invades."

This "invasion" cover (1989), which Burress (1998) himself discusses, stands out as a blatant example of monolith-making; its head reads "Japan [not Sony] invades Hollywood," although Sony's name appears on the cover in a subhead. If the Thomson group bought scores of U.S. newspapers, we would probably not see a cover line screaming, "Canada invades the news biz."

Table 1. Newsweek Covers Japan: Main Topic of Stories

	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	TOTAL
Int'l economics/ trade	5	9	3	3	17	41	**78 (26.90%)**
Domestic economics	11	7	3	1	4	11	**37 (12.76%)**
International politics	3	10	4	3	3	12	**35 (12.07%)**
Domestic politics	7	8	3	3	4	6	**31 (10.69%)**
Int'l military/ confict	8	0	0	2	4	4	18 (6.21%)
Social services/ education	1	2	0	0	7	5	15 (5.17%)
Oddities/ animals	8	1	0	0	4	2	15 (5.17%)
Culture/ art/ history	4	1	1	1	2	3	12 (4.14%)
Entertainment/personalities	1	3	1	2	3	1	11 (3.79%)
Religion	2	2	1	0	0	0	5 (1.72%)
Ethnic issues/ politics	1	2	0	0	0	2	5 (1.72%)
Int'l aid/ development	0	0	0	0	3	1	4 (1.38%)
Gender issues	0	0	0	0	0	3	3 (1.03%)
Energy/ environment	0	0	0	0	2	0	2 (0.69%)
Crime/ justice/ police	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.34%)
Sports	0	0	0	0	0	1	1 (0.34%)
Natural disasters/ weather	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (0.34%)
Civil war/domestic conflict	0	0	0	0	1	0	1 (0.34%)
Human rights	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.34%)
Migration/ immigration	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (0.34%)
Globalization/int'nalization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 (0%)
Other	3	1	1	0	4	4	13 (4.48%)
TOTAL	56	48	17	15	58	96	290

Table 2. Newsweek Covers Japan: Main Topic of Stories by Decade

A. 1965 - 74	
Domestic economics	18 (17.3%)
Domestic politics	15(14.4%)
Int'l economics/ trade	14 (13.5%)
International politics	13 (12.5%)
Oddities/ animals	9 (8.7%)
Int'l military/ confict	8 (7.7%)
Other	27 (26.0%)
TOTAL	104 (100%)

B. 1975 - 84	
International politics	7 (21.9%)
Int'l economics/ trade	6 (18.8%)
Domestic politics	6 (18.8)
Domestic economics	4 (12.5%)
Entertainment/personalities	3 (9.4%)
Other	6 (18.8%)
TOTAL	32 (100%)

C, 1985 - 94	
Int'l economics/ trade	58 (37.7%)
Domestic economics	15 (9.7%)
International politics	15 (9.7%)
Social services/ education	12 (7.8%)
Domestic politics	10 (6.5%)
Int'l military/ confict	8 (5.2%)
Other	36 (23.4%)
TOTAL	154 (100%)

Figure 1. Newsweek Covers Japan: Volume of Reporting, Year by Year



Figure 2. Newsweek Covers Japan:
Long Stories as Index of Informational Depth



% = 25.0 45.8 11.8 20.0 62.1 66.7

Note: Stories could be coded as long, medium or short.

Figure 3. Newsweek Covers Japan:

Direction of Coverage



Figure 4. Newsweek Covers Japan:

Stories with U.S. Focus



Note: Japan is "main country" by definition; "second country mentioned" could also be coded.

Figure 5. Newsweek Covers Japan:
Gender of Main Actors



Note: 141 stories are tabulated above; 149 stories had no gender-specific actor.

V. CONCLUSIONS

When Lippman (1922, p.364) wrote of the "beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of the darkness and into vision," he could have said "country" instead of "episode." In Japan's case, the beam shone most brightly for five years, 1988-93, and then moved on. The beam can illuminate with a golden glow ("praising," as in the 1960s) or glare harshly ("bashing," as in the early 1980s). But the searchlight's abrupt departure ("passing," as in 1994) has the most serious implications.

Will a new decade of inattention follow? As Harootunian (1998, p. 88) states, the Japanese "are almost invisible. . . Given the economic power, you would expect them to play a much greater role politically in the world." This researcher for one plans to update this study every 10 years to further explore the changing perception of Japan.

The present study's analysis of all 290 pieces that Newsweek published about Japan during 30 years should be set in context. Before attributing the low number of stories in 1986 and 1987 to a slighting of Japan, we need to know that the Tokyo bureau also covers Korea; in 1986-88, bureau chief Bradley Martin spent at least 100 nights in Seoul covering Korea's process of democratization (personal communication, Bradley Martin, March 29, 1998).

Three interesting techniques appeared in Japan coverage. First, provocative questions in headlines seemed to imply an answer, but stories filled in somewhat different complexities; the subhead on the 1990 cover read, "A nation of crybabies?" while another asked, "Will kids in Toledo ever catch up with Tokyo?" (5/11/92). Second, loaded, well-worn symbols came into play quite often: kimonos, samurai swords, bombers sporting the rising sun.

As an example of both techniques, the well-worn phrase "end of the miracle?" was used as a head five times--the first time in 1973. The reader may tend to remove the question mark and gloat a bit, feeling superior, as Burress (1998) points out. Actually, the answer to the question is a qualified "no."

Third, Newsweek seemed almost to anticipate the Burress (1998) plea for media to tell the other side. Specifically, four Newsweek stories tried to shed light on how the Japanese view situations differently from Americans, including the cover story "What Japan thinks of us" (April 2, 1990).

But are these efforts enough? Readers do not uniformly endorse the Japan coverage they are getting. In a 1991 survey, only 61.9% of respondents called it fair; by contrast, about 75% found coverage of Great Britain to be fair (Flournoy et al 1992). While not directed specifically at Newsweek, these criticisms and the flat circulations of all news weeklies should give editors pause.

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APPENDIX



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
AMERICA'S OUTBACK
Hard Times on the High Plains
Newsweek
October 9, 1989 : $2.00
Japan Invades Hollywood
Sony's $3.4 Billion Deal for Columbia
Five Ways to Meet the Challenge on Trade, Takeovers and Technology

October 9,1989

~~April 12, 1990~~



November 25, 1991

CLINTON: THE ROAD TO INDECISION
Newsweek
RELUCTANT PRINCESS
THE WOOING OF JAPAN'S ROYAL BRIDE

May 24, 1993

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